Estimating the household benefits of undergrounding electricity distribution networks by McNair, Benjamin John
  
 
 
Estimating the household benefits of undergrounding 
electricity distribution networks 
 
Benjamin John McNair 
 
May 2011 
(Submitted for examination in December 2010) 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The 
Australian National University. 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in any form 
for another degree or diploma at any university or other institute of tertiary 
education. To my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or 
written by another person, except where duly acknowledged in the text. 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Benjamin John McNair 
Date  20/05/2011
 iii 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I thank my supervisory panel: Rebecca Letcher, Jeff Bennett, and 
David Hensher. I am indebted to Rebecca for her encouragement and support 
when they were needed during the early part of my candidature; to Jeff, for his 
considered advice and for helping me to become part of the research community 
at the Crawford School; and, to David, for his valuable advice on choice 
modelling and for communicating so readily despite the distance barrier. I thank 
David Graham of ActewAGL Distribution for supporting the use of this research 
as a tool for policy and for allowing me flexibility in my role at ActewAGL over 
the course of my candidature. I am thankful to Peter Abelson for encouragement 
and advice regarding hedonic price estimation and cost-benefit analysis; and also, 
to my fellow PhD students at The Australian National University (ANU), 
particularly Gabriela Scheufele for her friendship and many hours of discussion 
about stated choice research design and estimation.  
My thanks go to John Rose of the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies 
(ITLS) for helpful advice on experimental design. My research was aided by 
excellent survey programming work by Andrew Collins and Yang Lan (also of 
ITLS), and by the high-quality survey pre-testing and implementation service 
provided by Kim Sullivan, Daniel Prior, and Rodney Latimer of ORIMA 
Research. I thank the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society for 
encouraging me with a prize for best first-time presenter at their annual 
conference in 2010. I appreciate advice from Judy Bell and Wendy Noble at ANU 
on academic writing. Ross Williams and several anonymous referees provided 
useful comments on some of the material used in this thesis and two anonymous 
examiners provided valuable comments on the thesis as a whole. I acknowledge 
 iv 
research funding from ActewAGL Distribution and ARC Industry Linkage Grant 
LP0669754. The opinions expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do 
not necessarily represent those of ActewAGL Distribution. 
Finally, I am forever grateful to my parents, John and Susan McNair, for their 
love and for the years spent teaching me from home. Most of all, I thank my wife, 
Anna, for her unerring love and support through the highs and the lows of the PhD 
journey; and, my precious little ones, Caitlin and Jack, for bringing me more than 
enough joy to counter the productivity lost due to sleepless nights! 
 v 
Abstract 
Underground low-voltage electricity networks have several advantages over 
overhead networks including reliability of supply, safety and improved visual 
amenity. The economic viability of replacing existing overhead networks with 
new underground networks depends on the value of these benefits to households, 
but no complete value estimates are available. In this thesis, the focus is on benefit 
valuation, with two methods used to gather information regarding the benefits of 
undergrounding in a case study area – the hedonic price method, in which 
household preferences are revealed through purchases in the real estate market; 
and, the stated choice method, in which preferences are elicited using a survey. 
The empirical data were collected in Canberra, Australia. 
Evidence from the stated choice survey suggests the value of benefits to 
households would be at least A$6,838 per household on average, with a 95 per 
cent confidence interval of A$5,444 to A$8,253. The demand function underlying 
this estimate is broadly consistent with evidence from the hedonic price study, 
which measures the benefits to a marginal purchaser in the real estate market. 
Some 31 per cent of households in the study areas chose to pay an estimated price 
premium of 2.9 per cent (between 0.4 and 5.3 per cent with 95 per cent 
confidence) to purchase a property serviced by underground networks (holding 
constant other property characteristics).  
In addition to estimating values for policy use, the thesis focuses on one challenge 
associated with applying each method. The hedonic price method can be difficult 
to apply in cities where retrofit undergrounding has yet to take place, since the 
type of network infrastructure tends to be highly correlated with other property 
characteristics, such as building age and distance to the central business district. In 
 vi 
this thesis, it is shown that this problem can be overcome by analysing data from 
areas with a mix of underground and overhead infrastructure where properties are 
otherwise relatively homogeneous. 
Turning to the stated choice method, this thesis supports a growing body of 
literature finding violations of the assumptions typically made when analysing 
responses to a sequence of choice tasks; in particular, the assumptions of truthful, 
independent response and stable preferences. Preferences stated in the first of a 
sequence of binary choice tasks were not significantly different from those stated 
in an incentive compatible single binary choice task, but, in subsequent choice 
tasks, willingness to pay for undergrounding was lower and responses were 
influenced by cost levels observed in past questions.  
An understanding of the decision processes (or heuristics) underlying this 
influence is required to ensure value estimates are not biased. The response 
patterns identified by novel econometric analysis in this thesis are consistent with 
certain types of heuristics involving strategic misrepresentation and/or value 
learning. The results suggest practitioners should test whether the standard 
assumptions are violated, and, if they are, account for the violations either by 
econometric techniques, such as the models presented in this thesis, or by simple 
sample selection approaches, such as focusing on responses to the first question 
presented to each respondent.   
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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Undergrounding electricity and telecommunications 
wires 
In recent decades, it has become standard practice in Western nations for low-
voltage electricity distribution and telecommunications networks to be installed 
underground in new housing developments. Prior to that, these networks were 
typically installed as overhead wires on poles in lower-density residential areas. 
As a result, many suburban areas in cities around the world are still serviced by 
overhead networks. A number of cities have implemented or are considering 
programs to replace these overhead networks with new underground 
infrastructure.  
This network conversion process, which is referred to as undergrounding, 
involves several steps. Typically, the first step is to install new electricity and 
telecommunications wires under the verge in each street using either open 
trenching or underground horizontal drilling.
1
 A similar process is then used to 
install new wires from connection pillars (typically positioned near the front 
corner of every second property) to the meter box at each house. The new 
underground wires are then connected to the existing meter box and 
telecommunications connection box within each residence and disturbed work 
areas are re-instated and repaired. After supply is changed over from the overhead 
to the underground network, existing poles and overhead wires are removed. 
                                                 
1
 The use of underground drilling is more expensive than open trenching, but it limits the areas 
disturbed and reduces the impact on local residents during underground installation works. 
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Undergrounding is taking place through systematic, ongoing programs in a 
number of locations in the United States of America, including in several 
Californian cities and in a few cities in Florida, Maryland and Virginia. The New 
Zealand cities of Auckland and Wellington have also implemented 
undergrounding programs. In the United Kingdom, programs are focused on 
undergrounding network infrastructure in national parks and areas of outstanding 
natural beauty. 
In Australia, only the cities of Perth and Darwin have implemented formal 
undergrounding programs, but interest in more widespread undergrounding has 
been renewed by the recent commencement of the roll-out of the National 
Broadband Network (NBN) (Bester, 2010; Economic Regulation Authority, 2010; 
Energy Networks Association Limited, 2010). Most of the households to be 
connected as part of the first phase of the NBN roll-out in the State of Tasmania 
are to be serviced by overhead cables installed on existing poles. As the roll-out 
proceeds, consideration needs to be given to whether a better long-term outcome 
could be achieved by installing NBN cables underground and relocating low-
voltage electricity networks at the same time. 
1.2 The net economic benefits of undergrounding 
Undergrounding is an expensive exercise, with major civil works required to 
install the new wires and remove the existing infrastructure. This expense must be 
justified by the mixed bundle of benefits conferred by undergrounding, which 
includes reduced ongoing network maintenance costs, improved aesthetics, better 
safety during storms and fires, and improved supply reliability. It is important that 
policymakers evaluate economic viability before proceeding with an 
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undergrounding program. That is, it is important they consider whether the 
benefits of undergrounding would exceed the costs, or, equivalently, whether the 
net benefits of undergrounding would be positive. 
1.2.1 The costs of undergrounding 
The primary cost of undergrounding is the initial capital cost. This includes the 
cost of new assets, such as wires and substations, and the cost of the civil works, 
including trenching and/or drilling, installing new wires, reconnection work 
within each residence, and removal of existing overhead infrastructure. This cost 
varies by location depending on several factors, including the soil conditions and 
whether existing telecommunications wires are reticulated on poles. In Perth, soils 
are typically sandy, existing telecommunications wires are already underground, 
and civil works contractors can be offered certainty of work as part of Western 
Australia‘s ongoing underground power program. The capital cost of 
undergrounding in Perth is approximately A$10,000 per property (Office of 
Energy, 2008). In other areas, where conditions are less favourable, the capital 
costs can be much higher. For example, in South Australia, these costs exceed 
A$20,000 per property (ETSA Utilities, 2009). In a few small undergrounding 
projects in Florida, capital costs have ranged from US$489 to US$4,609 per 
customer (Infrasource Technology, 2007b). These costs are lower than those 
experienced in Australia, due, at least in part, to the fact that some of the project 
areas are dominated by multi-dwelling units.  
1.2.2 The benefits of undergrounding 
Undergrounding confers a mixed bundle of benefits on network service providers, 
households and the wider community. Network service providers benefit from 
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lower ongoing maintenance costs. In particular, the costs of periodic pole 
inspections, reinstatements, and replacements are avoided once undergrounding 
has taken place. Undergrounding also leads to some energy savings due to the 
lower energy losses from the heavier cables that can be used in the lower-
temperature underground environment. 
Households situated in areas where undergrounding takes place benefit in several 
ways. First, the appearance of residential areas is improved by the removal of 
visible poles and wires. Trees are allowed to grow to a more natural shape and, in 
some instances, views from residential properties may become less polluted. In 
some areas, households are responsible for keeping trees clear of power lines on 
their property. When wires are placed underground, households save on fees paid 
to tree surgeons and time and safety costs associated with undertaking trimming 
themselves. Where vegetation management is a responsibility of local 
government, these benefits flow to the government (and the community it 
represents). 
Underground networks are less exposed to risks of damage from fires, strong 
winds, storms and other severe weather events. This leads to safety benefits from 
reduced risks of electrocution from fallen wires and supply reliability benefits 
from reduced frequency of electricity and telecommunications outages.  
Households in areas with overhead wires are typically connected to the network 
by an overhead service line from a nearby pole. As a result, some restrictions are 
imposed on the use of yard space beneath these service lines. In some instances, 
the positioning of service lines prevents the installation of swimming pools or 
garden sheds. Undergrounding leads to the removal of these restrictions.  
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Where overhead networks are reticulated along the street verge, there are benefits 
from reduced incidence and severity of motor vehicle accidents. If, on the other 
hand, overhead networks are reticulated along the back spine of properties, 
undergrounding removes the need for network operators to access residential 
properties to conduct inspections or maintenance on the network. This access can 
be inconvenient for households; for example, where arrangements need to be 
made with regard to pets kept in back yards. 
1.3 Valuing the benefits of undergrounding 
The benefits described above are not as easily quantified as the capital costs of 
undergrounding. The savings to electricity and telecommunications businesses in 
terms of lower energy purchases and network maintenance costs can readily be 
estimated, but these benefits are usually only a small percentage of the cost of 
undergrounding. The expense of undergrounding must be justified primarily by 
the benefits to households. The estimated value of household benefits is therefore 
a key component in the economic evaluation of undergrounding programs. 
Here lies a major problem. There appears to be no complete estimate of the 
benefits to households available in the literature. Supply reliability improvements 
have been valued using contingent valuation (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2007; 
Layton and Moeltner, 2005) and choice experiments (Accent, 2008; Beenstock et 
al., 1998; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008a), but it seems no studies have 
attempted to value the overall household benefit from undergrounding, including 
amenity and safety benefits. Several studies have examined household disutility 
from proximity to high-voltage transmission infrastructure (Colwell, 1990; Des 
Rosiers, 2002; Gregory and von Winterfeldt, 1996; Hamilton and Schwann, 1995; 
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Ignelzi and Priestley, 1991; Kinnard and Dickey, 1995; Sims and Dent, 2005), but 
this type of infrastructure affects households quite differently from low-voltage 
distribution infrastructure. The infrastructure is larger and, in contrast to low-
voltage network infrastructure, is rarely situated on residential property in urban 
areas. Perhaps the most significant difference is the perceived health risks 
associated with electromagnetic fields generated by high-voltage wires. 
As a result of the absence of complete benefit estimates, the 1998 Australian 
Government investigation into the costs and benefits of undergrounding 
distribution networks (Commonwealth Department of Communications 
Information Technology and the Arts, 1998) and the subsequent investigation by 
the New South Wales economic regulator (Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal, 2002) categorised most household benefits as unquantifiable. This led to 
the conclusion in both reports that widespread undergrounding is not justified on 
the basis of quantifiable costs and benefits. A similar situation has occurred in 
studies conducted in the United States (InfraSource Technology, 2007a).  
The absence of household benefit estimates in the literature is not for want of 
available techniques. Indeed, environmental economists have been estimating 
household values for the removal of urban disamenities for many years. Most 
studies have employed either the hedonic property price approach or stated 
preference techniques.  
The hedonic price method uses data from the real estate market to gather 
information on households‘ preferences for underground networks as revealed 
through their purchase decisions. Its purpose is to isolate the contribution of 
specific property attributes to the overall sale price of a property. These 
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contributions are termed implicit prices. The method has been used to estimate 
implicit prices for real estate and associated environmental attributes such as 
energy efficiency (Dinan and Miranowski, 1989), noise (Nelson, 1982), air quality 
(Brookshire et al., 1982; Freeman, 1979), quality of schools (Black, 1999), 
agricultural sedimentation (Bejranonda et al., 1999) and proximity to urban 
wetlands (Mahan et al., 2000) and landfill (Hite et al., 2001).  
In contrast, stated preference methods attempt to elicit households‘ preferences by 
asking questions in a survey context. This approach has become increasingly 
popular over recent decades due to its ability to elicit preferences with respect to 
goods that are not observable in an actual market. In particular, the stated choice 
approach, in which survey respondents are asked to indicate their preference 
between designed scenarios, has become a common technique for valuing 
environmental benefits.  
The literature makes a distinction between two types of stated choice survey. The 
earliest environmental valuation studies employed the contingent valuation 
technique (Carson and Mitchell, 1989), in which respondents are presented with a 
choice between the status quo and a single policy scenario at specified cost. Over 
the past decade, this technique has come to be complemented by a broader class of 
stated choice survey, termed the choice experiment or choice modelling (Bennett 
and Blamey, 2001), which was originally developed in the transport economics 
(Hensher and Truong, 1985) and marketing (Hensher and Louviere, 1983) 
disciplines. Choice experiments typically involve presenting multiple choice 
tasks, where each task offers multiple policy scenarios described by a set of 
relevant attributes.  
 8 
In principle, both the hedonic property price approach and stated choice methods 
could be used to quantify the benefits households would derive from 
undergrounding. However, there are many challenges associated with applying 
these methods. The hedonic price approach can be difficult to apply when 
property characteristics are highly correlated. This multicollinearity problem is 
common when estimating the implicit price of underground networks in cities 
where retro-fit undergrounding is yet to take place. As a result, it can be difficult 
to disentangle the price effect of underground wires from the effects of other 
property characteristics, such as building age and proximity to the central business 
district. Even when this implicit price can be estimated, available data are rarely 
sufficient to identify the demand function required to estimate the benefits of 
undergrounding across all households.  
One of the challenges associated with stated choice methods is that of 
understanding the implications of task dependence in the choice data. Task 
dependence refers to the situation in which responses are influenced by 
information observed in the course of completing the choice tasks. Several studies 
have found task dependence in choice data by identifying violations of one or both 
of the standard assumptions of truthful response and stable preferences (for 
example, Ariely et al., 2003; Bateman et al., 2008b; Boyle et al., 1985; Cameron 
and Quiggin, 1994; Carson et al., 2009; Day et al., 2009; Day and Pinto, 2010; 
DeShazo, 2002; Hanemann et al., 1991; Hensher and Collins, 2010; Herriges and 
Shogren, 1996; Holmes and Boyle, 2005; Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008; McFadden 
and Leonard, 1995; Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). Some of these studies have 
speculated as to the respondent decision processes (or heuristics) that lead to task 
dependence, such as strategic misrepresentation (Carson and Groves, 2007), and 
 9 
value learning (Plott, 1996). Only a few have investigated which of the various 
heuristics raised in the literature best explains the response patterns in a given data 
source (Bateman et al., 2008b; Day and Pinto, 2010; DeShazo, 2002). It seems 
that none has investigated the possibility of heterogeneity in response behaviour 
over the population; that is, the possibility that each of the heuristics explains the 
response behaviour of a sub-group of the population. 
1.4 Research objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to make a contribution towards addressing the 
research gaps identified in the preceding discussion. In particular, the intention is 
to: 
1) estimate the value of benefits to households from undergrounding low-
voltage electricity and telecommunications networks in a specific case 
study area; 
2) investigate whether the hedonic price approach can be adapted to 
overcome the multicollinearity problems generally present in cities where 
retro-fit undergrounding is yet to take place; and 
3) develop the understanding of the respondent decision processes that lead 
to task dependence in stated choice data by: 
a) investigating whether elicitation format, in terms of the number of 
choice tasks per respondent and the number of alternatives per 
choice task, influences the extent to which respondents employ 
heuristics that lead to task dependence; and 
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b) investigating whether sub-groups of the population respond in 
accordance with different heuristics. 
1.5 Research approach 
These objectives were addressed by the collection and analysis of data from two 
sources – real estate sales data, and stated choice survey data. Both data sources 
were collected in the city of Canberra, Australia. Electricity networks in Canberra 
have been installed underground in new housing developments since the late 
1980s, but approximately 70 per cent of Canberra households (about 100,000 
households) are situated in older suburbs serviced by overhead networks.  
The real estate sales data are used to estimate the implicit price of underground 
wires (as opposed to overhead wires) in Canberra, holding constant other property 
characteristics. Since very little retro-fit undergrounding has taken place in 
Canberra, the data are also used to investigate whether a selective sampling 
approach can be used to overcome the problems caused by multicollinearity in the 
explanatory variables in the price function. The selective sampling approach to be 
investigated is similar to the boundary discontinuity approach used to value 
school quality (Black, 1999; Davidoff and Leigh, 2008; Gibbons and Machin, 
2003). It can be applied where property attributes change continuously over space, 
but the attribute of interest changes discretely at a boundary. In this case, it 
involves comparison of the prices of properties that are broadly similar to each 
other, but on opposite sides of boundaries between adjacent areas serviced by 
underground and overhead wires. As will become clear, the implicit price 
estimated using this approach provides limited information about the benefits to 
households from undergrounding. It represents the value placed on underground 
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wires by the marginal purchaser of that attribute in the real estate market. The 
correct measure of benefits is the average (or total) value placed on underground 
wires across all households. In principle, this can be estimated directly using the 
second data source – the stated choice survey data. 
The stated choice data analysed herein were collected using an internet survey of 
households serviced by overhead wires in Canberra. They are used to develop an 
understanding of the respondent decision processes underlying any task 
dependence. This understanding informs the approach used to estimate the 
benefits to households from undergrounding existing overhead networks in 
Canberra.  
A split-sample treatment of elicitation format was employed in the survey to 
facilitate examination of the influence of elicitation format on the extent to which 
respondents employ heuristics that lead to task dependence. Three formats were 
used in the survey – a single binary choice between the status quo (the current 
overhead network service) and an undergrounding option, an expanded elicitation 
format comprising a sequence of four binary choice tasks, and a further expanded 
elicitation format comprising a sequence of four multinomial choice tasks each 
comprising the status quo and two undergrounding options.  
Three studies are used to develop the understanding of the decision processes that 
lead to task dependence. In the first, estimates of household benefits derived from 
the single binary choice data are compared to those from the repeated binary 
choice data to examine whether the theoretical property of incentive compatibility 
is important in practice. A second study examines the effect on responses to the 
repeated binary choice survey of the cost of undergrounding options observed by 
respondents in earlier choice tasks. The nature of this effect provides some insight 
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into the decision processes underlying the survey responses. The third study 
develops a novel approach to estimating, up to a probability, the proportion of 
respondents behaving in accordance with each of the broad types of decision 
process in both the repeated binary and multinomial choice formats.  
In some cases, it is possible to pool data collected using revealed and stated 
preference methods (Louviere et al., 2000); however, this is not true of the case 
studies presented in this thesis. Both methods are studied here because either may 
be preferred by policy makers depending on the time and financial resources 
available when considering the merits of undergrounding in a given area. 
Although the hedonic price is not a measure of average value across households, it 
can be checked for consistency with the demand function that is estimated in the 
stated choice study to derive the average value. Obtaining consistent results across 
the two methods would add robustness and defensibility to the benefit estimate 
from the stated choice study. 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as shown in Figure 1.1. There are three parts to the thesis 
other than the introductory and concluding chapters. The first part outlines the 
motivation for the research and develops a theoretical framework (Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 4). The second part details the research design and the collection of data 
in accordance with that design (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). The third part sets out 
the results of the analysis of the data (Chapter 7 to Chapter 11). 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 describes the natural monopoly characteristics of the electricity network 
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economic benefit.  
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result from undergrounding – the hedonic price method and stated preference 
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Chapter 4 explores a challenge associated with applying each method. It describes 
the difficulties associated with applying the hedonic price method when property 
characteristics are highly correlated. It also discusses the implications of, and 
potential explanations for, task dependence in stated choice data. 
In Chapter 5, research questions formed on the basis of the challenges explored in 
Chapter 4 are presented. A research design developed to address the questions in a 
case study is described and the hypotheses to be tested are specified. 
Chapter 6 details the collection of data in the case study area (Canberra, Australia) 
based on the approaches developed in Chapter 5. Two data sources were collected 
– real estate sales data and responses to an internet stated choice survey. 
Chapter 7 sets out an analysis of the real estate sales data using the hedonic price 
method. The implicit price of underground wires in Canberra is estimated and the 
ability of the sample selection approach to overcome the problems caused by 
multicollinearity is tested.
2
  
Chapter 8 sets out a comparison of responses to two of the elicitation formats 
employed in the stated choice survey – the single binary choice format, and the 
repeated binary choice format – with a view to understanding the importance of 
the theoretical property of incentive compatibility in practice.  
Chapter 9 uses data from the repeated binary choice survey to examine the 
influence on responses of the cost of undergrounding options observed by 
                                                 
2
 The findings of Chapter 7 were reported in an article published in The Australian Economic 
Review (McNair and Abelson, 2010). This author conducted all analysis and took the primary role 
in writing the article, with Peter Abelson providing helpful discussion at the research design stage 
and contributions during the writing of the article. 
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respondents in earlier choice tasks. The identified relationship provides insight 
into the decision processes underlying the survey responses.
3
  
Chapter 10 demonstrates a novel approach to estimating, up to a probability, the 
proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with each of the broad types of 
decision process raised in the literature. The model is applied to data from the 
repeated binary and multinomial choice formats.
4
 
In Chapter 11, the results of the preceding chapters are used to inform the 
specification of a model to estimate the benefits to households from 
undergrounding in Canberra. The value placed on undergrounding is related to the 
socio-economic characteristics of respondents and to the specific benefits from 
undergrounding viewed as most significant by respondents to provide an 
indication of the areas where undergrounding would yield the greatest benefits.
5
 
                                                 
3
 The findings of Chapters 8 and 9 were reported in an article published in Resource and Energy 
Economics (McNair et al., 2011a). This author conducted all analysis and took the primary role in 
writing the article, with Jeff Bennett and David Hensher providing input at the research design 
stage and contributions during the writing of the article. 
4
 The findings of Chapter 10 were reported in an article that has been revised for resubmission to 
Environmental and Resource Economics (McNair et al., 2011c). This author conducted all analysis 
and took the primary role in writing the article, with David Hensher providing input at the 
modelling stage and Jeff Bennett and David Hensher providing contributions during the writing of 
the article. 
5
 The findings of Chapter 11 were reported in an article published in Energy Policy (McNair et al., 
2011b). This author conducted all analysis and took the primary role in writing the article, with 
Jeff Bennett, David Hensher, and John Rose providing input at the research design stage and 
contributions during the writing of the article. 
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Finally, Chapter 12 draws conclusions and identifies areas for future research. 
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2 Theory of optimal network service provision 
2.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, a broad research question was established with respect 
to the net economic benefits of undergrounding low-voltage electricity and 
telecommunications networks. The purpose of this chapter is to formalise a 
framework for defining the situation where net economic benefits are maximised 
(the social optimum) and to highlight the role that household benefit estimates 
play in working towards that optimum. Although this chapter does not deal with 
the primary focus of the thesis, which is the estimation of benefits, it nevertheless 
plays a vital role in the thesis by setting out the motivation for the estimation of 
benefits. In subsequent chapters, the focus shifts to the methods typically used to 
inform estimates of household benefits. Chapters 3 and 4 examine certain 
challenges associated with these methods. The remainder of the thesis uses a case 
study to address research questions related to these challenges and to provide 
benefit estimates for undergrounding where little or no information was 
previously available. 
In Section 2.2, the natural monopoly characteristics of network infrastructure 
service provision are discussed and, in Section 2.3, the governance structures 
typically associated with natural monopoly markets are introduced. After a formal 
economic model is set out in Section 2.4, the implications for net economic 
benefits are examined under three types of governance structure; namely the 
unregulated private monopolist (Section 2.5), the public monopolist (Section 2.6), 
and the regulated private monopolist (Section 2.7). In particular, the focus is on 
the marginal effect of service quality on social welfare, recognising that 
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undergrounding is a project that enhances the quality of network services. The 
mechanisms used to achieve net economic benefits under the latter two 
governance structures are discussed: namely, cost-benefit analysis by the public 
service provider and quality-adjusted price cap regulation of the private service 
provider. The important role of household benefit estimates in implementing each 
mechanism is highlighted.  
2.2 Electricity networks and natural monopoly 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Before developing an economic model for characterising the amount of 
undergrounding that would maximise net economic benefits, it is necessary to 
establish the nature of the market in which electricity network services are 
provided and consumed. In particular, it is important to recognise that electricity 
network services are provided in a natural monopoly setting.  
2.2.2 Electricity networks 
Four distinct stages are involved in the provision of electricity to consumers. First, 
the electricity is generated. Second, it is transported along high-voltage 
transmission (generally inter-city) networks to substations. Third, it is transported 
along lower-voltage distribution (generally intra-city) networks to consumers. 
Fourth, and finally, retail services, such as billing and customer support are 
provided. Many governments around the world have vertically disintegrated 
electricity businesses into separate entities dedicated to each of these stages in 
order to facilitate competition in the generation and retail sectors. The focus of 
this research is on the third stage: distribution networks. Distribution network 
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businesses (or network service providers) operate and maintain the lower-voltage, 
intra-city networks that transport electricity from substations to consumers. These 
businesses do not supply electricity per se, but rather they provide a transportation 
service that enables retailers to purchase electricity from generators and sell it on 
to consumers.  
The quality of this service varies on several dimensions. For example, faults in 
network equipment can cause the supply of electricity to be interrupted or the 
voltage of electricity supplied to fluctuate. Of particular interest in this research is 
a dimension that is often overlooked in discussions relating to network service 
quality – the impact on consumers of the network infrastructure itself. Overhead 
networks, in particular, may affect consumers by: 
1) polluting the aesthetics on and around consumers‘ properties; 
2) imposing a risk of electrocution (particularly when infrastructure is 
damaged by strong winds or storms); 
3) requiring trees to be trimmed away from wires;  
4) reducing the amount of yard space available for certain developments (for 
example, swimming pools or garages); and 
5) increasing the risk and severity of car accidents. 
It is important to recognise that undergrounding is a project that enhances the 
quality of network services, where quality is broadly defined to include the 
dimensions outlined above. It is not the process of undergrounding that benefits 
consumers, but the improvement in network quality that results from that 
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process.
6
 In general, there are other means by which improvements in quality can 
be achieved, though undergrounding may be the only project that achieves 
significant improvements in particular aspects of quality, such as the impact of the 
network on neighbourhood aesthetics. The focus in the remainder of this chapter 
is therefore broadened to one of network service quality. Economic models are 
used to define the optimal level of network service quality. The optimal amount of 
undergrounding will be the amount present in the set of projects that achieves that 
level of quality at lowest cost. 
2.2.3 Natural monopoly 
The large, fixed costs associated with constructing an electricity distribution 
network mean that it is less costly for one provider to supply the service for a 
given urban area than for multiple providers to do so. The single provider in this 
setting is referred to as a natural monopolist. In general, a natural monopoly exists 
where costs exhibit sub-additivity over the relevant range of demand in a market. 
Costs are sub-additive at a given level of one or more outputs if those outputs can 
be supplied by a single firm at lower cost than can be supplied by multiple firms. 
Formally, a cost function, c, is sub-additive at output level Σxi if c(Σxi) < Σc(xi) 
(Ajodhia, 2006).  
                                                 
6
 In fact, the process of undergrounding may impose some inconvenience cost on households while 
the capital works take place. 
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Sub-additivity typically arises from economies of scale and/or economies of 
scope.
7
 The latter applies only when multiple goods (and/or services) are being 
produced, so the focus here is on the former. Economies of scale exist where 
average total costs are decreasing over output. Sub-additivity of costs, and hence 
natural monopoly, exists if economies of scale apply over a sufficient range of 
output relative to demand. To illustrate what is meant by ―sufficient range‖, 
consider the market described by Figure 2.1, where X is the demand for 
connection to the network, and q is the quality of the network service (Xq > 0). 
The market is a natural monopoly since the total cost of a single provider 
supplying X1 is less than the total cost of two firms supplying any pairing of 
amounts that sum to X1 (Train, 1991). For example, the figure shows that if the 
market is split equally between two firms, then the average cost of producing X1 is 
AC2 > AC1. Natural monopoly exists even though economies of scale do not apply 
over the full range of output, X1. 
Electricity networks, and other utility services, are a classic example of natural 
monopoly markets. The initial infrastructure investment, which does not vary with 
output, is considerable relative to variable costs. Duplicating the network would 
clearly add to total costs. The physical infrastructure is durable and specific to the 
market. Substitute services, such as private petrol-fuelled generation, are 
relatively costly. The implications of these market characteristics are considered 
in detail in the remainder of this chapter.  
                                                 
7
 Another driver, which is of less relevance here, is economies of density. Developed in the context 
of airline competition, it is a short-run construct that holds the network fixed but recognises the 
nature of usage (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994). 
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Figure 2.1: Natural monopoly 
 
2.3 Governance structures 
Natural monopoly markets are almost universally subject to some form of 
government intervention. However, the nature of that intervention varies over 
nations and has varied over time. The mechanisms used to achieve optimal quality 
outcomes depend on the governance structure that is in place. In this section, the 
governance structures of interest are introduced. In subsequent sections, these 
structures and their related mechanisms are discussed in detail.  
The economic theory of governance structures for natural monopolies has 
changed considerably over time. Prior to the 1960s, the ―market failure‖ literature 
characterised governments as omniscient, benevolent institutions whose role was 
to intervene in ―failed‖ markets, of which a natural monopoly market is an 
example. In the 1960s, it was recognised that governments, like all organisations, 
are flawed. The focus shifted to the economics of property rights, epitomised by 
Coase‘s (1959) argument that once property rights in resources have been created, 
markets allocate resources to their highest value uses and the only role for 
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government is to maintain a legal system that defines property rights and 
arbitrates disputes. In the 1970s, it was recognised that defining and enforcing 
property rights is costly, particularly for certain transactions. In recent decades, 
there has been growing acceptance of the ―transaction cost‖ economics literature 
(Williamson, 1979), reflected in the awarding of the Nobel Prize to its creator, 
Oliver Williamson, in 2009. This literature argues that there is a role for a range of 
governance structures depending on the extent of contractual hazards involved in 
a given type of transaction.  
The choice of governance structure is characterised in Figure 2.2, which is based 
on similar diagrams presented in Williamson (2000) and Crocker and Masten 
(1996). In ―unassisted market‖ transactions (Node A in Figure 2.2), parties are 
free to bargain as they please and there are few ongoing obligations once a 
transaction has taken place. However, establishing an electricity network requires 
large, durable investments in infrastructure that is specific to the market. Because 
this infrastructure has a relatively low value in its next best use, the parties (the 
network service provider and consumers represented by the government) are 
essentially locked into a bilateral trading relationship. Difficulties associated with 
switching to substitute goods or redeploying assets mean there are substantial 
transactional surpluses on offer. Transaction costs are likely to be lower where 
contracts are employed as a means of avoiding ongoing haggling and 
opportunistic behaviour with respect to the division of those surpluses. This 
theory offers an alternative explanation and justification for government 
intervention in electricity network services: that governance structures other than 
the unassisted market evolved because they resulted in lower transaction costs.  
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Figure 2.2: Governance structures 
 
An example of a long-term contract is monopoly franchise bidding (Demsetz, 
1968), which achieves competition for the market even though competition in the 
market is not possible (Node B). Complete contracts are not possible due to costs 
of composition and enforcement and the inability to precisely define obligations 
under unforeseen changes in circumstances. The more severe the conditions 
leading to contract incompleteness, the more the parties will rely on relational 
aspects of the contract and/or reduce the duration of the contract to minimise 
transaction costs. An explanation for the absence of franchise bidding structures 
for electricity network services in practice is that uncertain cost and demand 
conditions mean that transaction costs are lower under regulation (Node C) based 
on short-term incomplete contracts. If uncertainties are sufficiently severe or if the 
good is sufficiently complex, then transaction costs may be lower still under 
―vertical integration‖; that is, where the government undertakes to provide the 
network service itself (Node D). This governance structure avoids the costs of 
haggling and opportunistic behaviour with respect to terms of trade and facilitates 
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beneficial sharing of information. However, these advantages come at the cost of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies (Crocker and Masten, 1996). Williamson (2000) 
argued that this structure should be seen as a last resort. Moving from left to right 
in Figure 2.2, costs of haggling and opportunistic behaviour are mitigated, but 
bureaucratic costs are increased. The most efficient structure for a given 
transaction exists where the total of these two types of cost is minimised. 
Historically, public provision has been the dominant governance structure in the 
electricity networks market, but in the past several decades there has been a 
worldwide trend towards the more decentralised governance structure of 
regulation via short-term, incomplete contracts. There is a spectrum of possible 
regulatory regimes with incentives becoming more high-powered as structures 
shift from Node D towards Node C. The focus of regulation was initially on 
addressing socially costly monopoly rents using structures with lower-powered 
incentives such as cost-of-service or rate-of-return regulation. Over time, 
regulation in some jurisdictions has incorporated higher-powered incentives to 
minimise costs (price cap regulation) and, more recently, incentives to achieve 
optimal quality (quality-adjusted price cap regulation).  
In the following section, a formal economic framework is developed to define 
conditions for optimal network service provision. In subsequent sections, three 
governance structures of interest are characterised using the formal model, with 
particular focus on the role of the social value of quality in each. The three 
structures to be examined are the unregulated private monopoly (Node A), price 
cap regulation of a private monopoly (Node C) and the fully-integrated public 
monopoly (Node D). An intermediate (between Nodes C and D) structure 
commonly observed in the utilities sector is the regulation of a government-owned 
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corporation by a government-appointed regulator. The profit-maximising 
objective of these corporations is often conflicted with other objectives that are 
imposed, either transparently or otherwise, by their major shareholder – the 
government. This complicates the translation of the corporation‘s behaviour to a 
formal model. Therefore, the analysis in the following sections focuses on the 
extreme cases – fully-integrated public provision and price cap regulation of a 
private firm – as a means of demonstrating the various mechanisms used to 
achieve optimal service quality and the role of the social value of quality in those 
mechanisms. 
2.4 A formal economic framework 
2.4.1 Introduction 
In this section, a formal economic framework is developed. The intention is not to 
develop a framework for comparing the merits of the various governance 
structures. Rather, it is to understand the mechanisms used to achieve improved 
quality outcomes under different structures, and the role of estimates of the social 
valuation of quality in those mechanisms. To achieve this objective, it is necessary 
to analyse the behaviour of market participants within a common framework. 
Although the behaviour of these participants is a complex phenomenon, the 
intention is to translate the primary elements of that behaviour to a mathematical 
framework. As argued by Simon (1957, p. 89), ―mathematical translation… 
permits clear and rigorous reasoning about phenomena too complex to be handled 
in words.‖ However, it is acknowledged that it is unwise to rely on the 
mathematical translation alone. Simon (1957, p. 90) also pointed out that the 
―poverty of mathematics is an honest poverty that does not parade imaginary 
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riches before the world‖. In recognition of this ―honest poverty‖, assumptions are 
emphasised and, as the chapter progresses, consideration is given to features that 
may have been omitted or obscured in the mathematical translation.  
Central to the approach is the notion of social welfare. Social welfare is a function 
of the welfare (or utility) of the individuals that comprise society. It is a measure 
by which outcomes can be compared, where a higher level of social welfare 
represents a more desirable outcome for society. The optimal amount of 
undergrounding is defined as the amount that maximises social welfare. In 
practice, the costs of gathering information may mean that it is not efficient to 
exactly achieve the optimum as it is characterised here, but it is useful as a 
concept because it defines the goal of policy. 
The framework is developed in two stages. First, a general equilibrium model 
adapted from models in Jones (2005) is presented to show how the condition for 
optimal network service provision is derived from the basic problem of 
consumers‘ constrained maximisation of utility. The assumptions required to 
simplify the condition to include only the primary costs and benefits are 
emphasised. In a second stage, these main costs and benefits are carried over to a 
partial equilibrium model adapted from Laffont and Tirole (1993) that introduces 
two additional features that it is not possible to include in the general equilibrium 
model: endogenous productivity and asymmetric information between agents. It is 
this partial equilibrium model that is used in subsequent sections to define the 
conditions for optimal service provision under the various governance structures 
of interest. Criticisms of the assumptions underlying the model are acknowledged 
following the analysis. 
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2.4.2 General equilibrium foundations of optimal provision 
Consider an economy comprising I consumers who derive utility, U, from 
electricity, X, network quality, Q, and a composite of all other goods, Y (which is 
numeraire).
8
 For simplicity, assume that network quality is a composite of the 
various dimensions of quality and that it cannot be differentiated between 
consumers. Each consumer is endowed with an equal share of a composite 
resource, which is allocated as an input, Nj, in production of good j (where j = X, 
Q or Y).
9
 The price of this composite resource is c. Each consumer receives an 
equal share of profits from private production. These simplifying assumptions of 
equal endowment and shareholding across consumers allow the model to focus on 
the efficiency of provision rather than on distributional effects, which can be 
isolated through pricing (or taxation) decisions. Consumers choose the allocation 
of their resources except with regard to production of network service quality, 
which is an exogenous policy variable.
10
 Production of network quality is funded 
by a fixed charge (A) and/or a consumption charge (a specific tax, t, on 
electricity). All markets other than that for Q are competitive, including the 
market for electricity.
11
  
                                                 
8
 U‘>0, U‖<0 and there is heterogeneity in preferences across consumers. 
9
 dj/dNj>0, d
2
j/dNj
2
<0 and productivity is held constant. 
10
 Q is non-rivalrous, so dQi/dX = 0, and the level of X has no bearing on the cost of providing Q 
(Q has zero marginal cost in X). 
11
 This is consistent with the institutional arrangements for electricity markets in many Western 
nations, where generation and retail markets are privatised and competitive, but the networks used 
to distribute the electricity are regulated natural monopolies.  
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The full expression for changes in social welfare in this economy (and the 
derivation thereof) is presented in Appendix A. Here, the focus is on a simplified 
expression comprising the primary social costs and benefits of network service 
provision. The primary benefit is value placed by consumers on the quality 
improvement and the primary cost is the resource cost of providing that 
improvement. Formally, changes in social welfare are defined as:  
Q
i i
i
i
Q
i
i
cdNdQ
UdW
 

 
where λi is the marginal utility of income for consumer i. 
The resulting condition for welfare maximising provision of network service 
quality is:
12
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This condition is equivalent to the classic Samuelson (1956) condition for optimal 
provision of a pure public good. It simply states that marginal quality 
improvements should be undertaken up to the point at which the additional benefit 
to consumers no longer exceeds the additional resource cost (as illustrated in 
Figure 2.3).  
                                                 
12
 It is assumed that a benevolent social planner chooses NQ and that Q is a known function of NQ. 
The Hatta Decomposition (Hatta, 1982) shows how, for individual consumers, dollars are a 
reliable proxy for utility, whenever policy changes are incrementally small. This decomposition 
finds that income effects are a scaling coefficient on the efficiency effects from marginal policy 
changes that play no role in single consumer economies. 
 31 
 $ 
Q 
U(Q)/λ 
c.NQ 
slope = UQ/λ 
slope = c.dNQ/dQ 
Q* 
 $ 
Q 
UQ/λ 
c.dNQ/dQ 
 
Q* 
  
Figure 2.3: The primary costs and benefits of service quality provision 
 
The detailed workings in Appendix A make explicit the two main assumptions 
that are required to obtain the simplified optimisation condition above. First, the 
social welfare function is assumed to be an unweighted sum of individual welfare. 
This allows the condition for optimal provision to exclude the welfare effects of 
changes in market prices by assuming that they simply transfer welfare from one 
consumer to another (sometimes referred to as the ―dollar is a dollar‖ assumption). 
In other words, distributional effects are ignored, so that the model focuses solely 
on efficiency considerations. Second, all electricity and network service provision 
costs are assumed to be recovered via fixed charges (―lump-sum transfers‖).13 
This assumption of a non-distorted electricity market allows effects of network 
quality changes on that related market to be ignored.   
2.4.3 A model of optimal provision with endogenous productivity 
and incomplete information 
Two substantial limitations of the general equilibrium framework in the natural 
monopoly setting are the assumptions of exogenous productivity and a benevolent 
                                                 
13
 It is assumed that these fixed charges would not exclude any consumers from the market. 
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social planner with full information. Rationales for the governance structures 
typically associated with monopoly provision have revolved around endogenous 
productivity and the incompleteness of information available to social planners. 
Having established the assumptions implicit in the social welfare function 
comprising the primary social costs and benefits, the general equilibrium 
framework is now abandoned in favour of a partial equilibrium framework that 
retains the primary costs and benefits, but relaxes the assumptions of exogenous 
productivity and a benevolent social planner with full information. Following 
Baron and Myerson‘s (1982) seminal article, this ―agency‖ framework came to 
dominate economic analysis of monopoly markets. However, as discussed later in 
the chapter, some authors have criticised its limited applicability in practice (for 
example, Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002) and its over-simplified assumptions 
regarding ex post governance (Williamson, 2000). Transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 2000) may represent a more realistic view of the world, however, it 
is less conducive to translation to a formal mathematical framework. Moreover, 
accommodating further complexity in the framework would not further the 
objective of this section (and subsequent sections), which is to understand the role 
of estimates of the social value of service quality in mechanisms used to achieve 
optimal quality under different governance structures. This chapter therefore 
proceeds with the agency framework and highlights the implications of alternative 
theories following the formal analysis. 
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993), the model presented here assumes three 
drivers of social welfare – the quality of the service provided, the resource cost of 
producing the service, and the magnitude of any profit earned by the service 
provider. Optimal provision of the network service is defined as the 
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simultaneously determined levels of quality, cost and profit that maximise social 
welfare subject to any constraints. 
Consider a provider of network services for a fixed number of consumers with 
fixed electricity consumption. Service quality, q, is variable and verifiable by all 
agents. Total cost, which was defined as cNQ in the general equilibrium model, is 
now: 
C = (β – e).q + α 
Fixed cost, α, is assumed to be known and normalised to zero for simplicity. 
Average cost is a function of the technology available to the firm, β, and the level 
of cost-reducing effort, e. Disutility of effort, Ψ(e), increases with effort (Ψ’(e)>0) 
at an increasing rate (Ψ”(e)>0) and is zero when effort is zero (Ψ(0)=0). Different 
assumptions about institutional arrangements will call for different revenue 
arrangements for the service provider. In general, the excess of revenue over total 
cost is referred to as a transfer, t. The service provider‘s utility is: 
 U = t – Ψ(e) 
It is assumed that leaving a rent (positive utility) to the service provider is socially 
costly. There are two reasons why rent extraction may be socially beneficial. First, 
where revenue is collected using distorting prices or funded by distorted taxes, it 
imposes a social cost by reducing market activity. Second, leaving a rent to the 
service provider is likely to be considered socially costly due to distributional 
concerns (if the provider is privately owned). Following Laffont and Tirole 
(1993), and based on the former reason, this model includes a shadow cost of 
public funds, δ, which is broadly interpreted as the social cost of leaving a rent to 
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the firm.
14
 The notation for the social value of quality, which was Σ[Ui(Q)/λi] in 
the general equilibrium model, is simplified to S(q), where S’(q)>0 and S”(q)<0. 
Social welfare is: 
 W  = S(q) – (1 + δ) (C + t) + U 
= S(q) – (1 + δ) [C + Ψ(e)] – λ.U 
This leads to three conditions for optimal network service provision: 
No rent is left to the service provider:  U = 0 
Total cost, C + Ψ(e), is minimised (for given q): Ψ’(e) = q 
Optimal provision of quality (for given e):  S’(q) = (1 + δ) (β – e)  
The third condition is equivalent to the condition derived from the general 
equilibrium model. It implies that marginal quality improvements should be 
undertaken until the social value of the improvement no longer exceeds the 
marginal cost (after accounting for the shadow cost of public funds).  
2.5 The unregulated private monopoly 
Having established formal conditions for socially optimal network service 
provision, it is now possible to examine social welfare outcomes under various 
governance structures. This section examines the situation in which network 
services are provided by a private monopolist in the absence of government 
intervention. This arrangement rarely occurs in practice for the reasons discussed 
in Section 2.3. The model confirms that this arrangement tends to result in sub-
                                                 
14
 Where transfers from the Government are ruled out, this cost of funds becomes the shadow cost 
of funds in the electricity market. 
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optimal social welfare outcomes; however, rather than appealing to transaction 
costs, the model points to the fact that a private firm‘s profit-maximising 
objectives do not align with the conditions for social welfare maximisation. An 
unregulated firm maximises its utility, U = t – Ψ(e). It does so by choosing 
network quality, q, cost-reducing effort, e, and, effectively, the transfer, t. 
Consider the case where revenue is generated by a charge, A, on each of N 
consumers, so that t = NA – C. Let us assume that the firm selects the level of the 
charge, but if the charge exceeds the average value placed on service quality by 
consumers, S(q)/N, then all N consumers exit the market (by substituting to the 
next best alternative source of electricity; for example, private petrol-fuelled 
generators).  
The utility function to be maximised is then equivalent to the social welfare 
function with no social cost of leaving a rent to the firm, δ = 0:  
U  = S(q) – (β – e) q – Ψ(e)  
= S(q) – [C + Ψ(e)] 
The firm chooses cost-reducing effort, e, service quality, q, and the charge, A, in 
accordance with the consumer rationality constraint and the first-order conditions 
for effort and quality:  
A = S(q)/N 
Ψ’(e) = q 
S’(q) = β – e  
Because the firm does not take into account the social cost of earning a rent, it 
extracts all consumer surplus from the market. If lump-sum transfers were 
possible and if distributional concerns were set aside, then this outcome would be 
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socially optimal. However, if leaving a rent to the firm is socially costly (δ > 0), 
then the first condition for optimal provision is not met since U > 0. 
This model assumes electricity consumption is fixed. The case in which quality 
affects consumption of electricity (or monopoly consumption goods generally) 
was examined in detail by Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976). They found that 
quality is unlikely to be set at the social optimum by an unregulated monopolist. 
Quality may be over- or under-provided depending on the relative quality 
valuations of the marginal and average consumers in the market. 
2.6 The integrated public monopoly 
The unregulated monopoly structure discussed above is rarely observed in 
practice. Governments the world over have intervened in monopoly markets for 
the reasons discussed in Section 2.3. This section examines a governance structure 
in which the government fully integrates network service provision within the 
public sector. In the context of the model, the main social benefit of the 
intervention is the elimination of the socially-costly rent earned by the unregulated 
private service provider. However, there are also social costs arising from the 
intervention. One such cost that can be incorporated in the model is the reduced 
incentive to expend cost-reducing effort under the government‘s ―soft‖ budget 
constraint. There are other reasons why the objectives of a government may not 
coincide with the social objective function. Indeed, there is a large literature on 
political economy examining such issues (for example, Persson and Tabellini, 
2000). The model presented here abstracts from these issues and focuses solely on 
the lack of cost-minimisation incentives. 
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Consider the case where the observed costs, C, are covered by government 
revenue, but the budget is balanced so there is no transfer, t = 0. Only the 
managers of the network observe the components of cost, namely technology, β, 
and cost-reducing effort, e. Governments generally do not link employee 
remuneration to performance with respect to innovation and cost minimisation. 
Managers on a fixed salary maximise their own utility, U = – Ψ(e), by expending 
no cost-reducing effort, e = 0. The model predicts that the managers have no 
preference regarding the level of service quality since they bear neither the costs 
nor the benefits of the decision. In practice, the government is likely to target a 
particular service standard. Suppose this target is set at q*, the socially optimal 
level conditional on the observed marginal cost, c = β, such that:  
S’(q*) = (1 + δ) c 
Only two of the three conditions for socially optimal service provision are met. 
The first condition is met since there is no socially costly rent, U = 0. The second 
condition is not met since cost-reducing effort is zero and hence total (observed 
plus unobserved) cost is not minimised. The third condition is met since the 
government has set quality at the optimal level, q*, conditional on the zero level 
of cost-reducing effort. However, q* is below the optimum determined 
simultaneously with optimal cost-reducing effort. If cost-reducing effort were 
expended, marginal cost would fall and a marginal increase in quality would 
become economically viable.  
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2.6.1 Cost-benefit analysis 
Under the public provision governance structure, the mechanism for achieving 
optimal quality is direct cost-benefit analysis. This involves an assessment of the 
impact of marginal quality changes on social welfare: 
Wq = S’(q) – (1 + δ) c 
where c = β – e  
The government can improve social welfare by increasing service standards where 
Wq > 0; that is, where the marginal social value of the increase, S’(q), exceeds the 
marginal social cost, (1 + δ) c.15 Clearly, the estimate of the marginal social value 
of quality plays a crucial role in this mechanism. Inaccurate estimation of this 
value would lead to lower social welfare outcomes because quality changes 
resulting in a net social cost may be implemented and, conversely, quality changes 
resulting in a net social benefit may not be implemented.  
Similarly, the marginal cost used in the evaluation is important. A disadvantage of 
this governance structure is that its inherent low-powered incentives cause 
marginal cost to be above the optimal level (since cost-reducing effort, e, is sub-
optimal). As a result, certain quality improvements may be rejected even though 
the benefits exceed the efficient marginal cost. 
                                                 
15
 To achieve the optimal quality level, cost-benefit analysis would need to be undertaken for all 
possible combinations of investments. A more realistic optimum would be characterised by the 
trade-off between the costs involved in undertaking the analysis and the surpluses to be gained 
from it. 
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Turning to the quality-enhancing project of interest, cost-benefit analysis of 
undergrounding in a given area would involve a comparison of the estimated 
social value of the expected quality improvement and the estimated cost of 
delivering the project (net of ongoing cost savings). In principle, a network could 
be divided into many areas and cost-benefit analyses conducted for each, 
providing information on the amount of network undergrounding that would be 
socially optimal (conditional on the estimated cost, which may be above the 
efficient level). 
2.7 Incentive regulation of a private monopoly 
The third and final type of governance structure examined here is high-powered 
incentive regulation of a private network service provider (the firm). Following 
Laffont and Tirole (1993), total cost, C, is assumed to be paid by the government 
and a transfer, t, is paid to the firm. The firm‘s objective is to maximise its utility, 
U = t – Ψ(e). The model abstracts from theories of regulatory capture (Stigler, 
1971) and assumes the regulator‘s objective is to maximise social welfare subject 
to information constraints. The information constraint in this model is that the 
regulator does not observe the components of cost; namely, technology, β, and 
cost-reducing effort, e. The firm‘s disutility from cost-reducing effort is an 
additional cost of production that is not observed by the regulator. The firm would 
not be compensated for this disutility in a regulatory regime that allowed recovery 
only of observable, tangible costs. 
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2.7.1 Quality-adjusted price cap regulation 
Decentralised contracts 
The mechanism by which the optimal social welfare outcome is achieved in this 
setting is a quality-adjusted price cap regulatory regime. This mechanism is the 
culmination of work by several authors in the 1970s and 1980s. Seminal work by 
Spence (1975) introduced the use of decentralised regulatory contracts in which 
firms are compensated according to the social surplus resulting from their quality 
performance. Loeb and Magat (1979) showed that a firm will deliver the welfare 
maximising level of output if its revenues (or prices) reflect the consumer surplus 
generated by its output.
16
 More recently, DeFraja and Iozzi (2004) and Currier 
(2007) have set out dynamic decentralised regulatory mechanisms that would, 
according to their models, lead to welfare maximisation in the long run. These 
decentralised contracts induce optimal provision of quality by internalising the 
social cost-benefit optimisation within the firm‘s profit maximisation problem. 
Quality-adjusted price cap regulation integrates these quality incentives with 
incentives for efficient cost-reducing effort by making the firm residual claimant 
with respect to its costs. The mechanism can be represented by the following 
transfer function: 
 t = Ψ(e*) – (C – C*) + S(q) – S(q*) 
 where C* and q* are cost and quality performance targets, respectively. 
                                                 
16
 Distributional concerns associated with this mechanism were addressed by transferring some 
surplus to consumers through the application of a quality target that is unrelated to the firm‘s own 
quality performance. 
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Under this contract, the firm‘s utility is: 
 U = Ψ(e*) – (C – C*) + S(q) – S(q*) - Ψ(e) 
A utility-maximising firm will select socially optimal effort and quality levels for 
any C* and q* that are unrelated to the firm‘s own performance (C and q) as 
demonstrated by the first-order conditions: 
 ∂U/∂q = – (β – e) + S’(q) = 0 
 ∂U/∂e = q – Ψ’(e) = 0 
The information constraint 
In order for this form of regulation to satisfy all three conditions for socially 
optimal provision, it also needs to ensure rent extraction (U = 0), which occurs via 
the setting of C* (and q*). However, this task is hampered by the regulator‘s 
incomplete information about the firm‘s cost function. Consider the case where 
the regulator knows that β could take one of two values, βL or βH > βL. Quality is 
assumed to be constant, q = q*, and the regulator needs to offer a transfer function 
that satisfies the firm‘s rationality constraint, U ≥ 0. If the regulator knew the type 
(β) of the firm, it would choose the constant parameters, Ψ(e*) and C*, so that the 
transfer function, t = Ψ(e*) – (C – C*), passed through Point A (see Figure 2.4) 
for a low-cost firm or point B for a high-cost firm. However, the regulator does 
not know the type of the firm, which means that only the latter transfer function, t 
= Ψ(e*) – (C – C1*), ensures the firm‘s rationality constraint is met regardless of 
type. The outcome is socially optimal if the firm is high-cost, but if the firm is 
low-cost, it would receive a positive rent and expend below-optimal cost-reducing 
effort (Point D). Expected social welfare can be improved if the regulator offers a 
transfer function in which the firm is only partial residual claimant with respect to 
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costs. Figure 2.4 illustrates a transfer function, t = Ψ(e*) – γ (C – C2*), where 0 < 
γ < 1 and C2* < C1*. If offered this transfer function, low- and high-cost firms 
would choose Point E and Point F, respectively. This limits the rent of a low-cost 
firm at the cost of inducing sub-optimal effort from a high-cost firm. This reflects 
the classic result from the Laffont and Tirole (1993) principal-agent model: the 
regulator‘s two objectives – improving  productivity and limiting firm profits – 
are in conflict. There is a trade-off between rent extraction and effort inducement. 
Yardstick competition 
The information constraint described above means that the regulator cannot 
induce the firm to achieve the socially optimal outcome. A potential means of 
overcoming this problem is yardstick competition, or relative performance 
evaluation, which allows a regulator to gain information on β by comparing a 
firm‘s performance to that of other firms (Shleifer, 1985). To the extent that firms‘ 
technological environments are the same, yardstick competition can result in the 
optimal outcome through a price cap contract (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). If C* 
and q* are set at the median performance across firms, then the firm with median 
performance will have U = 0 (assuming the transfer, t, also includes an adequate 
compensation for disutility of optimal cost-reducing effort). Firms with above-
median performance will earn a rent, while firms with below-median performance 
will have negative utility. Frontier Economics (2003) note that the number of 
firms experiencing negative utility could be reduced by setting C* and q* as the 
average performance of the two worst performing firms.  
 43 
 t 
c 
U(βH) = 0 
U(βL) > 0 
βL – e* βH – e* 
A 
B Ψ(e*) 
D 
F 
E 
t = Ψ(e*) – (C – C1*)  
t = Ψ(e*) – γ (C – C2*)  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Regulation under asymmetric information 
 
In practice, it is difficult to use methods that simply average cost and quality 
performance across firms due to differences in size and operating environments. A 
more general cost function than that assumed in the simple model above is 
presented in Figure 2.5 (where Z represents the size of the network). 
In a dynamic model, regulators observe in each period the optimal quality and 
total cost levels chosen by the firm for given technology, β, and firm size, Z. 
Technology (and hence optimal cost and quality) varies over time and firm size 
varies across firms. Regulators require some measure of productivity that is 
comparable across firms and across time. Various measures have been proposed 
based on benchmarking methods such as data envelopment analysis and 
stochastic frontier analysis. For further detail on these methods, readers are 
referred to Coelli et al. (2005). Implementing measures of productivity across 
heterogeneous firms remains a challenge for regulators the world over. 
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C = C(Z, β – e, q) 
Regulator observes 
Firm chooses 
Exogenous 
 
Figure 2.5: Regulation and the cost function 
 
The quality-adjusted price cap mechanism 
In practice, the quality-adjusted price cap form of regulation is represented by the 
following rule for changes in the weighted average price cap formula over time, t: 
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 where  
p are prices, x are quantities, CPI is the change in prices across the 
economy, and Q = (qt – q*) S’(q*) 
Once the form of regulation has been established, there are two main regulatory 
parameters to be set periodically by the regulator. The first is X, which has 
commonly been referred to as the ―X-factor‖ following the RPI-X regulatory 
approach developed by Stephen Littlechild (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989) and 
applied to British Telecom. It represents the per period reduction in prices for a 
given quality level. It is calculated to extract rent by reflecting changes (or 
forecast changes) in some measure of industry-wide productivity.  
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The second is S’(q*), which is often referred to as the ―quality incentive rate‖. 
This is the mechanism by which optimal quality is achieved in the price cap 
governance structure. This incentive rate is the means by which the social cost-
benefit analysis is internalised in the firm‘s profit maximising condition. It 
determines the magnitude of the financial reward or penalty for exceeding or 
falling short of the target level of quality performance. Setting the incentive rate at 
the estimate of the marginal social value of quality means that the financial 
rewards and penalties provide an ongoing incentive to move towards the socially 
optimal quality level. In contrast to the case of fully integrated public provision, 
the marginal cost upon which the cost-benefit analysis is based is the efficient 
level (as a result of the high-powered incentives to minimise cost).  
Just as in the case of public provision, accurate estimation of consumers‘ marginal 
value of quality is crucial to achieving the social welfare optimum under this type 
of government intervention. A challenge in practice is to reflect in the quality 
incentive rate all of the aspects of quality that affect consumers‘ utility. For 
example, schemes implemented to date have stopped short of accommodating the 
time of day that supply interruptions occur.  
Turning to the quality-enhancing project of interest, estimates of the social value 
of quality improvements resulting from undergrounding could, in principle, be 
included in incentive rates. Ideally, separate rates, or components of a quality 
index, would apply to supply reliability and a composite of other benefits derived 
from undergrounding (for example, aesthetics and perceived safety). The rates 
could potentially vary from one area to another to reflect differences in the 
marginal value of the benefits of undergrounding. The goal is a situation in which 
the firm weighs up the additional revenue it would gain from undergrounding a 
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given area (including from ongoing improved reliability) against the cost (net of 
ongoing savings in maintenance and energy losses). There would be many 
challenges involved in implementing such a regime. For example, undergrounding 
would need to be incorporated within the yardstick competition framework to 
prevent the firm from earning large rents from extracting all consumer surplus via 
the financial rewards linked to undergrounding. 
2.8 Limitations of model assumptions 
The analysis employing the mathematical framework in the preceding sections 
favours high-powered incentive regulation as a governance structure. All models 
make simplifying assumptions that depart from reality in one way or another, but 
some authors have argued that the assumptions underlying the type of model 
presented above may lead to infeasibilities in practice. For example, proponents of 
transaction cost economics argue that the model is based on complete contracts 
that are not feasible because quality is a complex good and future costs and 
demand are uncertain. Possibly as a result of these infeasibilities, the quality-
adjusted price cap form of regulation has been implemented in very few countries 
to date; namely Norway (Langset et al., 2001) and the Netherlands (Netherlands 
Competition Authority, 2006). Three other considerations that could hamper the 
effectiveness or feasibility of certain forms of regulation are described below. 
They are included here as acknowledgement of the debate that surrounds 
governance structures in monopoly markets.  
2.8.1 The commitment problem 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), and proponents of transaction cost economics 
generally (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1979; 1983; 2000), have 
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criticised the assumption that the regulator can credibly commit to certain 
contracts. The incentive for efficient cost-reducing effort under price cap 
regulation will not hold if the regulator cannot credibly commit to allowing 
efficient firms to continually earn observed (excluding disutility of effort) profits 
(or to allowing inefficient firms to earn losses). The commitment may not be 
credible if firms are aware that regulators face considerable political pressure to 
limit observed monopoly profits and that there is a risk of expropriation. A firm 
knows that once it reveals information through the ex ante optimal contract the 
regulator will have an incentive to change the contract. If the firm anticipates this 
risk of expropriation, then it no longer has an incentive to minimise costs and the 
outcomes described in Section 2.7 are not feasible.  
2.8.2 Administrative burden and rent-seeking 
To this point it has been assumed that regulation is a costless exercise. As 
recognised by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979), this is certainly not 
the case in practice, though the costs of regulation vary depending upon the type 
of regulatory regime. In general, considerable resources are expended by both the 
regulator and the firm in the process of periodically setting the regulatory 
parameters. Where yardstick competition is impractical or infeasible, regulators 
can become quite intrusive in an effort to gain information about the cost function 
or to control outcomes – even dictating firms‘ policies. In some cases, firms may 
appeal regulatory decisions, leading to further expenditure of resources on legal 
and expert advice by both parties. Of course, the public provision governance 
structure also leads to some additional administrative costs and some waste of 
resources through rent-seeking behaviour as interest groups lobby to obtain a 
share of the redistribution of monopoly profits. The administrative and rent-
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seeking costs incurred under regulation are arguably higher even than those under 
the integrated public monopoly governance structure.  
2.8.3 Regulatory capture 
In the model employed in this chapter, it is assumed that the regulator‘s objective 
is to maximise social welfare. Stigler (1971) and others since (for example, 
Peltzman, 1989) have argued that regulation does not maximise social welfare, but 
rather, that it is captured by the industry and designed to protect the interests of 
firms. They argue that this regulatory capture arises because compact, well 
organised groups such as producers can apply more pressure to regulators than 
broad, diffuse groups such as consumers. Regulators may give favourable 
decisions in order to maintain relationships at firms where they anticipate future 
managerial positions. At the extreme, regulators might accept bribes from firms. 
2.9 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has defined conditions for socially optimal network service provision 
under various monopoly governance structures using a specific economic model. 
The social value of network service quality is a crucial element in these 
conditions. The importance of accurate estimation of this value is highlighted by 
the model since inaccurate estimation would lead to a loss of social welfare.  
Consistent with observed governance structures and arguments in the wider 
literature, the model predicts that the social optimum will not be achieved by a 
monopoly firm in the absence of government intervention. An integrated public 
monopoly governance structure eliminates the socially costly monopoly rent, but 
at the cost of reduced incentives for cost minimisation. It utilises direct cost-
benefit analysis of projects to move towards optimal levels of service quality. The 
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key components of the cost-benefit analysis are the marginal social value of 
quality and the marginal cost of quality provision. As a result of the low-powered 
incentives inherent in the governance structure, the marginal cost used in the 
analysis will be above the efficient level and, consequently, quality changes that 
could potentially result in a net social benefit may not be implemented.  
Another form of governance structure, regulation by quality-adjusted price cap, 
uses financial penalties and rewards for quality performance to provide an 
ongoing incentive for the firm to adjust quality to the socially optimal level. 
Again, the marginal social value of service quality is crucial as it determines the 
magnitude of the rewards and penalties required to internalise social costs and 
benefits in the firm‘s profit-maximisation problem. In contrast to the integrated 
public monopoly governance structure, the marginal cost used by the firm in the 
cost-benefit analysis will, based on model assumptions, be at the efficient level. 
However, violations of model assumptions regarding regulatory commitment, 
regulatory capture and administrative burden would prevent the social optimum 
from being achieved in practice.  
The main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that, regardless of 
governance structure, the marginal social value of network service quality is a 
crucial element in identifying social welfare enhancing investments in quality. If 
firms, governments and regulators rely on inaccurate estimates of this social 
valuation, then quality-enhancing network projects resulting in a net social cost 
may be implemented and, conversely, projects that would result in a net social 
benefit may not be implemented.  
Turning to the quality-enhancing project of interest in this research, the net social 
benefits of undergrounding in a given residential area depend on the value placed 
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by households on the quality improvements resulting from the project. Accurate 
estimates of the household benefits of undergrounding are required to ensure that 
undergrounding takes place in, and only in, areas where the social benefits exceed 
the social costs. 
The next two chapters describe methods for estimating the social value of network 
service quality and discuss in detail certain challenges associated with those 
methods. 
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3 Valuation methods 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 established the role of the social value of service quality in 
understanding whether undergrounding electricity networks in a given area would 
result in a net economic benefit. This chapter describes two types of method used 
to gather information on the value placed by households on network service 
quality – the hedonic price method (in Section 3.2) and stated preference (SP) 
methods (in Section 3.3). The discussion is tailored to focus on the methods as 
they would be applied when the objective is to understand household preferences 
for undergrounding. The outputs from the methods are related to the formal 
economic framework developed in Chapter 2.  
The hedonic price method uses data from the real estate market to gather 
information on households‘ preferences for underground networks as revealed 
through their purchase decisions. SP methods attempt to elicit households‘ 
preferences for potential network service options by asking questions in a survey 
context. As will become clear, there are relative advantages and disadvantages 
associated with each method. In some cases, the data collected using the two 
methods can be pooled (Louviere et al., 2000); however, this is not the case in this 
research. Both methods are studied here because either may be preferred by 
analysts depending on the time and financial resources available when considering 
the merits of undergrounding in a given area. Value estimates would be more 
robust and defensible if consistent results could be obtained across the two 
methods.  
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In the following chapter, certain challenges associated with the methods are 
discussed in detail. Then, in the remainder of the thesis, research questions related 
to those challenges are addressed using a case study, which also provides benefit 
estimates for undergrounding where little information was previously available in 
the literature. 
3.2 The hedonic price method 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974), among others, have argued that many goods 
and services can be characterised as a bundle of attributes. Differing levels of 
those attributes lead to the availability of many different versions of a good. The 
hedonic pricing method uses observed market prices for a good and observed 
attribute levels to estimate the implicit effect of each of the attributes on the 
overall price. These effects are termed implicit prices. They give an indication of 
the value that consumers place on each attribute as revealed through their chosen 
purchases from the available versions of the good.  
The method has been applied to all manner of goods, including automobiles and 
computers (Berndt, 1990), plastic bags (Anstine, 2000), and breakfast cereals 
(Stanley and Tschirhart, 1991). However, the good to which the hedonic price 
method has been most widely applied is real estate. Studies have used the hedonic 
pricing technique to estimate implicit prices for real estate and associated 
environmental attributes such as energy efficiency (Dinan and Miranowski, 1989), 
noise (Nelson, 1982), air quality (Brookshire et al., 1982; Freeman, 1979), quality 
of schools (Black, 1999), agricultural sedimentation (Bejranonda et al., 1999) and 
proximity to urban wetlands (Mahan et al., 2000) and landfill (Hite et al., 2001). 
 53 
In this research, the real estate attribute of interest is the presence of underground 
(as opposed to overhead) low-voltage electricity distribution networks – an 
attribute that has not been valued in previous published studies.
17
 As will become 
clear, the implicit price of this attribute conveys limited information about the 
social value of the network service quality improvement that results from 
undergrounding. Henceforth, the discussion relates to the application of the 
hedonic price method in this context. 
3.2.2 Theory of hedonic price estimation 
The theoretical framework for the estimation of implicit prices is as follows. The 
market price for a piece of real estate (referred to henceforth as a property) is p = 
p(UG, Z), where UG indicates whether the property is serviced by underground 
wires and Z = z1, z2, …, zn is a vector of the amounts of n other property attributes 
(for example, number of bedrooms, block size, distance to central business 
district). Households spend their income, y, on housing (real estate) and a 
composite good, x, whose price is normalised to unity. Households maximise their 
utility, U = U(x, UG, Z), by choosing x, UG, and Z subject to their budget 
constraint, y = x + p(UG, Z). The first order conditions of this constrained 
optimisation are ∂p/∂UG = UUG/Ux and ∂p/∂Zi = UZi/Ux for i = 1, …, n. For 
attributes with continuous levels, these conditions mean that households purchase 
the quantity of each attribute up to the point at which their value (or, equivalently, 
                                                 
17
 Some studies have valued the impact of proximity to high-voltage transmission networks 
(Colwell, 1990; Des Rosiers, 2002; Gregory and von Winterfeldt, 1996; Hamilton and Schwann, 
1995; Sims and Dent, 2005), but this infrastructure has quite different impacts on households. 
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their willingness to pay (WTP)), UZi/Ux, for an additional unit of the attribute is 
just equal to the implicit price, ∂p/∂Zi, of the attribute.  
However, the main attribute of interest in this research, UG, is a discrete binary 
attribute. Consequently, a household‘s WTP for underground wires, UUG/Ux, is 
not necessarily equal to the implicit price for underground wires, ∂p/∂UG 
(denoted henceforth as PUG). Figure 3.1 illustrates the optimal discrete choice in 
the x-UG plane cut at Z*. In order to purchase a house serviced by underground 
wires, a household must forgo PUG(Z*) units of x. This is the implicit price of 
underground wires for house type Z*. Two households are shown, both with 
income Y*. One has a utility function UA and the other UB. The indifference 
curves for the optimal utility levels of each household, UA
*
 and UB
*
, are shown in 
the diagram.
18
 The household with utility function UB chooses a house serviced by 
underground wires but the other household does not. 
3.2.3 Second stage of hedonic estimation 
Rosen (1974) suggested a second stage in the hedonic estimation process in which 
the estimated implicit prices are combined with data on the characteristics of 
individual suppliers and demanders to estimate supply and demand functions 
simultaneously. It has since been recognised that this second stage is more 
complex than Rosen had envisaged (Palmquist and Smith, 2002). Identification of 
the demand function requires data sufficient to distinguish the behavioural 
functions of households (in terms of their preferences for property attributes) from 
both the hedonic price equation and the supply functions for those attributes.  
                                                 
18
 These functions are undefined for 0<UG<1, but lines are shown for illustrative purposes. 
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Figure 3.1  Household consumption decision 
This identification has been achieved in a few cases by pooling data from multiple 
independent markets (Palmquist, 1984) or by assuming that household preferences 
follow a specific function form with non-linear restrictions on the attributes 
(Epple, 1987; Mendelsohn, 1985). However, the vast majority of empirical 
hedonic price studies do not proceed to this second stage due to the cost of these 
data requirements or other problems achieving identification (Palmquist and 
Smith, 2002). In this research, the focus is on the more common form of hedonic 
price study involving only the first stage of hedonic estimation – the estimation of 
implicit prices. 
3.2.4 Relating implicit prices to the social valuation 
The implicit price, PUG(Z*), derived from the (first stage) hedonic price estimation 
is related in a specific way to the marginal social value of quality, S’(q), discussed 
in Chapter 2. Returning to the notation used in the general equilibrium model, 
S’(q) is equal to ΣUQ
i
/λi dQ; that is, the sum of individual households‘ marginal 
values of quality (utility in dollar terms) or, using an equivalent term, households‘ 
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marginal WTP for quality. Assuming the change in quality from undergrounding 
is ΔQ, then an approximation of the social value of undergrounding is ΣUQ
i
/λi ΔQ. 
The first stage of the hedonic price method does not estimate this value directly, 
but certain information about households‘ WTP is revealed. An individual 
household‘s WTP for underground wires is less than the implicit price, PUG(Z*), if 
the household purchases a house serviced by overhead wires. It is equal to or 
more than the implicit price if the household purchases a house serviced by 
underground wires. Assuming a continuous distribution of WTP across 
households, the implicit price represents the WTP of the marginal purchaser of the 
underground wires attribute.  
To demonstrate this, consider the value function θ(UG, Z; y, u) described by 
Rosen (1974) where u = U(y – θ, UG, Z). The WTP for underground wires, 
holding all other house attributes constant at Z*, is θUG(Z*; u*, y) where u* is the 
optimum quantity given Z*. A demand function for underground wires in the 
market for houses of type Z* can be constructed by arranging these WTP amounts 
in descending order across households. The social value of underground wires is 
equal to the area underneath this demand function. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that 
the implicit price of underground wires is determined by the equilibrium of this 
demand function and the supply of houses serviced by underground wires, S, for 
each given type of house as characterised by Z. Over the relatively short periods 
of time used for cross-sectional hedonic price studies, the supply of houses 
serviced by underground wires in the real estate market is perfectly inelastic (in 
cities where no retro-fit undergrounding has taken place). 
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Figure 3.2  Implicit price and willingness to pay 
The fact that implicit price estimation provides only limited information about the 
value of interest, households‘ mean WTP for undergrounding, is a drawback of 
the method. The hedonic price method is nevertheless an appealing approach to 
gathering some, albeit limited, information about households‘ WTP due to the 
relatively inexpensive data requirements and the revealed, ―real market‖ nature of 
the data used. In certain cases, it may reveal to the analyst whether the median 
WTP is considerably above or below the cost of undergrounding. Consider an 
example where the cost of undergrounding is estimated at $15,000 per property, a 
hedonic price study reveals that 20 per cent of households paid an estimated 
implicit price of $5,000 for the underground networks attribute, and other 
benefits, such as those to network service providers, are estimated at $2,000 per 
property. Given that median household WTP for undergrounding is less than 
$5,000 (as revealed through the real estate market), it seems unlikely that the 
benefits of undergrounding would exceed the costs. On the other hand, if the 
hedonic price study showed that 80 per cent of households paid an estimated 
implicit price of $20,000, then it would be likely, though not certain, that net 
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benefits would be positive. However, in many cases, the likely outcome of a cost-
benefit analysis would be unclear.       
3.2.5 Estimating the hedonic price function 
Once the analyst has specified a functional form for p = p(UG, Z), what remains is 
to estimate the hedonic regression model and interpret the implicit prices. The 
economic theory discussed above does not dictate a particular functional form 
since the price function represents a locus of market equilibria. Three commonly 
used functional forms are the log-log, semi-log and linear forms.
19
 In the semi-log 
functional form, a logarithmic transformation is applied to the dependent variable, 
but not to the explanatory variables. A standard semi-log regression model 
incorporating time trend and area fixed effects is: 
 ln pijt  = α + β UGij + γ Zijt + δ Aj + λ Tt + εijt  
where  
ln pijt is the log of real price of house i in area j at time t;  
UGij is a dummy variable for indicating that house i is serviced by 
underground wires;  
Zijt is a vector of other house attributes; 
Tt is a vector of time indicator variables and;  
Aj is a vector of area indicator variables.  
                                                 
19
 Where the marginal effects of attributes are not constant, other, flexible specifications, such as 
Box-Cox transformations, are preferred. Such specifications may be necessary in second stage 
hedonic estimation. 
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The parameters to be estimated are α, β and the parameter vectors γ, δ and λ. The 
parameter of particular interest is β, which represents the implicit price of 
underground networks. In this model form, β is the proportionate increase in price, 
p, for a change from overhead to underground wires holding all other variables 
constant. 
An equivalent log-log model would be: 
 ln pijt  = α + β ln UGij + γ ln Zijt + δ ln Aj + λ ln Tt + εijt  
A disadvantage of the log-log model is that it does not allow any of the 
explanatory variables to take the value zero (or values less than zero), since the 
natural logarithm of numbers less than or equal to zero is not defined. This is 
problematic in the case of indicator variables such as the variable of interest, UG, 
which indicates the presence of underground networks.  
An equivalent linear model would be: 
 pijt  = α + β UGij + γ Zijt + δ Aj + λ Tt + εijt  
Although many examples of this type of model can be found in the literature, it is 
inconsistent with the linear homogeneity properties implied by microeconomic 
theory and should be avoided on a priori grounds (Diewert, 2003). 
3.3 Stated preference methods 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the hedonic price approach in which households‘ preferences are 
revealed by choices made in real markets, SP methods discover households‘ 
preferences through choices made in a survey context. The natural monopoly 
nature of the electricity network and indivisibilities in the service mean that 
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consumers are rarely able to choose their preferred version of the service. 
Consumers are only offered one version of the service for a given property. The 
exception, as discussed in Section 3.2, is the household that is active in the real 
estate market. They choose between multiple versions of the service to the extent 
that the service differs across properties. However, this group represents only a 
small proportion of the population. In general, it is not possible to observe 
households trading off price against network quality in a real market; but, these 
trade-offs can be observed in the context of an SP survey. 
This highlights one of the primary advantages of SP methods relative to the 
hedonic price method – the ability to observe choices relating to alternatives and 
attribute levels that are not observable in an actual market. This ability is valuable 
when information is being sought about an alternative not currently available in 
the market or when attribute levels associated with an existing alternative are 
invariant or highly correlated, as is often the case (Hensher et al., 2005). It is 
claimed that the primary disadvantage of SP methods is that they simulate a 
market that is, in a sense, hypothetical, and therefore may not replicate the 
financial constraints confronted by consumers in real markets. However, the 
extent of this disadvantage depends largely on the nature of the survey 
mechanism. Financial constraints may be absent if a respondent believes that their 
response will have no influence on the agency‘s actions or if they believe the 
agency would not be able to enforce payment. However, if a respondent believes 
that their response may (up to some non-zero probability) influence the agency‘s 
actions and that the agency could enforce a policy outcome (including payment) 
based on their response, then the survey becomes a real market transaction of sorts 
and financial constraints are present.  
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A number of studies have focused on hypothetical bias by comparing results from 
hypothetical choice experiments with those from choice experiments with 
immediate and certain implementation (Alfnes and Steine, 2005; Carlsson and 
Martinsson, 2001; Hensher, 2010; Lusk and Schroeder, 2004). It is important to 
make a distinction here between inconsequential hypothetical surveys (where a 
respondent believes there is zero per cent chance of implementation) and 
consequential hypothetical surveys (where a respondent believes their responses 
will influence up to some non-zero probability the likelihood of an alternative 
being implemented by the agency) (Carson and Groves, 2007). Economic theory 
predicts that responses to a consequential hypothetical survey and a survey with 
immediate and certain implementation will be equivalent. Consistent with this 
theory, Carson et al. (2006) found a difference between responses to 
inconsequential hypothetical questions and questions involving 100 per cent 
probability of actual payment, but, importantly, found equivalence in responses to 
all questions involving a non-zero (20 per cent, 50 per cent, 80 per cent and 100 
per cent) probability of actual payment. 
3.3.2 Background 
SP methods have been applied in various forms across a range of disciplines, 
including marketing, and transport, health, and environmental economics. To date, 
the SP approach applied in the monopoly service quality context has drawn most 
heavily, though not exclusively, on the approaches applied by environmental 
economists. The techniques used to estimate households‘ values for specific 
attributes of public environmental goods translate well to the context of valuing 
specific attributes of network service quality. Similarly, the techniques used to 
value the environmental improvements resulting from specific public projects 
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translate well to the context of valuing the network quality improvements 
resulting from specific infrastructure projects.  
The SP methods applied in the environmental economics discipline, and hence 
those applied in the monopoly service quality context, have changed considerably 
as a substantial literature has emerged over the past three decades. One of the 
earliest SP methods to be applied was an open-ended contingent valuation survey 
in which respondents were simply asked to state their maximum WTP for a 
changed policy scenario. Certain biases introduced by this preference elicitation 
format were recognised from an early stage; in particular, strategic ―shading‖ of 
bids similar to that observed in first-price sealed-bid auctions and clustering of 
bids around certain prominent numbers such as zero, $50 or $100 (Arrow et al., 
1993; Carson and Mitchell, 1989). These shortcomings led to this approach 
largely being abandoned in favour of the dichotomous choice contingent valuation 
(DCCV) survey format in which a changed policy scenario is offered at a certain 
price and respondents indicate whether they accept the offered scenario or retain 
the status quo. This referendum-type format became widely accepted following its 
recommendation by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) Blue Ribbon Panel in 1993 (Arrow et al., 1993). It potentially holds the 
appealing property of incentive compatibility, which, as will become clear later in 
this chapter, means that truthful revelation of preferences is the dominant strategy 
for all respondents regardless of their perceptions about how others will respond. 
However, it was recognised that asking a single question to each respondent is 
relatively inefficient in statistical terms. This inefficiency gave rise to expanded 
survey formats, such as the double-bounded DCCV survey in which a follow-up 
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question is asked in an attempt to narrow the identified interval within which the 
respondent‘s WTP value is known to lie.  
These contingent valuation survey formats typically involve the valuation of a 
single, specific policy change. In many instances, policy makers are interested in 
the contribution of specific attributes of a good to the overall valuation of the 
change; for example, the contribution of the reduction in the frequency of 
unannounced power cuts to the overall valuation of undergrounding. Estimates of 
these contributions would inform the valuation of a range of possible policy 
scenarios based on the various combinations of the attributes. A broader class of 
stated choice surveys, termed choice experiments (CE), originally developed in 
the transport economics (Hensher and Truong, 1985) and marketing (Hensher and 
Louviere, 1983) disciplines, was adapted to fulfil this purpose in the contexts of 
environmental goods (Bennett and Blamey, 2001) and monopoly service quality 
(for example, Beenstock et al., 1998). In order to identify the role of specific 
attributes in respondents‘ choices, these surveys typically involve multiple choice 
questions, where each offers multiple policy scenarios described by a set of 
relevant attributes. 
Before proceeding further, it is helpful to place these DCCV and CE survey 
formats in the context of a more general framework by recognising that a survey 
mechanism can be considered as two parts: the elicitation format, and the social 
choice function. The latter is the process by which survey responses are translated 
into a policy decision. As will become clear in the next chapter, this process, if it 
is known to respondents (or, if it is not known, the perceptions of the process) 
may influence responses to the survey itself. The former part, the elicitation 
format, refers to the nature of the question or questions that generate the survey 
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responses. DCCV and CE are terms that describe the elicitation format. Both are 
examples of stated choice elicitation formats, which are the focus here since they 
are the most commonly used format in SP studies today. Stated choice formats 
vary on several dimensions, including the number of choice tasks per respondent, 
the number of alternatives in each choice task (and whether the status quo is 
represented as an alternative), the number of attributes in each alternative and the 
number of different levels each attribute can take.  
The DCCV elicitation format is a specific form of stated choice survey featuring a 
single choice task per respondent, two alternatives per choice task (where one of 
those alternatives represents the status quo) and a fixed set of attributes 
characterising the relevant policy scenario. Typically these attributes are not 
described in the DCCV question itself, but they are generally detailed in 
background information in an earlier part of the questionnaire. The term CE 
loosely refers to a broader class of stated choice survey that typically, though not 
without exception, features multiple questions per respondent, multiple 
alternatives per choice task, multiple attributes describing each alternative and 
multiple levels taken by each attribute over choice tasks. 
The critical elements of stated choice methods are the theoretical framework, its 
econometric representation, and the experimental design of the choices that 
comprise the survey. Each of these elements is discussed in turn below. 
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3.3.3 Random utility theory 
The most common theoretical framework underpinning stated choice methods is 
random utility theory (McFadden, 1980).
20
 It is broadly consistent with the 
economic theory of consumer behaviour discussed in earlier chapters of this 
thesis. The choices made by survey respondents are assumed to be determined by 
a process of utility maximisation where utility is a function of respondents‘ 
preferences. However, analysts have incomplete information with respect to 
respondents‘ utility functions and can therefore only explain stated choices up to a 
probability.  
More formally, random utility theory is built on the assumption that the utility, U, 
derived by a respondent from an alternative is a function of the attributes of the 
alternative (typically including cost or price), choice invariant characteristics 
(such as the characteristics of the respondent or the choice task) and a random, 
unobserved element, ε. In any given choice task, respondents choose the 
alternative that yields the highest utility. The outcome is an index of the observed 
choice, y. The utility that respondent i derives from alternative j in choice task t is 
assumed to be:  
Uijt = αij + i′xitj + δit′zit + itj  
Parameter vectors i and δit capture the contributions to marginal (dis)utility from 
observed variables, xitj, and choice-invariant characteristics, zitj, respectively. The 
coefficient on the alternative-specific constant, αij, captures the mean of the 
residual effect of other influences on marginal (dis)utility. The random element, ε, 
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 An example of an alternative theory is random regret minimisation (Hensher et al., 2010). 
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is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across choices and 
individuals according to the extreme value type I function. This allows the 
econometric representation of the theory to take the form of a logit model of 
choice probability. 
3.3.4 Discrete choice models 
The econometric representation of the random utility framework has become more 
advanced and general in its assumptions, particularly over the past two decades as 
improvements in computer technology have facilitated the use of simulation 
techniques such as simulated maximum likelihood estimation. Dozens of different 
models have now been proposed. The discussion here is limited to a few models 
that relate to those employed in the empirical part of this thesis. The generalised 
mixed logit (GML) model (Fiebig et al., 2009; Hensher and Greene, 2009), which 
is arguably the current state-of-the-art, is specified first. Other model forms, 
including the commonly-used multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (ML) 
models (Hensher and Greene, 2003), are defined as specific cases of this more 
general model, where the primary differences in the models relate to the 
accommodation or otherwise of heterogeneity in taste and/or scale across 
individuals. The GML choice probability function is:  
πitj  = Prob(yit = j | xitj, zitj, vi) = 
 
  
J
j itj
itj
V
V
1
exp
exp
 
 where 
 Vitj  = αij + i′xitj  
 i  = σiβ + [γ + σi(1 – γ)]Γvi 
σi  = exp(-τ
2/2 + τwi) 
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The term vi represents a vector of zero-mean random variables that provide the 
stochastic element in the taste intensities, and Г is a lower triangular Cholesky 
matrix (containing rows of zeros where parameters are non-random) providing the 
standard deviations and covariances for the taste intensities over the population of 
respondents. A weighting parameter, γ, governs the relationship between scale and 
residual taste heterogeneity. Unobserved scale heterogeneity, wi, is distributed 
standard normal, with coefficient . The parameters to be estimated are , α, the 
coefficient vectors  and , and the non-zero elements of Г.  
Choice invariant variables can be incorporated in the same way as observed 
variables: 
 Vitj  = αij + i′xitj + δi′zit 
 where 
δi  = σiδ + [γ + σi(1 – γ)]Γvi 
Alternatively, they can be used to explain heterogeneity in the means of the 
parameter distributions on the observed coefficients: 
 i  = σiβ + δ′zit + [γ + σi(1 – γ)]Γvi 
The ML model, which accommodates taste heterogeneity but not scale 
heterogeneity, is the special case where γ = 0 and τ = 0. The MNL model, which 
accommodates neither taste nor scale heterogeneity, features an additional 
restriction, Γ = 0, so that σi = σ = 1 and i = β. 
In GML and ML models, choice data are typically treated as panel data (multiple 
observations per respondent). The resulting log-likelihood function to be 
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maximised is the sum over individuals of the log of the joint probability of the 
sequence of T choices: 
 
i t j
y
itj
itjL lnln  
In the MNL model, data are treated as cross-sectional, as though all observations 
were sourced from a representative decision maker. In that case, the log-likelihood 
function to be maximised is the log of the sum of choice probabilities over all 
tasks: 

i t j
itjitjyL lnln  
Another model, the latent class model, accounts for heterogeneity in a discrete, 
rather than continuous, manner. Following Hensher and Greene (2010), the latent 
class logit choice probability function for the discrete choice from J alternatives 
can be written:  
Prob[choice j by individual i in choice task t | class q ] = πit|q = 
 
  
J
j itjq
itjq
V
V
1
exp
exp
 
 where 
 Vitjq  = αqj + q′xitj + δqtzitj 
The probability that individual i belongs to class q of Q is: 
 
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q
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

 , θQ=0  
The log-likelihood function to be maximised is the sum over individuals of the log 
of the expectation over classes of the joint probability of the sequence of T 
choices: 
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3.3.5 Relating choice models to social values 
If at least one of the attributes in the vector, xitj, represents the financial cost of the 
alternative to the respondent, the estimated utility function, Vitj, can be used to 
estimate the marginal social value of service quality, S’(q), discussed in Chapter 2. 
To this point, quality, q, has been broadly defined to incorporate all of the various 
attributes of network service quality. In discrete choice models, the contribution to 
utility of each of the various attributes of service quality can be captured. It is 
therefore possible to consider respondents‘ marginal values for specific attributes 
of service quality as well as their marginal values for changed policy scenarios 
potentially affecting multiple attributes.  
Turning first to marginal valuations of specific attributes of service quality, recall 
from Chapter 2 that the marginal social value of quality is ΣUQ
i
/λi dQ; that is, the 
sum of individual households‘ marginal values for quality multiplied by the 
change in quality. In the case where quality is an exogenous policy variable (so 
that each consumer is unable to choose their own consumption level), this 
measure is the compensating surplus illustrated in Figure 3.3 as the interval BC 
(where the change in quality is from Q0 to Q1 and Y is numeraire). 
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Figure 3.3: The value of a marginal change in quality 
Discrete choice models estimate the utility function based on observed choices. 
Using the consumer represented by Figure 3.3 as an example, observed choices 
could include the choice of Point D from the set of alternatives A, C, and D; or, 
the choice of Point A from the set of alternatives A, E, and F. In simple, linear 
discrete choice models, the marginal effect of a quality attribute on utility, UQ
i
, is 
estimated by the coefficient in the vector i that corresponds to the relevant 
quality attribute in the vector x. The marginal utility of income, λi, is estimated by 
the negative of the coefficient in the vector i that corresponds to the cost attribute 
in the vector x. The value of a unit change in quality, UQ
i
/λi, is therefore the ratio 
of these two coefficients. In summary, the relationship between the notations used 
in the general equilibrium welfare model in Chapter 2 and the linear econometric 
choice model is: 
 UQ
i
/λi = - 
quality
/
cost
 
 71 
This measure is often referred to as the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for 
the relevant quality attribute. The social value of a unit change in quality, ΣUQ
i
/λi, 
is the sum of individuals‘ MWTP across the population. 
To obtain an estimate of the social value from a discrete choice model, it is 
necessary to infer a value for the full population from the results from the 
surveyed sample of the population. If a sample comprising proportion ρ is 
representative, then the social value of a unit change in quality is 1/ρ ΣUQ
i
/λi 
where the sum is across survey respondents. If the sample is not representative, 
then the sum can be weighted towards types of households or consumers that are 
under-represented and vice versa. Typically, some individuals will reject the 
opportunity to complete a survey (either at the recruitment or questionnaire stage). 
A topic of ongoing debate relates to the treatment of these non-respondents when 
extrapolating the results. For example, a conservative assumption is to include 
these individuals in the surveyed sample and assume that they place no value on 
the good in question.  
Turning now to the valuation of a changed policy scenario affecting multiple 
attributes, Small and Rosen‘s (1981) classic paper details the link between 
discrete choice models and valuations generally. Based on earlier work by Ben-
Akiva and Lerman (1978), they set out the explicit evaluation of the value 
(compensating surplus, CS) of a changed scenario when using a logit model 
(where superscript 0 and 1 denote before and after the change) is: 
 CSi =    





 
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In the case of a single good where a specific quality attribute is changed with all 
other attributes held constant, this equation collapses to the simple ratio of 
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coefficients described above. In the case where multiple attributes change 
simultaneously, a more complex calculation will apply, but its calculation using 
the indirect utility function, V, estimated in the discrete choice model is generally 
straightforward. 
However, in some cases, it is not possible to use the explicit evaluation. An 
example is the case commonly present in DCCV studies in which a logarithm 
transformation is applied to the monetary attribute resulting in an estimate of the 
marginal utility of income that is not constant over prices. In these cases, analysts 
typically rely on a computational approximation of Small and Rosen‘s (1981) 
more general equation for compensating surplus (Equation 5.5 in their paper). In 
certain cases, analysts are able to utilise the fact that the choice probability curve, 
π, for a specific policy scenario represents a demand curve for that scenario 
(Hanemann, 1984; McConnell, 1995). An example of such a case can be found 
where the elicitation format is a binary choice between the status quo and a 
changed policy scenario, where no allowance is made for panel data in the model 
(as is the case in the standard MNL model). The area under this curve represents 
the expected WTP of the representative respondent for the relevant policy 
scenario:
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 To calculate expected WTP using this approach, the analyst needs to fix the levels of attributes 
(other than the cost attribute) to represent a specific scenario. 
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This expression, which, like the Small and Rosen (1981) expression, represents a 
Hicksian compensating measure of welfare change, is commonly used when data 
are collected using a DCCV elicitation format where a specific policy scenario is 
of interest (Hanemann, 1984; Seller et al., 1985). However, it can also be applied 
to MNL model results derived from data collected using binary CE formats. In 
some cases, this can be evaluated explicitly. In others, such as the case where a 
logarithm transformation has been applied to the monetary attribute, it may be 
necessary to approximate the integral. Often it will be necessary to make an 
assumption about the upper tail of the curve. A common assumption involves 
truncating the integral at the maximum cost level used in the survey, giving the 
improper expectation:  
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This assumption accords with standard statistical practice of not extrapolating 
beyond the range of the data, and has desirable properties including consistency 
with theoretical constraints, statistical efficiency, and ability to be aggregated 
(Duffield and Patterson, 1991).  
Just as in the case of MWTP estimates, values calculated at an individual level 
need to be aggregated across respondents and extrapolated to the full population 
in order to estimate the social value of the policy change. Similar challenges to 
those discussed earlier apply. 
3.3.6 Experimental design 
Recall that, according to random utility theory, the utility that respondent i derives 
from alternative j in choice task t is assumed to be:  
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Uijt = αij + i′xitj + δitzitj + itj  
Up to this point, this section has focused on the estimation of i and δit, the 
contributions to marginal (dis)utility from the observed variables, xitj, and choice 
invariant characteristics, zitj. Here, the focus turns to the observation of the 
variables themselves. The quality of preference information derived from a stated 
choice survey depends on the nature of the choices observed. The aim is to design 
choices that induce trade-offs between scenario attributes in a way that reveals the 
relative importance of each attribute to the respondent. Where a cost attribute is 
present, the choices reveal the willingness to trade money for each of the non-
monetary attributes. The term experimental design refers to the design of the 
choices, and the inherent attribute trade-offs, that appear in a survey. There is a 
fast-growing literature on the experimental design of stated choice experiments. A 
brief summary of some recent developments is provided here and readers are 
referred to Rose et al. (2010) for further detail. 
Once the problem being studied has been understood and refined, the first steps in 
designing a stated choice experiment involve identifying the alternatives to appear 
in the choice tasks and the attributes that will be used to describe those 
alternatives. Alternatives may be labelled (for example, underground network and 
overhead network) or unlabelled (for example, Option A and Option B). Where 
alternatives are labelled, some attributes may be specific to particular alternatives. 
Analysts typically assume that a larger number of attributes increases the 
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complexity of a choice task (Arentze et al., 2003; Swait and Adamowicz, 2001).
22
 
However, it is also important to consider the relevance of attributes. If attributes 
considered material by a respondent are omitted from the alternative descriptions, 
then the choice task may be more confusing as the respondent may attempt to 
make inferences about the level of the omitted attribute (Hensher, 2008). 
To generate an experimental design, the analyst must decide on the levels that 
each attribute can take and the number of choice tasks to be presented to each 
respondent. A wide range of attribute levels is desirable from a statistical 
perspective, but it is important that the levels are credible and meaningful to 
respondents. It is also desirable to maintain attribute level balance, meaning that 
each attribute level appears an equal number of times for each attribute in the 
design. The final step in the experimental design process is to use the available 
attribute levels to create the various scenarios that comprise the choice tasks 
ultimately presented to respondents. 
Different types of designs may be preferred depending on the available 
information and the analyst‘s preferences with respect to statistical properties and 
the size of the design. A full factorial design is one in which all possible choice 
tasks are enumerated. While these designs are orthogonal (zero correlation 
between attributes) and balanced, they are often impractically large. Fractional 
factorial designs overcome this problem by using only a subset of tasks from the 
full factorial design. Different subsets lead to different types of fractional factorial 
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 Swait and Adamowicz (2001) quantify task complexity using the measure of entropy, which is a 
function of the similarity of choice probabilities across alternatives, as well as the number of 
attributes and the degree of attribute correlation. 
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designs. An orthogonal subset has been a common design choice, but, if prior 
information about preferences is available, then the design can be altered to 
extract more information per choice task. For example, orthogonal designs for 
binary choice tasks frequently include tasks containing a dominant scenario; that 
is, a scenario in which all attributes are at more desirable levels than in the other 
scenarios in the choice task. These choice tasks generate very little new 
information since no trade-offs are induced. The analyst is likely to have enough 
prior information to identify the expected sign of the parameters, so, at the very 
least, choices between low-quality-high-price and high-quality-low-price goods 
can be avoided. If prior parameters, or a (Bayesian) probability density function 
for the parameters, are assumed, then a design can be generated to maximise the 
amount of information derived from each choice task. These types of designs are 
known as efficient designs. 
Different measures of the amount of information generated by the choice tasks 
lead to different types of efficient design. Several noteworthy designs base the 
measure on the asymptotic variance-covariance (AVC) matrix of the parameters, 
which can be calculated analytically or by simulation using the prior parameter 
estimates. The AVC matrix is: 
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D-efficient designs minimise the d-error (= det(Ω)1/K) of the AVC matrix and A-
efficient designs minimise the a-error (= tr(Ω)/K) of the AVC matrix. The latter is 
calculated solely on the diagonal variance elements of the matrix, while the d-
error is a function of the variance and covariance elements of the matrix. S-
efficient designs maximise a chosen function of the asymptotic t-ratios of the 
parameter estimates, where the standard deviation is the square root of the 
relevant diagonal element in the AVC matrix. A type of design that is particularly 
relevant when estimation of marginal WTP is the objective of the survey is the C-
efficient design (Scarpa and Rose, 2008). This design maximises a chosen 
function of the t-ratios of the estimates of marginal WTP for the non-monetary (or 
non-price) attributes, where the t-ratio is: 
 t(WTP) = (-β1 / βP) / se(WTP) 
 where 
 βP is the parameter on the price attribute;  
 β1 is the parameter on the relevant non-price attribute; and 
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The design can be generated to maximise the average (or a weighted average) of 
the t-ratios of the non-price attributes, or to maximise the minimum t-ratio across 
the non-price attributes. 
Efficient designs are typically computer generated by estimating the criterion 
measure for a large number of different designs, with the ―best‖ design updated 
after each iteration. Various algorithms have been proposed as a means of 
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selecting the designs as part of this iterative process, utilising random selection 
from a candidate set of choice tasks (Cook and Nachtsheim, 1980) or re-labelling, 
swapping and cycling (Huber and Zwerina, 1996). 
3.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has described two methods for estimating the marginal social value 
of network service quality – the hedonic price methods and SP methods. 
The theoretical framework for hedonic price estimation has been established, 
focusing on the first stage of the hedonic estimation process in which the implicit 
effects of attributes of a good on the overall price of the good are estimated. In the 
case of a binary attribute, such as the type of network infrastructure (underground 
or overhead) the implicit price is equal to the marginal value (or WTP) for the 
marginal purchaser of the attribute in the market. A drawback of the hedonic price 
method is the limited information conveyed by the implicit price about the value 
of interest; namely, the mean WTP for underground networks across households. 
On the other hand, the data required for the method tend to be relatively 
inexpensive to collect and they reveal households‘ preferences via choices made 
in a real market setting. Moreover, in some cases, the method may reveal whether 
the median WTP across households is considerably greater than or less than the 
per property cost of undergrounding. As a result, the hedonic price method can be 
an appealing approach to gathering some information on the social valuation of 
the network quality improvement resulting from underground wires. 
The second approach, which allows estimation of the mean WTP across 
households, is the SP approach. This chapter has described the different survey 
mechanisms that have been developed over recent decades as SP methods have 
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grown in popularity, focusing on a broad type of SP survey – the stated choice 
survey. A number of econometric models based on random utility theory have 
been introduced herein, focusing on the state-of-the-art and on models that have 
been widely used in recent decades. These models can be applied to data from 
stated choice surveys to estimate the value of interest developed in Chapter 2 – the 
marginal social value of quality. The primary advantage of stated choice surveys 
is that they allow the analyst to observe choices that are not made in the market. 
This makes the technique extremely valuable in the monopoly service quality 
setting in which household choices are rarely observed.  
In the next chapter, certain challenges associated with applying the hedonic price 
and SP methods are examined in detail. The subsequent chapter outlines research 
questions formed on the basis of those challenges. These questions are addressed 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
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4 Valuation challenges 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 established the importance of accurate estimation of the social value of 
network service quality in understanding where undergrounding would result in a 
net economic benefit. Two methods used to inform estimates of this social value – 
the hedonic price method and stated preference (SP) methods – were introduced in 
Chapter 3. The objective in this chapter is to detail certain challenges associated 
with applying those methods. The intention is not to outline all of the valuation 
challenges being dealt with in the literature, but rather to focus on one particular 
challenge associated with each method. In subsequent chapters, research questions 
formed on the basis of these challenges will be addressed using a case study. 
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the difficulties associated 
with applying the hedonic price method when explanatory variables are highly 
correlated. This multicollinearity problem is particularly common when 
estimating the implicit price of underground networks in cities where retro-fit 
undergrounding is yet to take place. Section 4.3 turns to challenges associated 
with SP methods, focusing in particular on the implications of task dependence; 
that is, the situation in which respondents‘ decision processes are influenced by 
information observed in the course of completing the choice tasks. Section 4.4 
concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Multicollinearity and the hedonic price method 
A statistically appealing approach to estimating the implicit price of underground 
wires is the difference-in-difference approach. In essence, this approach would 
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involve a comparison of the increase in property prices before and after 
undergrounding relative to the increase over the same period for some control 
group of properties that had not been subject to undergrounding. This approach is 
less appealing in practice since it can only be applied where some retro-fit 
undergrounding has already taken place. In most circumstances, information on 
the benefits of undergrounding is sought by policy makers prior to any program 
proceeding. A more useful approach would be applicable in towns and cities 
where undergrounding has yet to take place. However, the nature of the data when 
using such an approach presents a challenge. Generally, houses in these towns and 
cities can be broadly categorised in two groups – inner-city, older houses serviced 
by overhead wires, and outer-city, newer houses serviced by underground wires. 
Disentangling the effect of underground wires from the effects of other property 
attributes on property prices can be difficult in this setting.  
Recall that the hedonic price function to be estimated is p(UG, Z), where UG 
indicates whether the property is serviced by underground wires and Z = z1, z2, …, 
zn is a vector of the amounts of n other property attributes. In a city-wide sample, 
the presence of underground wires, UG, is likely to be highly correlated with 
certain other important property attributes in Z. In many cities, installation of 
underground wires has been a standard development requirement in new, 
greenfields housing developments for several decades. Prior to that requirement, 
underground wires tended only to be installed in commercial or high-density 
developments. As a result, houses serviced by underground wires tend to be those 
built in recent decades on the suburban fringe. The presence of underground wires 
is therefore highly correlated with building age and distance to the central 
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business district (CBD). This multicollinearity in the explanatory variables is 
potentially problematic.  
The implicit price of interest is the impact of underground wires on property 
prices with all other variables held constant. In the presence of multicollinearity, 
this estimate is imprecise because there are few observations in which the type of 
network infrastructure changes independently of the variables to be held constant, 
which include building age and distance to CBD. In loose terms, if observations 
with underground wires tend to feature newer buildings, then the model has 
difficulty determining whether price effects are due to the type of network 
infrastructure or the age of the buildings. This difficulty is manifest in two ways. 
First, standard errors on the coefficient estimates are large for the affected 
explanatory variables. Second, the estimates are not robust in the sense that minor 
changes in the model can cause them to vary dramatically. Moreover, other biases, 
such as omitted variables bias, can be amplified by multicollinearity. 
4.3 Task dependence and stated preference methods 
4.3.1 Introduction 
There has been a rapid rise in the popularity of stated choice methods as a non-
market valuation tool in recent decades. As a result of the relatively recent 
development of the techniques, there is ongoing research and debate with respect 
to many challenges associated with applying the methods. For example, a current 
line of investigation concerns the way in which econometric models account for 
heterogeneity over respondents (and/or alternatives) in the extent to which 
responses are deterministic as reflected in the scale parameter (Fiebig et al., 2009; 
Hensher and Greene, 2009). Another line of investigation deals with the way in 
 83 
which models account for heterogeneity in taste over respondents. Recently 
developed models allow assumptions about the shape of the distribution of taste to 
be applied directly to estimates of marginal willingness to pay (WTP) rather than 
to the parameter estimates that are components in a function used to evaluate 
WTP (Hensher and Greene, 2009; Scarpa et al., 2008; Train and Weeks, 2005). 
Another line of investigation concerns the way in which econometric models 
account for the decision processes applied by respondents when completing 
choice tasks. Certain models have been proposed that account for simplifying 
heuristics (decision processes) such as attribute non-attendance (Scarpa et al., 
2009) and aggregation of common-metric attributes (Hensher and Greene, 2010; 
Hensher and Layton, 2010; Hess and Hensher, 2010; Layton and Hensher, 2010). 
Other models have been developed to understand the role of choice complexity 
and cumulative cognitive burden in the adoption of simplifying heuristics (Swait 
and Adamowicz, 2001). 
In this research, the focus is on accounting for task dependence. Broadly, this term 
is used to refer to the situation in which respondents‘ decision processes are 
influenced by information observed in the course of completing the choice tasks.
23
 
Such decision processes lead to a violation of certain assumptions that are 
typically made when analysing responses to stated choice surveys. These standard 
assumptions are that:  
1) respondents truthfully answer the question being asked; and 
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 The term task dependence is not used here to refer to the correlation that exists between multiple 
responses by a given respondent. 
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2) respondents‘ true preferences are stable throughout the decision process 
and over the course of a sequence of choice tasks.  
Several studies have found evidence of violations of these standard assumptions 
(for example, Ariely et al., 2003; Bateman et al., 2008b; Boyle et al., 1985; 
Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Carson et al., 2009; Day et al., 2009; Day and Pinto, 
2010; DeShazo, 2002; Hanemann et al., 1991; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; 
Holmes and Boyle, 2005; Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008; McFadden and Leonard, 
1995; Racevskis and Lupi, 2008; Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). This growing 
body of literature suggests that an alternative set of assumptions is required to 
derive WTP estimates from stated choice data. The appropriate set of alternative 
assumptions depends on the nature of respondents‘ underlying decision processes 
(or heuristics). 
In this section, the heuristics that have been proposed in the literature as a means 
of explaining task dependence are described. They are grouped into two broad 
categories – those that involve a violation of the first standard assumption, and 
those that involve a violation of the second. A discussion of the empirical 
evidence with respect to those heuristics follows.  
Violations of the standard assumptions tend to be more obvious when similar 
goods are offered at very different prices over the course of a sequence of choice 
questions (Carson and Groves, 2007). Such surveys arise in non-market valuation 
settings where significant heterogeneity is expected in the distribution of WTP for 
a public project over the population, but the set of credible project options is 
viewed as similar. The valuation of the network quality benefits resulting from 
undergrounding is an example of such a setting. This type of survey is therefore 
the focus in this thesis. A consequence of offering similar goods at different prices 
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is that utility differences across alternatives tend to be driven mainly by the 
monetary (or cost) attribute. As a result, task dependence is manifest primarily as 
a relationship between stated choices and the cost levels observed in previous 
choice tasks.
24
 In surveys where cost plays a less dominant role, the previously 
observed levels of other attributes may also become important, but, in this 
research, the focus is on the role of the cost attribute.   
4.3.2 Strategic misrepresentation heuristics 
Decision processes that violate the first standard assumption are broadly classified 
here as strategic misrepresentation heuristics. Such heuristics arise from the fact 
that respondents anticipate a social choice function; that is, the process by which 
responses will be used by the agency to arrive at a policy decision. Respondents‘ 
decision processes could be affected in several ways, depending on the anticipated 
social choice function. In order to influence the outcome in their favour, 
respondents might answer a different question from that being asked, for example 
by considering alternatives accepted in previous choice tasks. 
Carson and Groves (2007) use established mechanism design theory (Hurwicz, 
1972; Mirrlees, 1971) to highlight two specific types of survey mechanism that do 
not induce such heuristics: 
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 It is assumed throughout that backward navigation through choice tasks is prevented, as is often 
the case in internet and CAPI surveys. A mail-out paper survey would require a different analysis 
of heuristics. 
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1) one in which the elicitation format is a single binary choice (between the 
status quo and one alternative) and the social choice function is based on 
majority rule (Farquharson, 1969); and 
2) one in which the elicitation format is a sequence of binary choices and the 
social choice function is based on majority rule applied to a single, 
randomly selected question from the sequence.  
These mechanisms are said to be incentive compatible if the agency can credibly 
claim to be able to force any of the alternatives on any given respondent. It is not 
necessary for the survey to be binding (Carson et al., 1997) or a full public vote 
(Green and Laffont, 1978). Incentive compatibility implies that truthful response 
to each question being asked is the dominant strategy for all respondents. That is, 
truthful response is the utility-maximising strategy for all respondents regardless 
of perceptions about others‘ responses.  
The first mechanism has successfully been applied in the dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation (DCCV) survey context, particularly following its 
recommendation by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) blue ribbon panel in 1993 (Arrow et al., 1993). However, where the 
objective is the estimation of WTP for multiple attributes, the presentation of 
multiple choice tasks per respondent is preferred, and in some cases necessary. It 
greatly increases the statistical efficiency of estimation through opportunities for 
learning how to evaluate choice tasks (Braga and Starmer, 2005) as well as the 
much higher number of choice observations. It allows estimation of individual-
specific taste intensities and heterogeneity in taste intensities across a population, 
which may be problematic when using a single observation per respondent (Rose 
et al., 2009). The second mechanism may be possible in a laboratory environment 
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(Boyle et al., 2004), but in field surveys the ―random draw‖ social choice function 
lacks credibility. Respondents are unlikely to believe that the agency would 
discard the majority of the data that they expended resources collecting (Carson 
and Groves, 2007). As a result, elicitation formats with multiple questions per 
respondent will continue to play an important role in value estimation. It is 
therefore important to understand the decision processes that are induced by these 
survey mechanisms so that WTP estimates are not biased by inappropriate 
modelling assumptions. 
It has long been recognised in neo-classical economic theory that consumers may 
conceal their true preferences if it enables them to obtain a public good at a lower 
cost (Samuelson, 1954). More recently, Carson and Groves (2007) highlighted the 
predictions of this theory in relation to stated choice surveys comprising a 
sequence of binary choices where similar goods are offered at different prices 
over the course of the sequence. One of the predicted patterns of response 
behaviour is the rejection of an alternative that is preferred to the status quo when 
a similar good was offered at a lower cost in a previous choice task. This rejection 
increases the likelihood that the respondent‘s most preferred option observed in 
the sequence of choice tasks to that point is implemented. For example, consider 
the social choice function where any option receiving majority support in a binary 
choice goes on to be considered for implementation by the agency and the 
respondent assumes that options proceeding to that stage have equal likelihood of 
implementation. Under certain assumptions about respondents‘ perceptions of 
others‘ preferences, a respondent may have an incentive to withhold support for 
all but their most preferred option. 
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Bateman et al. (2008b) differentiate between strong cost minimisation, in which 
respondents always reject a (sufficiently similar) good if it was offered at a lower 
cost in a previous choice task, and weak cost minimisation, in which respondents 
weigh up the rejection against the perceived risk of the good not being provided at 
the lower cost. The latter reflects a perceived social choice function in which the 
likelihood of implementation by the agency increases with consumers‘ stated 
WTP (as is often the case when stated choice surveys are used as input to project 
cost-benefit analyses). The prediction in both cases is that, on average, the WTP 
estimate implied by the first question in a sequence will exceed the WTP 
estimates implied by subsequent questions (assuming backward navigation 
through choice tasks is prevented). This prediction has been found to hold 
empirically in several studies (Bateman et al., 2008b; Carson et al., 2009; 
DeShazo, 2002; Racevskis and Lupi, 2008; Scheufele and Bennett, 2010a; 
Scheufele and Bennett, 2010b). 
DeShazo (2002) also argued that respondents evaluate choice questions in terms 
of deviations from reference points based on previously accepted alternatives. He 
argued that respondents‘ value functions shift when a ―non status quo‖ option is 
chosen because the choice is viewed as a transaction up to a probability and this 
causes a revision of the reference point around which the asymmetric value 
function predicted by prospect theory is centred (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Despite the difference in underlying theory, this model shares the two main 
predictions of the weak cost minimisation heuristic; first, that respondents 
compare presented alternatives with alternatives accepted in previous choice 
tasks, and, second, that respondents consider expected utility based on the 
probability of provision. It also shares the prediction that the WTP estimate 
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implied by the first question in a sequence will exceed the WTP estimates implied 
by subsequent questions. 
An entirely different prediction arises if respondents find some questions 
implausible and answer as though cost or attributes of the good are at levels 
considered more realistic or more likely (Carson and Groves, 2007). For example, 
Bateman et al. (2008b) describe a cost averaging strategy in which respondents 
believe that the cost that would be charged if the good were provided would lie 
somewhere in the middle of the range of costs presented in a sequence. Under 
such a strategy, the prediction is that alternatives with cost levels from the low 
(high) end of the range observed by the respondent will be accepted less (more) 
frequently than in a truthful response. There is little empirical evidence of 
respondents employing this heuristic. In fact, Bateman et al. (2008b), when 
investigating the possibility of this heuristic, found that it was contrary to the 
response patterns in the data. 
4.3.3 Value learning heuristics 
Decision processes that violate the second standard assumption are broadly 
classified here as value learning heuristics. Value learning heuristics revolve 
around the idea that preferences are initially poorly-formed and are discovered in 
the process of completing choice tasks (Plott, 1996). They generally predict that 
discovered preferences are positively influenced by the cost levels presented in 
choice tasks.  
The literature identifies a second type of learning, institutional learning. This type 
of learning relates to the process of learning how to evaluate and complete a 
choice task (Braga and Starmer, 2005). Institutional learning and its converse, 
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fatigue, have been shown to influence ―noise‖ in the data, manifest as changes in 
the variance of the random error component (or, equivalently, scale)
25
 (Bradley 
and Daly, 1994; Caussade et al., 2005; Holmes and Boyle, 2005), but there is no 
implied relationship with WTP. Given the focus here on the effect of decision 
processes on WTP, the notions of institutional learning and fatigue are not central 
to the discussion that follows. 
In the context of DCCV surveys with multiple questions per respondent, the 
outcome of value learning decision processes has been termed starting-point or 
anchoring bias. Some of the earliest DCCV surveys used a bidding game format. 
In this format, if a respondent rejected the policy scenario at an initial cost level 
(or bid), follow-up questions would be asked with successively decreasing bids 
until the respondent accepted the policy scenario. If the respondent accepted the 
initial policy scenario, a succession of increasing bids would be offered until the 
policy scenario was rejected. WTP estimates derived from this approach have 
been found to be influenced by the level of the initial bid (Boyle et al., 1985; 
Carson and Mitchell, 1989). Survey formats with limits on the number of follow-
up questions have been found to suffer from the same phenomenon. In the double-
bounded format, which is limited to a single follow-up question either above or 
below the initial bid depending on the response to the initial question, the WTP 
distributions implied by the initial and follow-up questions have been found to 
differ (Hanemann et al., 1991; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; McFadden and 
Leonard, 1995).  
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 In the multinomial logit model, the scale parameter, λ, is an inverse function of the variance of 
the unobserved effects, σ2=π2/6λ2.  
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Ariely et al. (2003) used a series of experiments to show that initial valuations are 
heavily influenced by anchors (even if those anchors are known by respondents to 
be arbitrary), but subsequent valuations are coherent in terms of improvements or 
decrements in the good. They emphasise that this coherent arbitrariness has 
implications not only for SP methods, but for the revelation of preferences in real 
markets. In the first experiment detailed in their paper, participants were asked 
two questions with respect to a range of ordinary consumer goods. In the first 
question, they were asked whether they would be willing to purchase a good for a 
price equal to the last two numbers in their social security number.
26
 In the 
second, they were asked a simple open-ended maximum-WTP question. 
Subsequently, a random device determined whether the good would be sold on the 
basis of the first or second question. The authors found that responses to the 
second question were strongly influenced by the arbitrary bid value used in the 
first question.  
While it has been suggested that some of these outcomes could be explained by 
yea-saying or fatigue, the most commonly held view is that the cost levels 
observed in the choice tasks provide a focal point (or anchor) for the uncertain 
respondent. For example, Herriges and Shogren (1996) model the decision 
process as though respondents form a posterior WTP distribution equal to a 
weighted average of the cost level observed in the given choice task and an 
initially held prior distribution of WTP. The motivation for this decision process 
remains unclear. While some authors have speculated that respondents might infer 
that the cost level reflects some expert opinion of the value of the good (Herriges 
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and Shogren, 1996), the coherent arbitrariness result (Ariely et al., 2003) suggests 
otherwise since the phenomenon remains even when respondents are aware that 
the cost level is entirely arbitrary. 
With respect to the longer sequences of questions typically employed in choice 
experiments, some authors have maintained the focus on the effect of the first 
choice task (Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008), while others have suggested that the 
effect may extend beyond the first task, potentially for the duration of the 
sequence of questions. Although Herriges and Shogren (1996) employed a short, 
two-question elicitation format in their study, they speculated that preference 
revision could take place throughout longer sequences of questions. Bateman et 
al. (2008b) characterised this type of decision process as a ―good deal / bad deal‖ 
heuristic in which an alternative is more (less) likely to be chosen if its cost level 
is low (high) relative to the levels presented in previous choice tasks. Day et al. 
(2009) used the term reference pricing to describe this phenomenon. They found 
evidence to suggest that respondents consider the prices presented in previous 
choice tasks, with more weight placed on recently completed tasks. In contrast, 
Ariely et al. (2003) found that, as a sequence of questions progresses, the initial 
anchor continues to have a greater influence on stated preferences than 
information presented more recently. 
It remains somewhat unclear how this type of decision process should be 
accounted for when estimating WTP given that it clearly implies a relationship 
between WTP estimated under the standard assumptions and the cost levels used 
in the choice survey (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008b). Herriges and Shogren 
(1996) argue that the analyst should be interested in the prior distribution of WTP, 
uncertain as it may be, rather than the posterior distribution influenced by the 
 93 
experimental design. However, other authors have argued that the value learning 
decision process represents a respondent‘s discovery of his/her preferences and 
hence greater weight should be placed on responses to questions presented later in 
a sequence (Braga and Starmer, 2005). Bateman et al. (2008a) highlight the more 
fundamental problem that a decision process in which prices influence values is 
incompatible with standard microeconomic theory. 
4.3.4 Empirical evidence on heuristics as competing hypotheses 
While a number of studies have found evidence of response patterns associated 
with a single heuristic, whether it be a strategic misrepresentation type of heuristic 
(Carson et al., 2009; Carson et al., 2006; Hensher and Collins, 2010) or a value 
learning type of heuristic (Ariely et al., 2003; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008b; 
Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Holmes and Boyle, 2005; Ladenburg and Olsen, 
2008), only a few have tested the heuristics discussed above as competing 
hypotheses to ascertain which best explains responses in a given data set. Two of 
those studies, DeShazo (2002) and Bateman et al. (2008b), found evidence that 
supports the strategic misrepresentation type of heuristic in which consideration is 
given to alternatives accepted in previous choice tasks and to the perceived 
probability of provision. In contrast, the weight of evidence found by Day and 
Pinto (2010) supports a value learning heuristic, although the study found that no 
proposed heuristic unambiguously explained the ―ordering anomalies‖ in the data. 
It appears that no study has investigated the possibility of heterogeneity in 
response behaviour across respondents; that is, the possibility that each of the 
proposed heuristics explains the response behaviour of a sub-group of respondents 
in the survey. 
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4.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, certain challenges associated with estimating the implicit price of, 
and the WTP for, undergrounding have been discussed. Rather than attempting to 
outline all of the valuation challenges being dealt with in the literature, this 
chapter has focused on one particular challenge associated with each of the two 
methods discussed in Chapter 3.  
Turning first to the hedonic price method, a challenge that must be overcome 
when estimating the implicit price of underground wires in a city in which retro-fit 
undergrounding is yet to take place is multicollinearity in the explanatory 
variables of price function. This multicollinearity arises because installation of 
underground wires in new housing developments has only become widespread in 
recent decades and, as a result, the presence of underground wires is typically 
highly correlated with building age, the distance to the CBD and, potentially, 
other important explanatory variables. Disentangling the separate effects of these 
variables becomes difficult when they are highly correlated. The difficulties are 
manifest in the statistical models as large standard errors on the coefficients of the 
relevant variables and a lack of robustness to small changes in model 
specification. 
Although there are many challenges associated with applying SP methods, the 
focus here is on accounting for respondent decision processes that lead to task 
dependence. A growing body of evidence is showing that respondents‘ decision 
processes are influenced by information observed in the course of completing 
choice tasks. Analysing the choice data on the basis of the standard assumptions 
of truthful, independent response and stable underlying preferences is likely to 
lead to biased estimates of WTP. Specific decision processes raised in the 
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literature have been discussed in this chapter in two broad categories – strategic 
misrepresentation and value learning. Strategic misrepresentation involves 
answering a different question from that being asked as a means of influencing the 
policy outcome. Value learning, on the other hand, involves the revision of 
underlying preferences based on information (and, in particular, the cost levels) 
observed in choice tasks. 
The two types of heuristics have important, but quite different, implications for 
the application of stated choice methods. Where strategic misrepresentation is 
prevalent, it seems greater weight should be placed on the response to the first 
question in a sequence, and econometric techniques could be adapted to account 
for the effects of the decision process in subsequent questions. Where value 
learning is prevalent, a more fundamental question is raised about the underlying 
microeconomic theory. In particular, it raises the possibility that values are 
determined, at least in part, by prices. This is at odds with the strict vice versa 
relationship assumed in neo-classical economic theory. It is therefore vital to 
understand the extent to which each of these decision processes may be affecting 
the data generated by a given stated choice survey. 
In the next chapter, research questions are formed on the basis of the valuation 
challenges discussed in this chapter. These research questions will then be 
addressed in the remainder of the thesis using a case study. 
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PART TWO: 
Research design and data 
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5 Research questions, design, and hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
The broad research question outlined in the introductory chapter related to the 
evaluation of net economic benefits from undergrounding electricity networks in 
residential areas. Chapter 2 showed that the marginal social value of network 
service quality is a crucial element in this evaluation, regardless of governance 
structure in the industry. Inaccurate estimation of the values could lead to 
investments with a net economic cost being undertaken and, conversely, 
investments with a net economic benefit not being undertaken. Considerable 
reliance is therefore placed on two methods for gathering information on the 
social value of the network quality improvement resulting from undergrounding – 
the hedonic price method and stated preference (SP) methods. In Chapter 4, the 
focus was narrowed to two specific challenges associated with applying the 
methods – multicollinearity in the hedonic price method and task dependence in 
stated preference methods. In this chapter, research questions are formed on the 
basis of those challenges. A research design is developed to address the questions 
in a case study and, where possible, the hypotheses to be tested are specified.  
5.2 Research questions 
The intention is to form questions and related hypotheses that, once addressed, 
would lead to improvements in the application of the methods or, at least, 
improved understanding of the nature of the challenges and avenues for future 
research. Consistent with the objectives outlined in the introductory chapter, the 
research questions addressed in the case study are as follows: 
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Q1. Can the hedonic price method be adapted to overcome the 
multicollinearity problems generally present in cities where retro-fit 
undergrounding is yet to take place? 
Q2. Do respondents to stated choice surveys employ strategic 
misrepresentation heuristics? 
Q3. Do respondents to stated choice surveys employ value learning 
heuristics? 
Q4. Does elicitation format, in terms of the number of choice tasks per 
respondent and the number of alternatives per choice task, influence the 
extent to which respondents employ strategic misrepresentation or value 
learning heuristics? 
Q5. What is the social value of the network quality improvement that would 
result from undergrounding in the case study area? 
These research questions are addressed using a series of studies based on two data 
sources – real estate sales data and stated choice survey data. As discussed in the 
next chapter, both data sources were collected for a case study area as part of this 
research. The data collection was designed in a specific way to facilitate analysis 
that would generate evidence relating to the research questions. The remainder of 
this chapter describes that design and the hypotheses tested as part of the analysis. 
5.3 Research design and hypotheses 
5.3.1 Hedonic price estimation: research design 
The primary objective of collecting real estate sales data was to facilitate analysis 
that would provide evidence to address the first of the research questions outlined 
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above – Q1. This question relates to whether the hedonic price method can be 
adapted to overcome the multicollinearity problems generally present in cities 
where retro-fit undergrounding is yet to take place. The data can also be used to 
provide limited evidence with respect to the fifth research question, Q5, which 
relates to the estimation of the social value of undergrounding in the case study 
area.  
Turning to the first question, one possible means of overcoming the problems 
posed by multicollinearity is to limit the sample to areas where the correlation 
between underground networks and other explanatory variables is lower. An 
example of such an approach is the boundary discontinuity approach that has been 
applied in studies estimating the implicit price of school quality (Black, 1999; 
Davidoff and Leigh, 2008; Gibbons and Machin, 2003). This approach is a special 
case of the regression discontinuity approach (Hahn et al., 2001). It can be applied 
where property attributes change continuously over space, but the attribute of 
interest changes discretely at a boundary. In this case, it would involve 
comparison of the prices of properties that are broadly similar to each other, but 
on opposite sides of boundaries between adjacent areas serviced by underground 
and overhead wires. As well as minimising correlations, this approach also 
controls for unobserved neighbourhood characteristics by allowing comparison of 
prices for houses with similar access to features such as shopping centres, 
recreational areas and transport facilities, but different types of network service. 
Not all boundaries between overhead and underground network areas would be 
useful for this purpose. Often, they coincide with suburb boundaries. Using data 
from these boundaries does not fully overcome the collinearity problem since it is 
difficult to disentangle the price effects of the type of network infrastructure from 
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those of the unobserved suburb effects (that may be captured in the area fixed 
effects indicator variables). Ideally, the sample would be based around intra-
suburb network boundaries within the case study area.  
To see the importance of the sample selection approach, consider an expansion of 
the sample. Almost all of the introduced data would fall into one of two 
categories: sales of older houses in inner suburbs serviced by overhead wires; and, 
sales of newer houses in outer suburbs serviced by underground wires. These data 
would be of little value since they would hamper efforts to disentangle the price 
effect of underground networks from those of building age and distance to the 
central business district. 
The disadvantage of the intra-suburb boundary approach is that the selective 
sample may not be representative of the wider population. If this were the case, 
then the data would be less useful for gathering evidence with respect to the 
research question relating to the social value of undergrounding in the case study 
area as a whole. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample needs to be 
assessed; for instance, by testing for equivalence in socio-demographic 
characteristics of the two area populations.  
5.3.2 Study #1: Identification and robustness of the implicit property 
price of underground networks 
The first study presented in this thesis, in Chapter 7, analyses data from suburbs in 
the case study area meeting the criteria described above. The intention is to 
estimate the implicit price of underground networks. The main equation estimated 
is a semi-log hedonic price function: 
ln Pijt = α + β.UGij + γ.Zijt + δj + λ.Tt + εijt  
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where 
ln Pijt is the log of real price of house i in area j at time t;  
UGij is a dummy variable for indicating that house i is serviced by 
underground wires;  
Zijt is a vector of other house attributes; 
Tt is a vector of time trend variables; and,  
δj are area fixed effects.  
The focus of the study is β, the parameter used to establish the implicit price of 
underground wires. Other house attributes are included where they are likely to be 
significant or correlated with type of infrastructure in the sample areas. The null 
hypothesis to be tested is that the coefficient, β, on the underground networks 
indicator variable, UG, in the hedonic price function is zero.  
There are two problems posed by mulitcollinearity. The first is that 
multicollinearity leads to large standard errors. If the standard error on the 
coefficient is sufficiently low that the coefficient estimate is statistically different 
from zero, then this problem will have been overcome. The other problem is that 
the coefficient estimate is highly sensitive to changes in model specification. To 
assess whether this problem has been overcome, statistical significance is tested 
for several variants on the main model specification. If the coefficient is 
significant for each variant, then this problem will also have been overcome.  
Hypothesis #1  10H : β = 0 
   1AH : β ≠ 0 
With respect to Q5, this study provides limited evidence relating to the social 
value of the network quality improvement that would result from undergrounding 
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in the case study area. As described in detail in Chapter 3, the implicit price of 
underground wires, β, represents the value placed on undergrounding by the 
marginal purchaser of that attribute in the real estate market. To estimate the 
social value of undergrounding, the analyst requires an estimate of the average or 
total value placed on undergrounding across all households. The coefficient, β, 
provides an estimate of one point on the demand curve for undergrounding, but 
this is not sufficient to calculate the social value of undergrounding, which equals 
the area under the entire demand curve. It does, however, provide an indication of 
where the demand curve lies. 
5.3.3 Stated choice survey: research design 
Turning now to the design of the stated choice data collection, there are four 
research questions to be addressed by the data. The first two, Q2 and Q3, relate to 
ascertaining whether respondents are employing strategic misrepresentation or 
value learning heuristics. The third, Q4, relates to the influence of elicitation 
format (in terms of the number of choice tasks per respondent and the number of 
alternatives per choice task) on the extent to which those heuristics are employed 
by respondents. The fourth, Q5, relates to the social value of undergrounding in 
the case study area. 
One way of assessing whether strategic misrepresentation heuristics are being 
employed in a multiple question elicitation format is to compare responses to a 
control group that is free from strategic misrepresentation. To achieve this, a split-
sample treatment of elicitation format was used. One group of respondents 
received an incentive compatible survey mechanism comprising a single binary 
choice between the status quo (the current overhead network service) and an 
undergrounding option with a suburb-based majority-rule social choice function 
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(the single binary, SB, format).
27
 A second group responded to an expanded 
elicitation format comprising a sequence of four binary choice tasks (the repeated 
binary, RB, format).
28
  
Data from the RB format can also be used to assess whether value learning 
heuristics are being employed by respondents. To ensure this is possible, the order 
in which choice tasks were presented to respondents was cycled through all 
possible orderings. This allows analysis of the influence of cost levels observed in 
previous choice tasks. For example, it is possible to compare whether a $4,000 
undergrounding option offered in the third choice task is more likely to be 
accepted if the options presented in the previous choice tasks cost $2,000 and 
$12,000 as opposed to $2,000 and $6,000. 
Turning to the question relating to the influence of elicitation format on the 
adoption of both types of heuristic, the influence of expanding the number of 
choice tasks per respondent can be assessed by comparing responses to the SB and 
RB formats. However, to examine the influence of expanding the number of 
alternatives per choice task, a third elicitation format in the sample was required. 
This third group responded to a further expanded elicitation format comprising a 
                                                 
27
 It is also necessary for the agency to credibly claim to be able to force any alternative on a given 
household. It is a maintained assumption that this condition held in the stated choice survey in this 
thesis. It is expected that the presence of ActewAGL, the local electricity network service 
provider, as a partner in the research (reflected in the branding on the questionnaire) would have 
assisted in this regard. 
28
 All non status quo alternatives involve new underground infrastructure. This ensures that every 
alternative in the design is meaningful as an SB choice, while allowing the same set of alternatives 
to be used in all elicitation formats. 
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sequence of four choice tasks each made up of the status quo and two 
undergrounding options (the multinomial, MN, format). The effect of this 
expansion of the number of alternatives is assessed by comparing evidence on the 
adoption of heuristics in data from the RB and MN formats. 
To ensure approximately equal representation of elicitation formats across choice 
observations, four in six respondents were assigned to the SB format, and one in 
six were assigned to each of the RB and MN formats. In both the RB and MN 
formats, the order in which choice tasks were presented to respondents was cycled 
through all possible orderings to ensure that the role of cost level ordering in the 
strategic misrepresentation and value learning heuristics can be determined. A 
summary of the split-sample treatment of elicitation format is presented in Figure 
5.1. 
The alternatives used in the choice tasks in each format were drawn from the same 
design to ensure that the effects of elicitation format can be isolated from other 
design-driven effects. An example of the translation of a design comprising eight 
undergrounding options to the split-sample treatment of elicitation formats is 
presented in Figure 5.2. The figure represents a cycle of 12 respondents. Eight 
respondents are assigned to the SB format. Each receives one of the eight 
undergrounding options. Two respondents are assigned to the MN sample-split. 
Both are offered all eight undergrounding options over the course of four choice 
tasks. Two respondents are assigned to the RB format. Each receives half of the 
eight undergrounding options over the course of four binary choice tasks. One of 
those respondents receives the four undergrounding options presented in the 
column on the far right-hand side of the choice tasks in the MN format. The other 
respondent receives the remaining four undergrounding options.  
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Sample split Single binary (SB) Repeated binary (RB) Multinomial (MN) 
Stylised 
representation of 
elicitation format  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social choice function 
The agency will 
proceed with further 
investigation of the 
undergrounding 
option in your suburb 
if it is preferred to the 
current service by 
more than 50% of 
survey respondents in 
your suburb. 
The agency will proceed with further 
investigation of an undergrounding option in 
your suburb if it is preferred to the current 
service by more than 50% of survey 
respondents in your suburb. 
Proportion of full 
sample of 
respondents, N 
4/6 1/6 1/6 
Figure 5.1: The split sample survey mechanism 
Finally, by recruiting survey respondents from the case study area, the data can 
also be used to estimate the social value of the network quality improvement 
resulting from undergrounding in that area. 
This thesis presents four studies that analyse the data generated by the stated 
choice survey. Each tests a hypothesis or series of hypotheses that address the 
research questions. These hypotheses are detailed in the following sections. 
 
 106 
Resp 1 Resp 9
SQ A SQ A SQ C SQ E SQ G
… … … … … … _ … … … _ … … … _ … … …
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Resp 2 Resp 10
SQ B SQ B SQ D SQ F SQ H
… … … … … … _ … … … _ … … … _ … … …
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Resp 3 Resp 11
SQ C SQ A B SQ C D SQ E F SQ G H
… … … … … … … _ … … … … _ … … … … _ … … … …
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Resp 4 Resp 12
SQ D SQ A B SQ C D SQ G H SQ E F
… … … … … … … _ … … … … _ … … … … _ … … … …
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Resp 5
SQ E
… … …
… … …
□ □ Notes:
Resp 6 SQ denotes status quo alternative.
SQ F
… … … A - H denote undergrounding options.
… … …
□ □ Respondents 1-8 receive SB  format.
Resp 7 Respondents 9-10 receive RB  format.
SQ G
… … … Respondents 11-12 receive MN  format.
… … …
□ □ Choice task orderings in the RB and MN
formats vary in subsequent cycles.
Resp 8
SQ H
… … …
… … …
□ □
 
Figure 5.2: Linking the design to the split-sample treatment of elicitation format 
5.3.4 Study #2: A comparison of responses to single and repeated 
discrete choice questions 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the prediction of neo-classical economic theory is that 
strategic misrepresentation heuristics will be employed in the RB format, but not 
in the SB format. The expected pattern of response behaviour in the RB format is 
the rejection of some undergrounding options that would have been accepted had 
they been presented as a single choice task. As a result, the prediction is that 
estimated willingness to pay (WTP) for undergrounding would be lower in the RB 
format than in the SB format. This prediction is tested by comparing expected 
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WTP for the mean undergrounding scenario from a multinomial logit (MNL) 
model estimated on data from the SB format with the equivalent estimate from a 
MNL model estimated on data from the RB format.  
The author is aware of just one existing study (Racevskis and Lupi, 2008) and one 
concurrent study (Scheufele and Bennett, 2010a) employing this type of split-
sample treatment of elicitation format. As yet, there is no body of evidence to 
support or counter Racevskis and Lupi‘s (2008) finding of a significant difference 
between models fitted to data from the SB and RB elicitation formats. This thesis 
represents a contribution towards addressing this research gap.  
The (one-tailed) hypothesis to be tested is based on the prediction of theory. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis would be consistent with the prediction of the 
strategic misrepresentation heuristic. 
Hypothesis #2  20H : E(WTP)SB = E(WTP)RB  
   2AH : E(WTP)SB > E(WTP)RB  
 where t
j
j
jt
jj dx
V
V
dxWTPE coscos
)exp(
)exp(
)( 
   as described in Chapter 3. 
The MNL model is utilised for this test because models estimating heterogeneity 
in taste (the mixed logit (ML) model), scale (the scaled MNL model) or both (the 
generalised mixed logit model) across individuals are problematic when estimated 
on data with a single choice observation per respondent. Although ML models 
may be able to disentangle the Gumbel error distribution and the random 
parameter distributions when estimated on repeated choice data (Fosgerau and 
Nielsen, 2006), further work is required to establish whether this is true of models 
estimated on single binary choice data. Rose et al. (2009) found random 
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parameter estimates to be statistically insignificant where data were single choice 
observations per respondent in their study of the impact of the number of choice 
tasks per respondent.  
Economic theory also predicts that responses to the SB format may differ from 
responses to the first question presented to each respondent in the RB format. The 
first question presented in the RB format does not hold the ―take it or leave it‖ 
property required for incentive compatibility. The consequence of this is that, in 
theory, respondents may reject an alternative in anticipation of receiving a better 
offer later in the sequence. The question as to whether this prediction is realised in 
practice is an important one, since, if it is not, the RB format would be preferred to 
the SB format due to the additional information it generates at little or no 
additional cost. 
To test whether stated preferences in the first of a sequence of choice tasks are 
affected by advance knowledge that multiple choice tasks will be presented, the 
MNL model on the RB data used to test Hypothesis #2 is altered to include 
interactions between the cost variable and indicator variables for the order in 
which choice tasks were presented. For example, an indicator variable, q1, would 
take the value one when a choice task is the first presented to a respondent (and 
zero or minus one otherwise depending on the coding approach).
29
 Again, the test 
involves a one-tailed comparison of WTP for the mean undergrounding scenario 
from MNL models on the two response formats, but, in this test, WTP is 
evaluated at the first question in the sequence in the model on the RB data.  
                                                 
29
 The effects coding approach used in the study is detailed in Chapter 8. 
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Hypothesis #3  30H : E(WTP)
SB
 = E(WTP)
RB | q1 = 1
  
   3AH : E(WTP)
SB
 > E(WTP)
RB | q1 = 1
 
Although rejection of 30H  would be consistent with the prediction of the cost 
minimisation heuristics, the same result would follow from a value learning 
heuristic that is asymmetric in the way in which cost levels influence underlying 
preferences. If lower cost levels have a greater impact on preference revision, 
then, over the course of a sequence, average underlying WTP will fall. Further 
testing would be required to understand which heuristic is best supported by the 
data and whether there is heterogeneity in heuristics across respondents; that is, 
whether sub-groups of respondents are employing different heuristics giving a 
mixed overall outcome. Two approaches are taken to gathering this evidence. The 
first examines the effect of ―relative cost position‖, which, as will become clear, 
provides evidence on which heuristics best explain the data pooled across all 
respondents. In the second approach, an equality-constrained latent class (ECLC) 
model is used to estimate the proportions of respondents behaving in accordance 
with the different heuristics. This approach also allows examination of whether 
the number of alternatives per choice task influences the heuristics employed by 
respondents. 
5.3.5 Study #3: The effect of relative cost position on response 
behaviour towards a sequence of choice questions 
Turning to the ―relative cost position‖ approach, the intention is to understand 
which heuristics may be most prevalent in the data. While it may not be possible 
to identify whether an heuristic has been employed by observing the responses of 
a single respondent, over a sufficiently large sample, it is possible to identify the 
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response patterns predicted by a given heuristic in terms of relationships between 
responses and cost levels observed by respondents in previous choice tasks. The 
means of achieving this are to incorporate, in ML and MNL models on the RB 
data, variables indicating the four possible ―relative positions‖ for the cost level 
presented in a choice task. In any given choice task, the cost level presented must 
be one of the following four ―relative positions‖: 
a) both the minimum and the maximum level presented in the sequence to 
that point (m11);
30
 
b) the minimum, but not the maximum level presented in the sequence to that 
point (m10); 
c) the maximum, but not the minimum level presented in the sequence to that 
point (m01); or 
d) neither the minimum nor the maximum level presented in the sequence to 
that point (m00). 
In this study, the m11, m10 and m01 indicator variables are interacted with the 
cost variable to allow estimation of the relationship between cost sensitivity and 
the positioning of the cost level relative to the levels presented to the respondent 
in previous choice tasks. For example, if the parameter estimate for the m00 
interaction is significantly higher than that for the m01 interaction, this indicates 
that cost sensitivity is lower (and WTP is higher) when the cost level is within the 
range of levels presented in previous choice tasks relative to when it is the highest 
                                                 
30
 A necessary and sufficient condition for the m11 relative position is that the question is the first 
in the sequence. 
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level presented in the sequence to that point (with all other variables, including 
cost, held constant). This would imply, for example, that an alternative with a cost 
level of $4,000 is more likely to be chosen if previously presented cost levels were 
$2,000 and $6,000 than if they were $2,000 and $1,000.  
The relationships between the relative cost position interaction coefficients 
implied by the various heuristics are presented in Table 5.1. Strong cost 
minimisation predicts an increase in cost sensitivity when the cost level is not the 
minimum presented in the sequence to that point. Alternatives are rejected 
whether cost is the highest level observed by the respondent or within the range 
observed. Under weak cost minimisation the relationship between these two 
relative positions is uncertain since likelihood of acceptance depends on the 
maximum level of cost accepted in the sequence to that point. The parameter 
relationships implied by reference point revision are the same as those implied by 
weak cost minimisation, with likelihood of acceptance decreasing where a lower-
cost alternative has been presented in an earlier choice task. Value learning 
implies that cost sensitivity is increased when cost is the highest level observed by 
the respondent and decreased when cost is the lowest level observed by the 
respondent relative to the first question or to questions in which cost lies within 
the range observed by the respondent. Cost averaging implies the opposite set of 
effects. Finally, the standard assumptions imply that relative cost position has no 
influence.  
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Table 5.1: Parameter relationships implied by heuristics 
Heuristic Implied parameter relationships 
Strong cost minimisation βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost=βm00*cost 
Weak cost minimisation βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost and 
βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm00*cost Reference point revision 
Value learning 
βm10*cost>βm11*cost>βm01*cost and 
βm10*cost>βm00*cost>βm01*cost 
Cost averaging 
βm10*cost<βm11*cost<βm01*cost and 
βm10*cost<βm00*cost<βm01*cost 
Standard assumptions βm10*cost=βm11*cost=βm00*cost=βm01*cost=0 
 
The parameter estimates from the models are compared to these implied 
relationships to determine which heuristics are consistent with, or counter to, the 
data. Identification of a single overriding theory may not be possible, but some 
discrimination is possible and allows a narrowing of the range of potential 
explanations for the response behaviour observed in the RB sample.  
A null hypothesis of truthful response with stable preferences is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis of task dependence. If the null is rejected, behavioural 
explanations for the task dependence are sought by comparing the interaction 
coefficient relationships to those implied by the heuristics.  
Hypothesis #4  
4
0H : βm11*cost = 0 and βm10*cost = 0 and βm00*cost = 0 and βm01*cost = 0 
4
AH : βm11*cost ≠ 0 or βm10*cost ≠ 0 or βm00*cost ≠ 0 or βm01*cost ≠ 0 
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The ML model uses the relative cost position indicator variables to explain 
heterogeneity in the mean and variance (heteroscedasticity) of the distribution of 
cost sensitivity over respondents. The results will provide preliminary insights 
into any heterogeneity in the way in which respondents behave in the presence of 
a particular relative cost position. This will deepen the understanding of the nature 
of the heuristic or heuristics being employed by respondents in this survey. 
5.3.6 Study #4: A latent class approach to estimating heterogeneity 
in response behaviour towards a sequence of choice 
questions 
While the study into the effect of relative cost position identifies the heuristics that 
best explain the response patterns in the data, it is not well-suited to estimating the 
extent of any heterogeneity in response behaviour across respondents. The 
possibility of heterogeneity in the use of heuristics is investigated separately in 
this study. An ECLC model is used to estimate the latent (or unknown) 
proportions of respondents behaving in accordance with three heuristics based on 
the three broad types of decision process discussed in Chapter 4: 
1) the standard assumptions (truthful, independent response with stable 
preferences); 
2) value learning; and 
3) strategic misrepresentation.31 
                                                 
31
 It is not possible to elicit this information simply by asking respondents to reveal their 
behaviour. The responses would be of little value since those behaving in accordance with the 
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The model is applied to data from both the RB and MN formats.  
Recall from Chapter 3 that the latent class logit choice probability function for the 
discrete choice from J alternatives is:  
Prob[choice j by individual i in choice task t | class q ] = Pit|q = 
 
   

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The probability that individual i belongs to class q of Q is: 
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The log-likelihood function to be maximised is the sum over individuals of the log 
of the expectation over classes of the joint probability of the sequence of T 
choices. 
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The standard attributes, x, are defined so that they take the value zero in the status 
quo utility function. To achieve this, the attributes are defined in terms of changes 
relative to the status quo. The reason for this redefinition becomes clearer in the 
discussion to follow. 
The Q classes are defined by separate parameter vectors, βjq. Parameters are 
constrained to take the value zero in certain classes, but the non-zero parameters 
to be estimated will be constrained to take the same value across classes (that is, 
they will be assumed to be generic). These Q vectors effectively translate to Q sets 
                                                                                                                                     
strategic misrepresentation heuristic would indicate that they responded to each choice task 
independently and truthfully. 
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of utility functions to which respondents are assigned up to a probability to 
maximise the log-likelihood function.  
In this study, Q=3 sets of utility functions are specified to capture the response 
patterns associated with each of the three types of decision process. Given that the 
literature contains variants on each hypothesis, there is likely to be some argument 
about how the utility functions should be specified for each class. While it is not 
claimed that the functions specified here represent a definitive set of utility 
functions, they are considered the most suitable for this study based on the weight 
of evidence in the literature and model fit testing. They are tailored to analyse 
responses to stated choice surveys in which similar goods are offered at very 
different prices over the course of a sequence.
32
 The consequence is that value 
learning and strategic behaviour tend to be driven mainly by the cost attribute. 
These utility functions are specified accordingly, however, the approach could be 
expanded to incorporate the effects of other attributes.  
Standard assumptions (Class 1) 
The utility functions specified for the latent class of respondents behaving in 
accordance with the standard assumptions are the conventional sum-product of the 
k attributes as they appear in the choice task being answered and their associated 
taste intensities:  
                                                 
32
 This type of survey is required here since significant heterogeneity is expected in the distribution 
of WTP for undergrounding over the population, but credible project options are viewed as 
similar. 
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Uit,SQ,class1  =  1x1,it,SQ + … + kxk,it,SQ 
Uit,ALT,class1  = 0 +  1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT 
Value learning (Class 2) 
The second latent class represents those responding in accordance with a value 
learning heuristic. The focus here is on the role of cost levels in value learning. 
Cost levels are generally considered to be the main influence in the value learning 
process in stated choice surveys in which similar goods are offered at very 
different prices over the course of a sequence. The utility function is specified to 
capture the response patterns of this group by allowing the alternative-specific 
preference to vary with the average of cost levels observed in the sequence up to 
and including the current choice task.
33
 The cost level in the current choice task is 
included in the average to accommodate the prediction of coherent arbitrariness 
(Ariely et al., 2003), anchoring, and starting-point bias (Herriges and Shogren, 
1996) that the cost level observed in the first choice task will influence 
preferences prior to response. The utility functions are as follows: 
Uit,SQ,class2  =  1x1,it,SQ + … + kxk,it,SQ 
Uit,ALT,class2  = 0 +  1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT + k+1zit,ALT 
                                                 
33
 In longer sequences of choice tasks, perfect recall is less likely and a weighted specification (for 
example Day et al., 2009) may be preferred to the equal-weight average applied here. In this study, 
it was not possible to estimate separate classes for different lengths of choice tasks over which the 
learning occurs. The class is defined in such a way that learning occurs over the duration of the full 
sequence of four choice tasks, but value revision is based on changes in average observed cost, 
which become smaller on average over the course of a sequence.  
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where 
zitj = z
o
itj – žj 
z
o
itj  = the average of cost levels observed up to and including the 
current choice task 
žj  = the average of cost levels in the sample (across all respondents 
and all choice tasks) 
The purpose of žj is econometric rather than behavioural. It simply ―normalises‖ 
the average observed cost variable by ensuring its sample mean is approximately 
zero. This prevents the latent class model from using the coefficient, k+1, to infer 
heterogeneity in taste across classes, thus ensuring the model estimates only 
heterogeneity in response behaviour towards the sequence of questions.  
The average observed cost variable is calculated using only on the cost levels 
observed in undergrounding alternatives and it is included only in the utility 
function for undergrounding alternatives. Cost levels observed in the status quo 
alternative, which are zero in every case, are not included in the calculation and 
the status quo utility function is unchanged from Class 1. 
A positive coefficient on the average observed cost variable would indicate, for 
example, that respondents are more likely to accept a $6,000 undergrounding 
alternative in the second question of a sequence if the first question contained an 
undergrounding alternative costing $4,000 rather than $2,000.  
Strategic misrepresentation (Class 3) 
In a third class of response behaviour, utility functions are specified to capture the 
response patterns predicted by a strategic misrepresentation heuristic. The 
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heuristic is modelled on the weak cost minimisation and reference point revision 
heuristics in that it has two features.
34
 The first is that respondents compare 
alternatives to those accepted in previous choice tasks. In particular, they choose 
the status quo option not only when the status quo is preferred to the alternatives, 
but, potentially, also when a previously accepted alternative is preferred to the 
alternatives currently on offer. It is assumed that respondents effectively replace 
the status quo with a reference alternative once they have expressed a preference 
for an alternative over the status quo. The reference alternative is defined as the 
highest-cost alternative previously accepted in the sequence. Over the range of 
cost and WTP levels that matter, this reference alternative yields the highest 
expected utility (based on the provision probabilities discussed below) of all 
previously accepted alternatives.
35
 
The second feature of this heuristic is that respondents consider the probability of 
provision. When a similar good is offered at very different cost levels over the 
course of a sequence of choice tasks, respondents may assume that higher-cost 
goods are more likely to be provided because the agency is more likely to proceed 
with the project the higher the respondents‘ stated WTP. It is assumed that the 
perceived probability of project provision is equal to the ratio of the maximum 
                                                 
34
 These are shown in Study #3 (Chapter 9) to be the most prevalent strategic misrepresentation 
heuristics in the data. 
35
 A spreadsheet simulation showed that, if the good being offered is sufficiently similar across 
tasks, the highest-cost alternative previously accepted yields higher expected utility (as a reference 
alternative) than all other previously accepted alternatives for all combinations of WTP and cost 
(in the present task) in which the present alternative yields expected utility higher than at least one 
previously accepted alternative. 
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cost level accepted and the maximum cost level observed.
36
 Consider the case 
where a project option priced at $4,000 is accepted in the first of a sequence of 
binary choice tasks. If a project option priced at $8,000 is presented in the second 
task, then the perceived probability of project provision is revised to 50 per cent. 
The respondent is faced with a trade-off. The perceived probability of provision 
can be increased to 100 per cent, but at the cost of accepting the more expensive 
($8,000) alternative. If the alternative is accepted, it becomes the reference 
alternative in the next choice task. Alternatively, if a project option priced at 
$2,000 is presented in the second choice task, then the choice does not influence 
the probability of project provision (and the respondent will accept the $2,000 
alternative assuming the goods are sufficiently similar).  
The utility equations represent the expected utilities from the reference and 
current alternatives:
37
 
Uit,SQ,class3  = pit,SQ(0 + 1x
a
1,it + … + kx
a
k,it) 
Uit,ALT,class3  = pit,ALT(0 + 1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT) 
where 
                                                 
36
 The perceived probability of provision is unlikely to ever be 100 per cent due to uncertainty 
about others‘ preferences and the advisory nature of most surveys. However, it is the relative 
probabilities, rather than the absolute probabilities, that are important in determining the choice 
probabilities.    
37
 The ―1-p‖ terms are not required since utility from the status quo is zero. 
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x
a
it = the levels of attributes in the highest-cost alternative accepted in 
previous choice tasks (x
a
1,it is the maximum cost level accepted in previous 
choice tasks) 
pit,SQ = x
a
1,it/x
o
1,it 
x
o
1,it = the maximum cost level observed up to and including the current 
choice task 
pit,ALT = max[pit,SQ , x1,it,ALT/x
o
1,it] 
The importance of defining the standard attributes in terms of changes relative to 
the status quo now becomes clear. If a respondent has chosen the status quo in all 
choice tasks to a given point, then x
a
1,it=0, pit,SQ=0 and Uit,SQ,class3= Uit,SQ,class1= 
Uit,SQ,class2=0. In the first question in a sequence, the Class 3 utility functions are 
identical to those in Class 1 since pit,SQ=0 and pit,ALT=1. Once a respondent has 
chosen an alternative over the status quo, that alternative replaces the status quo as 
the reference point and Uit,SQ,class3>0. Alternatives presented in subsequent choice 
tasks are accepted if the expected utility from choosing the alternative exceeds the 
expected utility from choosing the reference alternative.  
Class structure in the equality-constrained latent class model 
The three sets of utility functions are operationalised in the latent class model by 
three separate sets of restrictions on a ‗master‘ utility function. Certain parameters 
are restricted to be zero and certain parameters are restricted to be equal both 
within and across classes, as shown in Table 5.2. The alternative-specific 
constants and the standard attributes, x, are divided into two parts – one multiplied 
by pit,ALT and another by 1- pit,ALT. In Classes 1 and 2, coefficients on attributes 
multiplied by pit,ALT and 1- pit,ALT are assumed to be equal so that they represent 
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the marginal utility of the standard attribute without consideration of the 
probability of provision. In Class 3, the coefficients on attributes multiplied by 1- 
pit,ALT are set to zero so that utility does depend on the probability of provision. A 
set of reference alternative variables are restricted to hold zero value in Classes 1 
and 2 (in which previously accepted alternatives are ignored), but in Class 3, they 
are assumed to have the same taste intensities as the equivalent variables in the 
―non status quo‖ alternatives in the current choice task. All non-zero attributes are 
assumed to take the same value across classes. 
Table 5.2: Class structure 
Variable Alternative 
 Parametersa  
Class 1 
(Standard) 
Class 2 
(Learning) 
Class 3 
(Strategic) 
pit,SQ Status quo 0 0 0 
x
a
itpit,SQ Status quo 0 0  
pit,ALT Underground alternative 0 0 0 
xitpit,ALT Underground alternative    
1-pit,ALT Underground alternative 0 0 0 
xit(1-pit,ALT) Underground alternative   0 
zit,ALT Underground alternative 0 k+1 0 
a  refers to a coefficient vector, 1, 2,…, k, associated with x1,…, xk. 
Two sets of hypotheses are tested. The first set tests whether each heuristic 
explains the behaviour of a positive proportion of respondents. Recall that Gq is 
the estimated proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with heuristic q 
of Q. 
Hypothesis #5  50H : G1
RB
 = 0   
    5AH : G1
RB
 ≠ 0   
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 Hypothesis #6  60H : G2
RB
 = 0   
    6AH : G2
RB
 ≠ 0   
 Hypothesis #7  70H : G3
RB
 = 0   
    7AH : G3
RB
 ≠ 0  
Hypothesis #8  80H : G1
MN
 = 0 
   8AH : G1
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #9  90H : G2
MN
 = 0 
   9AH : G2
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #10 100H : G3
MN
 = 0 
   10AH : G3
MN
 ≠ 0 
The second set of hypotheses tests whether the proportions differ between data 
from the RB and MN formats. 
Hypothesis #11 110H : G1
RB
 – G1
MN
 = 0 
   11AH : G1
RB
 – G1
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #12 120H : G2
RB
 – G2
MN
 = 0 
   12AH : G2
RB
 – G2
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #13 130H : G3
RB
 – G3
MN
 = 0 
   13AH : G3
RB
 – G3
MN
 ≠ 0 
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5.3.7 Study #5: Estimates of household benefits for the case study 
area 
The method for estimating the household benefits from undergrounding in the 
case study area is informed by the results of the preceding studies. Therefore, the 
approach to accounting for the decision processes of respondents is described in 
Chapter 11. The key measure of household benefits to be estimated is the mean 
WTP for undergrounding across survey respondents. From a policy perspective, 
there is also interest in the heterogeneity in WTP across respondents and whether 
this heterogeneity can be related to the specific benefits of undergrounding valued 
most by respondents or to the socio-economic characteristics of respondents. This 
would assist policy makers in identifying which residential areas would benefit 
most from undergrounding. To enable this type of analysis, the questionnaire 
included the question: ―What would be the two most significant benefits to your 
household from undergrounding? 
1) improved appearance and unobstructed views; 
2) fewer power cuts; 
3) better safety, particularly during storms and bushfires; 
4) reduced tree trimming requirements and associated costs; 
5) fewer restrictions on use of yard space (for example, for construction 
of a garage or swimming pool); 
6) less need for ActewAGL to access your backyard; or 
7) other (please specify below).‖ 
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The questionnaire also included questions about the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondent and their household. In particular, questions 
relate to the age, gender and education of the respondent, the number of persons in 
the household, the suburb location of the household and annual household 
income. 
The answers to these questions can then be incorporated as respondent 
characteristics, zit, in the indirect utility function described in Chapter 3: 
 Vitj  = αij + i′xitj + δi′zit 
In the case of data from the binary elicitation formats, they can then be related to 
the household benefits from undergrounding by examining their effect on the 
measure of expected WTP: 
t
j
j
jt
jj dx
V
V
dxWTPE coscos
)exp(
)exp(
)( 
    
5.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has established a structure for the research presented in the remainder 
of this thesis. It has outlined questions relating to the conceptual and practical 
challenges discussed in Chapter 4 that, once addressed, will lead to improvements 
in the application of the methods or, at least, improved understanding of the nature 
of the challenges and avenues for future research. A series of studies has been 
designed to address these research questions using two data sources – real estate 
sales data and a stated choice survey. Approaches to data collection have been 
designed in a specific way to facilitate analysis that generates evidence relating to 
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the research questions. Where possible, the hypotheses to be tested in the studies 
have been specified. 
The next chapter details the two data collection processes. Then, results from the 
four studies examining valuation challenges are set out in Chapters 7 through 10. 
Chapter 11 provides estimates of the household benefits of undergrounding for 
policy use and Chapter 12 discusses the study outcomes and concludes the thesis. 
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6 Data collection 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, it was established that the marginal social value of 
network service quality is a crucial element in defining the conditions under 
which undergrounding electricity networks would result in a net economic benefit. 
Two methods for estimating this value were introduced and certain challenges 
associated with applying those methods were discussed. In Chapter 5, research 
questions were posed on the basis of those challenges and the structure for the 
studies conducted to address those questions was established. Approaches to 
collecting data from two sources for the purpose of facilitating those studies were 
described. This chapter details the data collection that took place. The chapter 
begins with an introduction to the case study area – the city of Canberra, 
Australia. Then, the collection of real estate sales data and stated choice survey 
data are detailed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. Section 6.5 concludes the 
chapter.  
6.2 The case study area: Canberra, Australia 
The case study area for the studies presented in this thesis is the city of Canberra, 
Australia. Canberra is the capital city of Australia and had a population of 
approximately 351,000 at the time of the data collection in mid-2009.
38
 Electricity 
                                                 
38
 The population of the wider ―Australian Capital Region‖, including Canberra and areas in 
surrounding New South Wales, was approximately 575,000 (Source: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics Cat No. 1308.8). 
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networks in Canberra have been placed underground in the majority of high-
density residential and commercial areas. The only lower-density residential areas 
to be serviced by underground networks are those developed since underground 
installation became a standard condition in land development deeds in the late 
1980s. The suburbs serviced entirely by underground networks are shown by the 
shaded areas in Figure 6.1. Approximately 70 per cent of Canberra households 
(about 100,000 households) are situated in older suburbs serviced by overhead 
networks (represented by the unshaded areas in the figure). The networks in these 
suburbs are usually reticulated along the rear boundary of properties, reflecting 
Canberra‘s original town planning decision to limit the amount of overhead street 
verge reticulation. A few of those suburbs contain a mix of sections serviced by 
overhead and underground wires because they were developed during the period 
in the 1980s when underground installation was starting to become a standard 
condition in land development deeds. These suburbs are discussed in more detail 
in the following section.  
The electricity distribution network service provider in Canberra, ActewAGL 
Distribution (ActewAGL), is considering the merits of replacing existing 
overhead infrastructure with new underground networks. The benefit estimates 
derived in this thesis are an input to ActewAGL‘s cost-benefit analysis of the 
potential project. 
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Figure 6.1: Map of Canberra suburbs by network type 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and ActewAGL Distribution network maps 
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6.3 Property sales data 
6.3.1 Selection of suburbs 
The research design set out in Chapter 5 involved collection of real estate sales 
data from suburbs containing a mix of overhead and underground infrastructure. 
Several candidate suburbs in Canberra were identified. Most were developed 
during the period in the 1980s when underground installation was starting to 
become a standard condition in land development deeds. Following site visits and 
advice from valuers with extensive experience in the city (Egan National Valuers, 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Branch, and Frank Brodrick of CB Richard 
Ellis), three of these suburbs (Calwell, Florey and Macarthur) were selected for 
analysis due to the relative homogeneity of neighbourhoods and housing stock 
across sections with overhead and underground wires. The areas serviced by 
underground wires in each suburb are shown in Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3, and Figure 
6.4. 
As acknowledged in Chapter 5, the risk when using a selective sample is that the 
data are not representative of the broader population. Table 6.1 (p. 131) presents a 
comparison of the characteristics of individuals and households in the three 
sample suburbs and Canberra as a whole. Residents in the sample suburbs tend to 
be younger and household sizes tend to be larger; but, importantly, the sample 
suburbs are representative of Canberra in terms of unemployment and the 
distributions of household income and house size (measured as the number of 
bedrooms). 
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Figure 6.2: Underground networks in Florey 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Underground networks in Calwell 
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Figure 6.4: Underground networks in Macarthur 
 
Table 6.1  Comparison of individual and household characteristics 
 
Sample suburbs 
(per cent) 
Canberra (per 
cent) 
χ2 tests for 
differences (p-value) 
Weekly household income:   
A$0 – A$1,699  49.9 50.9 0.20 
A$2,500 or more  21.0 21.6 0.53 
    
Unemployment rate  3.4 3.4 0.81 
    
Age:    
0-14 years  22.6 19.1 0.00 
65 years and older  5.3 9.7 0.00 
    
Separate houses - household size:   
5 persons or more  16.4 14.0 0.00 
    
Separate houses - building size:   
3 bedrooms  44.2 45.3 0.24 
4 bedrooms  52.7 51.2 0.11 
Source: ABS 2006 Census Data  
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6.3.2 Variables and data sources 
Data were collected for sales of detached houses in these three suburbs between 
January 2004 and September 2008. The variables employed in the analysis and 
their sources are shown in Table 6.2. The variables were chosen based on a review 
of the literature (for example, Ball, 1973; Kain and Quigley, 1970) and 
discussions with experienced valuers. The housing attributes found to be most 
significant in recent house price studies in Canberra by Davidoff and Leigh (2008) 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008) were included. Quality of view was 
included because of its significance in several studies (for example Benson et al. 
(1998)).
39
 Land characteristic data collected were: the size of the block, the 
distance to the central business district (CBD), a 3-point scale rating of the quality 
of views
40
, and dummy variables for high road traffic and for servicing by 
underground wires.
41
 Structure characteristics collected were: the number of 
bedrooms, the number of bathrooms and ensuites, and the number of car parking 
spaces in garages and carports. The quality of landscaping and the external 
condition of the house were rated jointly on a 3-point scale.
42
 Data were not 
                                                 
39
 The selection of variables was further validated by the strength of the estimation results reported 
in Chapter 7. 
40
 The rating of view quality was based on elevation and the amount of land visible from the 
property. The presence of overhead power lines was not a factor in the rating.  
41
 By coding underground wires as a single dummy variable, it is assumed that wires do not 
impose externalities on adjacent properties without wires (and vice versa).  
42
 It is expected that the measures of external quality would be strongly correlated with unobserved 
internal quality, effectively serving as a proxy. The estimate of the implicit price of external 
quality would then reflect the implicit prices of both external and internal quality.   
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collected for building age or other neighbourhood characteristics because, within 
each of the three suburbs, houses are of similar vintage and neighbourhoods are 
relatively homogeneous (for example, they have similar access to town centres 
and transport infrastructure).
43
 These effects are captured using indicator variables 
for suburb. It was judged that this set of variables sufficiently captured the main 
property characteristics that could be correlated with undergrounding.
44
 
Table 6.2  Data sources 
Data from <http://www.allhomes.com.au>: 
Sale price 
Date of sale 
Suburb 
Size of land 
Distance to CBD 
Number of bedrooms 
Number of bathrooms and ensuites 
Number of car parking spaces in garages and carports 
Data from field visits to properties: 
Quality of view (3-point scale) 
External condition of yard and building (3-point scale) 
Data based on address of property: 
High road traffic (dummy variable) 
Data based on ActewAGL network maps: 
Underground wires (dummy variable) 
 
                                                 
43
 There are very few knocked-down-rebuilt houses in these suburbs. Buildings in these suburbs 
are no older than 35 years, since all three were developed primarily in the 1980s. 
44
 The estimated implicit price would be affected by omitted variable bias if any variable 
correlated with both undergrounding and the regression residuals is omitted from the regression.  
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Most of the data were obtained from <http://www.allhomes.com.au>, a website 
containing a database of all property sales in Canberra. Other data were collected 
during field work between November 2008 and January 2009. Any measurement 
error resulting from the time between the house sale and the field work is 
expected to be uncorrelated with type of network infrastructure. Data on the 
number of bedrooms, bathrooms and car accommodation were available from 
<http://www.allhomes.com.au> for 436 of the 863 sales of detached houses in the 
period of interest. Deleting eight ―battle-axe‖ blocks that could not be inspected in 
the field and one price outlier, the final sample was 427 observations. Of these, 
132 were serviced by underground wires, as described in Table 6.3. Summary 
statistics for the data are set out in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.3  Final sample by suburb, year and type of network infrastructure 
Period Calwell Macarthur Florey Total 
2008 (to Sept.) 20 (5) 3 (1) 8 (2) 31 (8) 
2007 56 (18) 13 (1) 31 (15) 100 (34) 
2006 55 (15) 15 (3) 32 (16) 102 (34) 
2005 51 (17) 20 (3) 31 (12) 102 (32) 
2004 46 (10) 17 (0) 29 (14) 92 (24) 
Total 228 (65) 68 (8) 131 (59) 427 (132) 
Number of observations with underground wires are in parentheses 
6.3.3 Multicollinearity 
A regression explaining the indicator variable for underground wires (UG) in 
terms of the other explanatory variables from the main regression is presented in 
Table 6.5. The table shows that UG is unrelated at the 95 per cent confidence level 
to house sale date, the number of bedrooms and the presence of high-quality 
views, garages and ensuites. However, underground wires are negatively related 
to external condition, block size and the presence of high road traffic and average-
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quality views. An F-test shows the explanatory variables to be jointly significant 
at the 95 per cent confidence level indicating that housing characteristics differ 
between areas serviced by overhead and underground wires in the sample. 
 
Table 6.4  Descriptive statistics 
  Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Continuous variables:     
Real sale price (2008 A$ ‗000s) (PRICER) 262 964 426.0 106.4 
Number of days sale occurred after 11/01/2004 
(TIME) 1 1696 791.6 448.4 
Block area in m
2
 (SIZE) 232 1561 813.8 223.8 
Distance to Canberra General Post Office 
(CBDDIST) 8 19 14.7 4.0 
     
Dummy coded variables:     
3 bedrooms (BED3) 0 1 0.47  
4 bedrooms (BED4) 0 1 0.43  
5 or more bedrooms (BED5UP) 0 1 0.07  
At least one garage (GARAGE) 0 1 0.71  
At least one ensuite (ENSUITE) 0 1 0.63  
Underground wires (UG) 0 1 0.31  
Situated on a distributor road (TRAFFIC) 0 1 0.15  
Some view (VIEW2) 0 1 0.38  
Spectacular view (VIEW3) 0 1 0.06  
Average external condition (COND2) 0 1 0.63  
Above average external condition (COND3) 0 1 0.11  
Suburb of Calwell (CALWELL) 0 1 0.53  
Suburb of Macarthur (MACARTH) 0 1 0.16  
Sample size, N=427. 
This result means that the data cannot be treated as a randomised controlled trial. 
A simple comparison of average house sale prices across the two groups will not 
suffice. Rather, a hedonic regression is required to control for the differences 
between the groups. Importantly, the multicollinearity problem likely to have been 
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present in a city-wide sample does not appear to be present here. The correlations 
between UG and the other explanatory variables are low. Assuming linear 
relationships between variables, the highest correlation is 0.27 and all but two are 
correlated at less than 0.2, suggesting that it is possible to disentangle the effect of 
underground wires on house price from the effects of the other variables. The full 
correlation matrix is presented in Appendix B. 
Table 6.5: Regressing underground networks against other explanatory variables 
Variable Coefficient  t-stat 
(Constant) -13.344  -8.632 
TIME 0.000  0.836 
BED3 -0.155  -1.393 
BED4 -0.146  -1.181 
BED5UP -0.007  -0.048 
GARAGE -0.007  -0.137 
ENSUITE 0.094  1.683 
TRAFFIC -0.113  -1.980 
VIEW2 -0.152  -3.066 
VIEW3 -0.045  -0.482 
COND2 -0.177  -3.591 
COND3 -0.305  -3.848 
DIST_LN 6.097  9.086 
TIMESQ -6.531 E-08 -0.613 
SIZESQ -2.058 E-07 -3.369 
CALWELL -3.917  -9.074 
MACARTH -2.623  -9.239 
    
F 12.13  (p=0.000) 
R
2
 0.32   
N 427   
Dependent variable: UG 
 
6.4 Stated choice survey 
Turning now to the collection of the stated choice survey data, there are several 
aspects of the data collection process to be described. These include selection of 
the medium for the survey instrument, pre-testing of the draft questionnaire, 
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compiling the questionnaire, constructing the choice tasks, and recruiting the 
sample. Each is dealt with in turn in the discussion to follow.  
6.4.1 Selecting the survey medium 
The chosen medium for the survey instrument was the internet. The online survey 
was programmed and hosted by the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies at 
the University of Sydney. This medium was preferred to paper-based survey 
approaches because it allowed the prevention of backward navigation through a 
sequence of choice tasks, which is crucial to the research design discussed in 
Chapter 5. It was preferred to computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) 
primarily due to cost constraints. The use of an elicitation format with a single 
choice observation per respondent meant that the required sample size (in terms of 
the number of respondents) was relatively large at around 1,500 respondents. The 
cost of collecting these data using CAPI exceeded the funds available for the 
research. One of the potential disadvantages of internet surveys relative to CAPI is 
that respondents are less likely to complete relatively long questionnaires. 
However, given the short sequences of choice tasks planned for this survey, this 
disadvantage is of little relevance. Internet surveys also have some advantages 
over CAPI such as the absence of any interviewer bias.  
6.4.2 Pre-testing the questionnaire 
The web-based questionnaire was developed in consultation with ActewAGL, the 
local electricity network business, and was refined based on cognitive testing with 
11 participants. Cognitive testing refers to in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with individuals or couples from the survey target group. The interviews were 
designed to identify how respondents understood and interpreted specific 
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questions in the questionnaire and, for some questions, how they arrived at their 
answer. The interviews comprised two stages. In the first stage, the participant(s) 
completed the draft questionnaire and in the second stage an interviewer (a 
consultant from ORIMA Research) engaged the participant(s) in a conversation 
exploring the meaning of specific parts of the questionnaire and how the 
participant arrived at their answers. This process ensured that the questionnaire 
made sense to respondents and, as far as possible, successfully captured the 
information sought. It facilitated identification of questions that may have been 
misinterpreted by respondents and ways of improving those questions prior to 
fielding the survey. Second, it provided a richer understanding of the data 
collected in the survey.  
6.4.3 Compiling the questionnaire 
A summary of the questionnaire contents is provided here, focusing on 
components other than the choice tasks, which are discussed in detail later in this 
section. A complete example of the contents of the questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix C.  
The questionnaire login page included a short letter explaining the survey topic 
and providing contact details for enquiries regarding technical problems, the 
content of the questionnaire and research ethics. It explained that respondents‘ 
identities would not be revealed to the research partners (ActewAGL, the 
Australian National University and the University of Sydney) and data would be 
used in a grouped format. The first page of the questionnaire (following login) 
provided background information on the context for the survey, including the 
reasons why undergrounding was being considered. Two photos taken in 
Canberra were presented alongside versions edited to simulate the visual changes 
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that would result from undergrounding. A set of photos from East Victoria Park in 
Perth (Western Australia) before and after undergrounding was also presented. 
Further background information was provided in relation to the physical process 
of the undergrounding works and respondents were told to assume that all land-
owners in an area to be undergrounded would be required to make a specific 
contribution towards the cost of undergrounding in their suburb. 
The first set of questions in the survey related to the benefits and disadvantages of 
undergrounding. Respondents were asked to select two of the following specific 
benefits in response to the question: ―What would be the two most significant 
benefits to your household from undergrounding? 
1) improved appearance and unobstructed views; 
2) fewer power cuts; 
3) better safety, particularly during storms and bushfires; 
4) reduced tree trimming requirements and associated costs; 
5) fewer restrictions on use of yard space (for example, for construction 
of a garage or swimming pool); 
6) less need for ActewAGL to access your backyard; or 
7) other (please specify below).‖ 
Respondents were then asked, ―Other than cost, what would be the most 
significant disadvantage to your household?‖ The options provided were: ―power 
cuts may be longer‖, ―inconvenience during undergrounding works‖, ―service 
pillar in front of property‖, and ―other (please specify below)‖. Respondents were 
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also asked whether they thought undergrounding was a good idea in principle, 
putting cost aside. 
The purpose of the next section of the questionnaire was to establish the frequency 
and average duration of planned and unplanned power cuts associated with the 
respondent‘s current overhead service. This information would be used to describe 
the status quo option in the choice tasks (and, as described later in this section, to 
calculate the attribute levels in the undergrounding options). Pre-testing 
interviews had revealed that respondents preferred to be presented with a 
description of typical or average supply reliability levels and adjust them if 
necessary to align with their experience. Therefore, respondents were told that 
power cuts to be expected over a five-year period with an overhead service would 
be four power cuts without warning with average duration of one hour and three 
power cuts with written notice with average duration of three hours. Respondents 
were then asked whether this was representative of their current overhead service, 
or whether they would like to specify the number and duration of power cuts used 
to describe their current service. 
The next section of the questionnaire gave instructions regarding the choice 
task(s). Respondents were told that there are a number of different options for 
undergrounding and that different types of wires, service connections and 
maintenance programs would affect cost and supply reliability outcomes. They 
were told that the survey was seeking their input on which option, if any, should 
be considered for their suburb. Respondents were told how many choice tasks 
they would be asked to complete and the number of alternatives that would be 
presented in each task. They were advised that decisions on undergrounding 
would generally be made at a suburb level. A decision rule (or social choice 
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function) was given. Respondents were told, ―ActewAGL will proceed with 
further investigation of the/an undergrounding option in your suburb if it is 
preferred to the current service by more than 50% of survey respondents in your 
suburb.‖ In the SB elicitation format, the word ―the‖ was used, while, in the RB 
and MN formats, the word ―an‖ was used. This social choice function was 
required to ensure that the survey mechanism was incentive compatible in the SB 
format. 
Each choice task page included a reminder of the two most important benefits and 
the most important disadvantage of undergrounding selected by the respondent in 
earlier questions. Below each choice task, respondents were asked whether they 
would pay the specified land-owner contribution upfront with a discount or in 
instalments. Respondents were also asked, in relation to each attribute in the 
choice task, to indicate one of, ―I did not consider this at all‖, I considered this, 
but it did not influence my choice‖, or ―This did influence my choice.‖ The choice 
tasks themselves are described later in this section. 
Once the choice tasks had been completed, a series of follow-up questions was 
asked. These related to attribute processing strategies used in the choice tasks (for 
example, aggregation of common-metric attributes and multiplication of 
frequency and duration attributes), the influence of earlier choice tasks, the 
influence of perceptions about others‘ choices, the adequacy of the time and 
information available, and whether the respondent had seen or heard media stories 
on undergrounding in Canberra.
45
 
                                                 
45
 The questionnaire did not include ―cheap talk‖ scripts or reminders of substitute goods. Pre-
testing interviews indicated high levels of consequentiality, with all participants indicating an 
 142 
The final part of the questionnaire comprised questions about the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondent and their household. In particular, 
questions related to the age, gender and education of the respondent, the number 
of persons in the household, the suburb location of the household and annual 
household income. 
6.4.4 Constructing the choice tasks 
A split-sample treatment of elicitation format was applied to the choice task 
component of the questionnaire. Four in six respondents received a single binary 
choice between the status quo (the current overhead network service) and an 
undergrounding option (the single binary, SB, format). One in six respondents 
were presented with an expanded elicitation format comprising a sequence of four 
binary choice tasks (the repeated binary, RB, format). Finally, one in six 
respondents received a further expanded elicitation format comprising a sequence 
of four choice tasks each comprising the status quo and two undergrounding 
options (the multinomial, MN, format). The choice tasks used in these formats 
were constructed as follows. 
                                                                                                                                     
understanding that ActewAGL could decide to undertake undergrounding and pass on the cost in 
customer electricity bills. Most participants expected that the survey results would influence 
decisions on undergrounding. In other words, participants were considered ―yea-sayers‖ since they 
understood that if they expressed a preference for a high-cost undergrounding alternative (over the 
status quo) in the survey this would increase the likelihood that undergrounding would take place 
and that they would be billed that amount. 
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Attributes and levels 
The attributes used to describe the alternatives and the levels assigned to those 
attributes are presented in Table 6.6. Of the specific benefits of undergrounding, 
only supply reliability could be included as a variable in the choice tasks. It was 
judged that there was no credible way of including safety and amenity as 
attributes that vary independently of the type of infrastructure. These ―non-
reliability‖ benefits of undergrounding were effectively embodied in the 
alternative label. The purpose of the reminder of benefits and disadvantages of 
undergrounding included on the choice task pages was to ensure the prominence 
of supply reliability benefits in choice tasks did not cause a disproportionate focus 
on this benefit. The cost attribute took the form of a one-off undergrounding 
contribution that could be paid upfront with a small discount or by instalments for 
up to five years. 
The cost attribute took the level zero in the current service (or status quo) 
alternative. In the undergrounding options, the level ranged from A$1,000 to 
A$16,000. It was expected, based on pre-testing responses and interviews, that 
acceptance of undergrounding options would be high (approximately nine in ten) 
at the low end of this cost range and low (approximately one in ten) at the high 
end of the range. It was expected that almost all respondents would accept 
undergrounding at zero cost.
46
 Given the presence of ActewAGL as a partner in 
the research, it was expected that the claim to be able to enforce payment on all 
households in a suburb would be viewed as credible by respondents. The 
                                                 
46
 In the main survey, 97 per cent of respondents agreed that undergrounding is a good idea in 
principle putting cost aside. 
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credibility of this claim is crucial to the incentive compatibility of the SB 
elicitation format. 
Table 6.6: Attributes and levels 
Attribute 
Levels 
Status quo (overhead) 
alternative 
Undergrounding alternatives 
Your one-off undergrounding 
contribution (2009 A$) 
0 
1,000, 1,100, 2,000, 2,100, 2,800, 
3,000, 3,900, 4,000, 6,000, 6,200, 
8,000, 8,200, 11,800, 12,000, 
15,900, 16,000 
Power cuts without warning:   
Number of power cuts each 
five years 
Set by respondent 
Proportions of status quo level: 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 
a,b 
Average duration of power cuts Set by respondent 
Proportions of status quo level: 
0.33, 0.66, 1.33, 1.66 
a
 
Power cuts with written notice 
(occurring in normal business 
hours): 
  
Number of power cuts each 
five years 
Set by respondent 
Proportions of status quo level: 
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
a,b
 
Average duration of power cuts Set by respondent 
Proportions of status quo level: 
0.33, 0.66, 1.33, 1.66 
a
 
a 
Rounded to the nearest integer; 
b
 Absolute levels (0, 1 and 2) were assigned where respondents 
chose very low status quo levels (1 or less). 
Supply reliability attribute levels for the status quo alternative were set by the 
respondent as described earlier in this section. The levels assigned to those 
attributes in the undergrounding options were calculated as proportions of the 
status quo levels (rounded to the nearest integer). The chosen levels were 
informed by a comparison of supply reliability in overhead and underground areas 
in Canberra and by advice from ActewAGL. They were set to maximise the range 
of levels subject to correlations and limitations inherent in the infrastructure. An 
example of the limitations on the range of credible attribute levels is the range of 
proportions applied to the power cut frequency attributes, which needed to lie 
between zero and one since one of the benefits of undergrounding is a reduction in 
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the frequency of power cuts. A larger range of 0.33 to 1.66 was possible for the 
power cut duration attributes. 
The experimental design 
Two blocks of four choice tasks were constructed in the MN elicitation format to 
maximise the Bayesian C-efficiency of the design (Scarpa and Rose, 2008). The 
design was chosen to maximise the minimum of the t-ratios of the estimates of 
marginal willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid three attributes – the number of 
power cuts without warning, the total time off-supply due to power cuts without 
warning, and the total time off-supply due to power cuts with written notice –
where the t-ratio is: 
 t(WTP) = (-β1 / βP) / se(WTP) 
 where 
 βP is the parameter on the price attribute;  
 β1 is the parameter on the relevant non-price attribute; and 
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The parameter estimates used to calculate the t-ratios were set at the mean of 
Bayesian prior distributions derived from pre-testing responses and from an 
earlier choice experiment conducted in Canberra by NERA and ACNielsen 
(2003). The variances and covariances used in the calculation were drawn from 
the asymptotic variance-covariance (AVC) matrix based on a Bayesian prior 
utility function. The AVC matrix is the inverse of the second derivative of the log-
likelihood function: 
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The Bayesian prior utility function was the sum-product of the observed variables 
and their associated parameters described in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Bayesian prior utility function 
Observed variable 
Prior 
parameter 
mean 
Prior parameter 
standard deviation 
(normal) 
Type of infrastructure (1,-1) 5.200 1.7333 
Number of power cuts without warning each five yearsa -0.850 0.2125 
Total duration of power cuts without warning each five 
yearsa 
-0.220 0.0550 
Number of power cuts with written notice each five 
yearsa 
-0.010 0.0025 
Total duration of power cuts with written notice each 
five yearsa 
-0.490 0.1225 
Your one-off undergrounding contribution (A$ 2009) -0.002 0.0005 
a Proportion of status quo level. 
The MN design was used because it was expected that estimation of WTP for the 
supply reliability attributes, which were less statistically significant in the design 
than the alternative label and cost attribute, would rely heavily on data from that 
elicitation format.
47
 The typical supply reliability levels for the status quo that 
                                                 
47
 The results in later chapters show that this reliance was the case. Coefficients on reliability 
variables tended to be statistically insignificant in models on data from the SB and RB formats, but 
were significant in models on data from the MN format (in which respondents discriminate 
between undergrounding options based on reliability attributes). The analysis in this thesis focuses 
on total WTP (for undergrounding scenarios) rather than marginal WTP for reliability and other 
 147 
were presented in the questionnaire were assumed to apply. The cost levels 
assigned to the first undergrounding alternative in each choice task were drawn 
from A$1,000, A$2,000, A$3,000, A$4,000, A$6,000, A$8,000, A$12,000, and 
A$16,000. The cost levels for the second undergrounding option in each choice 
task were calculated as the sum of the level in the first option and a number drawn 
from -A$200, -A$100, A$100, or A$200. This ensured that the cost difference 
was sufficiently small to capture the trade-offs between cost and supply reliability 
improvements across the two undergrounding options. Candidate designs were 
generated by randomising the assignment of attribute levels across choice tasks. 
More than 50,000 iterations were computed in arriving at the final design, which 
maximised the minimum t-ratio of the WTP estimates across the attributes. The 
choice tasks in the final design were allocated to two blocks to minimise the 
maximum correlation between attribute levels and block assignment across all 
attributes. 
The final design for the MN format is presented in Table 6.8. The RB design was 
created by splitting the two blocks of four MN format choice tasks into four 
blocks of four binary choice tasks. Each choice task in the MN format was used to 
create two binary choice tasks for the RB design; one comprising the status quo 
and the first undergrounding option presented in the MN choice task, and one 
comprising the status quo and the second undergrounding option presented in the 
                                                                                                                                     
attributes, which suggests that a contingent valuation approach may have been more appropriate 
than a choice experiment approach. However, the data collected on preferences for reliability 
attributes (via the MN format) are valuable to the industry partner, ActewAGL Distribution, and 
will be assessed in detail separately from this thesis. 
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MN choice task. The first block of MN choice tasks formed the basis of the first 
and third blocks of RB choice tasks, and the second block of MN choice tasks 
formed the basis of the second and fourth blocks of RB choice tasks as shown in 
Table 6.9. The SB design was an extreme blocking of the RB design, with each 
respondent in the SB sample split receiving one of the 16 choice tasks in the RB 
design. 
Table 6.8: Experimental design for the MN elicitation format  
Block 1        
Task ID Alt 
Type of 
network 
Number of 
unplanned 
power cutsa 
Duration of 
unplanned 
power cutsa 
Number of 
planned 
power cutsa 
Duration of 
planned 
power cutsa 
Contribution 
1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 2 1 0.5 1.33 0.6 1.33 12000 
1 3 1 0.5 1.33 0.4 1.66 11800 
5 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
5 2 1 1 1.66 0.4 1.33 6000 
5 3 1 0.25 0.66 0.2 0.33 6200 
6 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 2 1 0.5 0.33 0.4 0.66 3000 
6 3 1 0.75 1.66 0.4 1.66 2800 
8 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
8 2 1 0.75 1.66 0.6 0.33 2000 
8 3 1 1 0.33 0.6 0.66 2100 
Block 2        
2 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 2 1 0.75 0.66 0.2 1.66 4000 
2 3 1 1 0.33 0.6 0.66 3900 
3 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 2 1 0.25 0.33 0.8 1.66 1000 
3 3 1 0.5 1.66 0.8 0.33 1100 
4 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 2 1 1 1.33 0.2 0.33 16000 
4 3 1 0.25 0.66 0.8 1.33 15900 
7 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
7 2 1 0.25 0.66 0.8 0.66 8000 
7 3 1 0.75 1.33 0.2 1.33 8200 
a Proportion of the status quo level set by respondent. 
The survey was programmed to cycle through the various blocks, choice task 
orderings and elicitation format sample splits to ensure approximately equal 
representation across choice observations. Cycling through the choice task 
orderings ensured approximately equal observation of each of the ―relative cost 
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positions‖ introduced in Chapter 5. The full sample of RB data contained 289, 
299, 297 and 271 choice observations for the m11, m10, m01 and m00 relative 
cost positions, respectively. 
Table 6.9: Experimental design for RB elicitation format 
Block 1         
MN 
format 
task ID 
MN 
format 
alt 
Alt 
Type of 
network 
Number of 
unplanned 
power cutsa 
Duration of 
unplanned 
power cutsa 
Number of 
planned 
power cutsa 
Duration of 
planned 
power cutsa 
Contribution 
1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 2 2 1 0.5 1.33 0.6 1.33 12000 
5 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
5 2 2 1 1 1.66 0.4 1.33 6000 
6 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 2 2 1 0.5 0.33 0.4 0.66 3000 
8 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
8 2 2 1 0.75 1.66 0.6 0.33 2000 
Block 2         
2 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 2 2 1 0.75 0.66 0.2 1.66 4000 
3 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 2 2 1 0.25 0.33 0.8 1.66 1000 
4 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 2 2 1 1 1.33 0.2 0.33 16000 
7 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
7 2 2 1 0.25 0.66 0.8 0.66 8000 
Block 3         
1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 3 2 1 0.5 1.33 0.4 1.66 11800 
5 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
5 3 2 1 0.25 0.66 0.2 0.33 6200 
6 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 3 2 1 0.75 1.66 0.4 1.66 2800 
8 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
8 3 2 1 1 0.33 0.6 0.66 2100 
Block 4         
2 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 3 2 1 1 0.33 0.6 0.66 3900 
3 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 3 2 1 0.5 1.66 0.8 0.33 1100 
4 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 3 2 1 0.25 0.66 0.8 1.33 15900 
7 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 
7 3 2 1 0.75 1.33 0.2 1.33 8200 
a Proportion of the status quo level set by respondent. 
An example of a choice task screen (in the MN format) from the final web-based 
survey is presented in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5: Example of a choice task 
6.4.5 Recruiting the sample 
Based on the prior parameter estimates, 135 responses to the full MN design 
would be required to ensure the minimum t-ratio across the prior WTP estimates 
was at least 1.96 (the t-ratio associated with two-sided statistical significance at 
the five per cent level), where the t-ratio is calculated as: 
    
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 where 
 βP is the parameter on the price attribute;  
 β1 is the parameter on the relevant non-price attribute;  
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n is the number of responses to the full design. 
Since the design was split into two blocks, the number of respondents required in 
the MN sample split was 270. These calculations suggested that a full sample of at 
least 1,620 respondents (1,080 in the SB format and 270 in each of the RB and MN 
formats) would be required to ensure statistically significant estimates of WTP for 
supply reliability attributes in the MN format. Similar calculations for the SB or 
RB formats suggested the number of respondents required to achieve statistically 
significant estimates of WTP for supply reliability attributes in those formats 
would be much greater and would require funds in excess of those available for 
the research. Participating households would need to be owner-occupiers of stand-
alone houses serviced by overhead wires, since these are the only households that 
would directly experience both the benefits of undergrounding and the land-owner 
contribution. A cash prize draw was offered as an incentive to participate, with 
A$1,500, A$1,000 and A$500 given to three randomly selected respondents 
completing the survey.
48
 A completion rate of approximately 65 per cent was 
expected based on the anticipated effect of the prize draw incentive and 
                                                 
48
 The prize draw incentive did not compromise the incentive compatibility of the SB survey 
because it was not linked in any way to the survey responses. It was explained to respondents that 
the winners would be selected at random from those who completed the survey. The unique login 
code given to each respondent only allowed the questionnaire to be completed once. 
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experience in recent ActewAGL customer surveys. The aim, therefore, was to 
recruit approximately 2,500 households to participate.  
Existing internet panels contained insufficient numbers of the target households. 
Consequently, households were recruited to the main survey by telephone using 
random sampling from directory listings for Canberra suburbs serviced by 
overhead wires. Screening questions were used to ensure that participating 
households were owner-occupiers of stand-alone houses serviced by overhead 
wires. Email invitations were sent to 2,485 households that agreed to participate. 
The invitation included information about the research, contact information for 
enquiries, terms and conditions for the prize draw, the URL link to the online 
questionnaire and a unique login code. The complete invitation is presented in 
Appendix D. Some 1,744 respondents completed the questionnaire; 1,163 in the 
SB sample split, 292 in the RB sample split and 290 in the MN sample split. The 
completion rate of approximately 70 per cent was higher than expected. The 
sample size of 290 for the MN sample split exceeded the 270 expected to be 
required to estimate WTP for supply reliability attributes that were statistically 
significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. 
Table 6.10 shows that the number of responses collected for each choice task was 
approximately equal within each of the three experimental designs. 
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Table 6.10: Number of responses to each choice task 
Multinomial (MN) design   Repeated binary (RB) design   Single binary (SB) design 
MN 
format 
task ID 
Number of 
responses   
MN 
format 
task ID 
MN format 
alternatives 
Number of 
responses   
MN 
format 
task ID 
MN format 
alternatives 
Number of 
responses 
1 143  1 1,2 73  1 1,2 72 
2 146  2 1,2 74  2 1,2 72 
3 146  3 1,2 74  3 1,2 72 
4 146  4 1,2 74  4 1,2 73 
5 143  5 1,2 73  5 1,2 73 
6 143  6 1,2 73  6 1,2 73 
7 146  7 1,2 74  7 1,2 73 
8 143  8 1,2 73  8 1,2 72 
   1 1,3 71  1 1,3 73 
   2 1,3 73  2 1,3 73 
   3 1,3 73  3 1,3 73 
   4 1,3 73  4 1,3 73 
   5 1,3 71  5 1,3 73 
   6 1,3 71  6 1,3 72 
   7 1,3 73  7 1,3 74 
      8 1,3 71   8 1,3 72 
 
6.4.6 Ex-post evaluation of the experimental design 
Once the data have been collected it is possible to undertake an ex post assessment 
of the efficiency of the experimental design, which will be suboptimal (ex post) to 
the extent that the prior parameter estimates used to generate the design do not 
accurately reflect the preferences of the sample (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007). That 
is, it is possible to determine the extent to which the design could have been 
improved had the preference information been known at the time of designing the 
choice experiment.  
The criterion for design selection was c-efficiency (Scarpa and Rose, 2008); in 
particular, the minimum t-value for marginal WTP across supply reliability 
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attributes.
49
 When the prior parameter estimates were replaced with point (rather 
than Bayesian) parameter estimates from a multinomial logit model on the full 
sample of data collected using the MN elicitation format (reported in Table 6.11), 
the value of the criterion was 0.0607. When the design was optimised (over 
20,000 randomisation iterations) based on the ex post parameter estimates, the 
value of the criterion was 0.0897, indicating that the implemented design was 32 
per cent below optimal efficiency. This inefficiency does not substantially affect 
the analysis set out in this thesis, which focuses on total WTP for undergrounding 
scenarios, but it will directly affect the statistical significance of estimates of 
marginal WTP for supply reliability attributes (which may be analysed by 
ActewAGL as part of a separate piece of research). 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the case study area, namely the city of Canberra in 
Australia, and detailed the collection of data from two sources – property sales 
data and stated choice survey data. Data were collected in accordance with the 
design described in Chapter 5 to facilitate the studies required to address the 
research questions. Data relating to 427 property sales were collected for three 
suburbs containing adjacent areas serviced by overhead and underground 
networks that were otherwise relatively homogenous in terms of neighbourhoods 
and housing stock. This sampling approach is a potential means for overcoming 
the multicollinearity problems posed by a city-wide sample. The stated choice 
                                                 
49
 The t-value for marginal WTP for the undergrounding-specific constant was omitted from the 
criterion since the structure of alternatives in the design was fixed (each choice task comprised one 
status quo option and two undergrounding alternatives). 
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survey data were collected from 1,744 households across all Canberra suburbs 
serviced by overhead networks using an online survey. A split-sample treatment 
of elicitation format was used to facilitate analysis of task dependence in survey 
responses. 
Table 6.11: Comparison of prior and ex post parameter estimates 
Observed variable 
Prior 
parameter 
mean 
Ex post parameter 
estimates (MNL 
model on data from 
MN format) 
Type of infrastructure (1,-1) 5.200 0.0260 
Number of power cuts without warning each five yearsa -0.850 -0.1623 
Total duration of power cuts without warning each five 
yearsa 
-0.220 -0.5881 
Number of power cuts with written notice each five 
yearsa 
-0.010 1.1650 
Total duration of power cuts with written notice each 
five yearsa 
-0.490 -0.7190 
Your one-off undergrounding contribution (A$ 2009) -0.002 -0.0001 
a Proportion of status quo level. 
Several lessons have been learned from the data collection process. The advice of 
valuers with extensive experience in the case study area proved an important step 
in identifying the study areas for hedonic price estimation. This advice enabled 
certain areas to be eliminated from consideration, based on differences in the 
original development and planning philosophies between areas serviced by 
overhead and underground wires. Site visits proved to be valuable in assessing the 
homogeneity of neighbourhoods and housing stocks in adjacent areas serviced by 
overhead and underground wires. Turning to the stated choice survey, pre-testing 
of the questionnaire proved to be an effective means of clarifying the 
questionnaire and avoiding large numbers of complaints and questions from 
respondents when undertaking the full survey. Some of the complaints and 
questions that were received could have been avoided by allowing more flexibility 
 156 
in the questionnaire; for example, by allowing respondents to skip questions and 
by asking more open-ended questions.  
In hindsight, the maximum cost level used in the survey of A$16,000 could have 
been set higher, since, as will become clear in later chapters, a substantial 
proportion (approximately one-quarter) of respondents in the SB format were 
willing to pay this amount or more for the mean undergrounding scenario. On the 
other hand, some participants responded angrily to this amount and ActewAGL 
(and its 50 per cent shareholder, the ACT Government) were concerned about 
using cost levels that exceeded the expected cost of the project by a significant 
amount.
50
 The decision on the maximum cost level used in the survey could have 
been better informed by a larger number of pre-testing interviews or a full pilot 
survey. 
The following five chapters use the data described in this chapter to undertake the 
studies foreshadowed in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
50
 Participants in pre-testing interviews appeared to form a view on a maximum price that would 
be appropriate for households to pay even though they indicated they were unable to estimate, 
even approximately, the cost of the undergrounding civil works. 
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7 Hedonic price estimation 
The findings of this chapter were reported in an article published in The Australian Economic 
Review (McNair and Abelson, 2010). This author conducted all analysis and took the primary 
role in writing the article, with Peter Abelson providing helpful discussion at the research 
design stage and contributions during the writing of the article. 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the hedonic price method was introduced as a means of gathering 
some, albeit limited, information about household preferences for the network 
quality improvement resulting from undergrounding electricity networks. Chapter 
4 outlined a challenge associated with applying the method in cities where retro-
fit undergrounding has yet to take place; namely, multicollinearity in the property 
characteristics. An approach to overcoming this challenge was developed in 
Chapter 5. The approach involves the use of a select sample from suburbs with a 
mix of overhead and underground networks and otherwise relatively homogenous 
neighbourhoods and housing stock. Chapter 6 introduced Canberra as the case 
study area, described the selection of sample suburbs in accordance with the 
approach developed in Chapter 5, and detailed the collection of data for the study. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse those data and use the results to address 
certain research questions as foreshadowed in Chapter 5. In particular, the results 
will provide an indication of the demand for undergrounding in the case study 
area and evidence with respect to the effectiveness of the sample selection 
approach to overcoming the challenge of multicollinearity. 
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7.2 Summary of the method 
As foreshadowed in Chapter 5, this study uses data from the selected suburbs in 
the case study area to estimate the implicit price of underground networks. The 
main equation to be estimated is a semi-log hedonic price function: 
ln Pijt = α + β.UGij + γ.Zijt + δj + λ.Tt + εijt  
where 
ln Pijt is the log of real price of house i in area j at time t;  
UGij is a dummy variable for indicating that house i is serviced by 
underground wires;  
Zijt is a vector of other house attributes; 
Tt is a vector of time trend variables; and,  
δj are area fixed effects.  
β is the parameter used to establish the implicit price of underground wires. It 
represents the proportional increase in price when a property is serviced by 
underground (as opposed to overhead) wires. The null hypothesis to be tested is 
that the coefficient, β, on the underground networks indicator variable, UG, in the 
hedonic price function is zero.  
Hypothesis #1  10H : β = 0 
   1AH : β ≠ 0 
The statistical significance of β is not only an indication that the type of network 
infrastructure affects real estate prices. It also indicates that the problem of large 
standard errors that arises from multicollinearity has been overcome (since the 
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standard error on the coefficient is sufficiently low that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically different from zero). 
The other problem arising from multicollinearity is that the coefficient estimate is 
highly sensitive to changes in model specification. To assess whether this problem 
has been overcome, the hypothesis is tested for several variants of the main model 
specification. If the null hypothesis is rejected for each variant, then this problem 
has also been overcome. 
7.3 Summary of the data 
As detailed in Chapter 6, the study uses detached house sales data for three 
Canberra suburbs between January 2004 and September 2008. The three suburbs, 
Calwell, Florey and Macarthur, were developed during a period in the 1980s when 
underground installation was starting to become a standard condition in land 
development deeds. As a result, they contain a mix of sections serviced by 
overhead and underground wires. The neighbourhoods and housing stock in these 
suburbs are relatively homogenous across sections with overhead and 
underground wires. In Chapter 6, it was shown that these suburbs are 
representative of Canberra in terms of unemployment and the distributions of 
household income and house size (measured by the number of bedrooms). 
The final sample comprised 427 house sale observations. Of these, 132 houses 
were serviced by underground wires. For further details of the sample and 
descriptive statistics, the reader is referred to Chapter 6.  
The log of distance from the CBD (DIST_LN) and the square of block size 
(SIZESQ) were found to be the best-fitting transformations of the CBDDIST and 
SIZE variables, respectively, when estimating the main equation. Both TIME and 
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TIMESQ (equal to TIME squared) were included to account for a non-linear 
movement in average real prices over the period. Interactions between the 
indicator variable for underground wires and other house characteristics such as 
quality of views and road traffic were found to be statistically insignificant and 
were omitted from the final model. 
7.4 Results 
The results for the main regression (Model 1) of the study are presented in Table 
7.1. The R
2
 value of 0.83 indicates a model fit similar to recent house price studies 
in Canberra by Davidoff and Leigh (2008) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) (2008). All coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 
95 per cent confidence level and with the expected sign. All but three of the 
coefficient estimates are highly significant with p-values less than 0.005.  
The variable of interest, UG, has a coefficient of 0.029, indicating that the 
presence of underground wires increases house prices by 2.9 per cent when all 
other explanatory variables are held constant. The 95 per cent confidence interval 
around this estimated implicit price is relatively wide at 0.4 per cent to 5.3 per 
cent. While this study confirms there is a price premium paid for houses serviced 
by underground wires, a larger sample size would be required to estimate the 
implicit price with precision. Turning to Hypothesis #1, the null is rejected at the 
95 per cent confidence level, which leads to the conclusion that the coefficient on 
UG is different from zero.  
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Table 7.1  Model results 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
(Constant) 6.937 16.24 6.908 13.83 5.978 14.33 6.953 16.40 7.169 6.33 
UG 0.029 2.30 0.026 1.97 0.040 3.07 0.031 2.50 0.031 1.87 
BED3 0.110 3.89 0.118 3.87 0.051 1.66 0.118 4.18 0.115 3.88 
BED4 0.289 9.19 0.289 8.49 0.228 6.69 0.295 9.48 0.296 9.10 
BED5UP 0.379 10.32 0.391 9.60 0.324 8.26 0.391 10.62 0.381 10.15 
GARAGE 0.032 2.58 0.032 2.30 0.029 2.33 0.027 2.17 0.027 2.15 
ENSUITE 0.067 4.69 0.066 4.20 0.066 4.55 0.065 4.62 0.064 4.48 
TRAFFIC -0.051 -3.50 -0.054 -2.83 -0.055 -3.75 -0.044 -3.05 -0.047 -3.03 
VIEW2 0.040 3.18 0.051 3.39 0.039 3.02 0.041 3.26 0.046 3.37 
VIEW3 0.163 6.90 0.164 6.11 0.183 7.77 0.159 6.79 0.163 6.67 
COND2 0.058 4.58 0.059 4.14 0.050 3.79 0.063 4.97 0.058 4.38 
COND3 0.177 8.62 0.176 7.39 0.163 7.87 0.181 8.74 0.169 8.06 
TIME -0.259 10-3 -5.83 -0.242 10-3 -4.85 -0.263 10-3 -5.86   -0.241 10-3 -5.27 
TIMESQ 0.202 10-6 7.45 0.191 10-6 6.21 0.205 10-6 7.50   0.190 10-6 6.82 
DIST_LN 0.143 10-6 9.07 0.144 10-6 8.01   0.144 10-6 9.10 0.132 10-6 7.70 
SIZESQ -0.553 -2.96 -0.545 -2.49 -0.610 -3.18 -0.560 -3.03 -0.534 -1.39 
CALWELL 0.283 2.36 0.277 1.98 0.318 2.58 0.283 2.38   
MACARTH 0.186 2.34 0.183 2.00 0.212 2.61 0.180 2.29   
SIZELN     0.189 8.44     
           
Quarterly 
dummy var. No  No   No  Yes  No  
Collection 
district 
dummy var. No  No   No  No  Yes  
            
R2 0.83  0.83  0.82  0.84  0.83  
N 427  342  427  427  427  
Dependent variable is PRICERLN (A$ 2008) in all models. 
Four additional models were estimated to test the sensitivity of this result to 
various aspects of the estimation (see Table 7.1). In Model 2, the sample is 
reduced by removing observations located in three ABS collection districts (one in 
each of the three suburbs) that do not contain a mix of underground and overhead 
infrastructure. Thus, Model 2 tests the impact of excluding observations that are 
furthest from underground-overhead boundaries. In Model 3, the natural logarithm 
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of block size is included rather than the SIZESQ variable used in Model 1. Testing 
sensitivity to specification of the block size variable is important because it is 
correlated (albeit weakly) with underground wires. In Model 4, the continuous 
time variables are replaced with quarterly dummy variables, and, in Model 5, the 
suburb dummy variables are replaced with ABS collection district dummy 
variables.  
The estimated implicit price of undergrounding of 2.9 per cent of house value is 
robust across the model variations. The models estimate the implicit price at 
between 2.6 per cent and 4.0 per cent of house value, with 95 per cent confidence 
bounds ranging from -0.2 per cent to 6.5 per cent. The underground infrastructure 
variable is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in all models except 
Models 2 and 5, in which its p-value is 0.06. The effects of underground wires 
have been disentangled from the effects of other property characteristics not only 
in the main regression, but also in a consistent manner across four models with 
alternative specifications. This result indicates that the lack of robustness that can 
arise due to multicollinearity has been avoided using the sample selection 
approach.  
Turning to the relationship between the implicit price and the social value of 
undergrounding, the implicit price of underground wires, PUG(Z) ≈ 0.029  P(Z), 
is the willingness to pay (WTP) of the marginal purchaser of the underground 
wires attribute in the market (as described in Chapter 3). Given that 31 per cent of 
houses in the sample are serviced by underground wires, it may be inferred that 31 
per cent of households would be willing to pay at least 2.9 per cent of house price 
for this attribute. Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between the implicit price and 
WTP, θUG, of households that purchased houses with average attribute levels from 
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the sample, Z*. The mean real house price in the sample is A$426,000, so the 
implicit price of undergrounding for this house type is approximately A$12,350. 
If the sample is representative of the population and the distribution of sales prices 
is assumed to be relatively symmetrical, then approximately 31 per cent of 
households would be willing to pay A$12,350 or more for underground wires. If 
the supply of underground wires increases, the marginal valuation of A$12,350 is 
likely to fall. 
 X 
% of households with house type Z* 
UG=1 UG=0 
$12,350 
θUG(Z*; u*, y) 
S(Z*) 
0.31 1 
 
Figure 7.1  Estimated implicit price and willingness to pay 
The 95 per cent confidence interval for the estimated implicit price evaluated at 
the mean house price in the sample is A$1,800 to A$22,770, reflecting the upper 
and lower bounds of 0.4 per cent and 5.3 per cent. This relatively large price range 
indicates that there is a fair degree of uncertainty around the implicit price 
estimate in this study. A larger sample size of real estate sales data would be 
required to narrow this interval. 
The social value of undergrounding is equal to the area under the demand curve 
over all households. This measure cannot be calculated from the implicit price 
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alone, but, by providing an estimated equilibrium point on the demand curve, the 
implicit price provides an indication of where the demand curve lies as 
demonstrated in Figure 7.1. 
7.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, real estate sales data were analysed with the intention of gathering 
evidence in relation to two research questions. The first research question relates 
to whether the sample selection approach developed in Chapters 5 and 6 can 
successfully overcome the problems caused by multicollinearity that tend to arise 
in a city-wide sample where retro-fit undergrounding has yet to take place. The 
two main problems caused by multicollinearity are large standard errors on the 
coefficient estimates for the affected variables, and a lack of robustness in those 
estimates to changes in model specification.  
In Chapter 6, it was shown that the sample selection approach, which utilises 
house price data from areas with a mix of overhead and underground 
infrastructure where neighbourhoods and housing stock are relatively 
homogeneous, reduced the correlations between explanatory variables to 
relatively low levels. The results in this chapter confirm that the problems 
associated with multicollinearity have been successfully overcome by the sample 
selection approach in this case study. The coefficient on the indicator variable for 
underground wires is significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent 
confidence level in the main regression. The value and significance of the estimate 
are both robust against four alternative model specifications. The effect of 
underground networks on real estate prices has been successfully disentangled 
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from the effects of other property characteristics when this was unlikely to have 
been possible when using a city-wide sample. 
The second research question addressed, in part, by this study relates to the social 
value of the network quality improvement from undergrounding in the case study 
area. Undergrounding was found to increase house price on average by 2.9 per 
cent with other property characteristics held constant. There is a fair degree of 
uncertainty around this estimated implicit price with the 95 per cent confidence 
interval ranging from 0.4 per cent to 5.3 per cent. Regardless, a statistically 
significant relationship has been identified. The estimate lies within the range of 0 
to 5 per cent of house prices predicted by the State Valuers-General of Australia 
(see Commonwealth Department of Communications Information Technology 
and the Arts, 1998). It is lower than the estimated property price impacts of 
proximity to high-voltage overhead transmission lines reported in the literature, 
which range from 5 to 17 per cent of property price (Colwell, 1990; Des Rosiers, 
2002; Hamilton and Schwann, 1995; Ignelzi and Priestley, 1991; Sims and Dent, 
2005). 
At the mean real house price in the sample, the implicit price of underground 
networks equates to A$12,350 per property, with a 95 per cent confidence interval 
from A$1,800 to A$22,770. Some 31 per cent of households in our sample chose 
to pay the price premium for a house serviced by underground wires. Since the 
proportion of houses serviced by underground wires in Canberra as a whole is 
also around 30 per cent, the evidence from this study suggests that the median 
WTP for undergrounding in Canberra is likely to be less than A$12,350.  
This study provides a single point on the demand curve for underground 
networks, but the social value placed on underground networks is equal to the area 
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under this demand curve (in the selected suburbs, which are representative of 
Canberra in terms of unemployment and the distributions of household income 
and house size). This value depends on the extent to which the value placed on 
underground networks by those who purchased a house serviced by underground 
wires exceeds the implicit price, and on the extent to which the value placed on 
underground wires by those who purchased a house serviced by overhead wires 
falls short of the implicit price.  
The stated choice data analysed in subsequent chapters allows estimation of the 
entire demand curve for underground networks, and, hence, facilitates estimation 
of the social value of the network quality improvement that would result from 
undergrounding in the case study area. The evidence from the stated choice 
analysis in relation to the demand curve is compared to the findings of this chapter 
in Chapter 11. This chapter has demonstrated a method that can provide an 
indication of the demand for underground networks that would be of some use to 
policy makers where no other information is available and where practical 
constraints necessitate a study that can be conducted quickly and inexpensively.  
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8 A comparison of responses to single and 
repeated discrete choice questions 
The findings of this chapter and Chapter 9 were reported in an article published in Resource 
and Energy Economics (McNair et al., 2011a). This author conducted all analysis and took 
the primary role in writing the article, with Jeff Bennett and David Hensher providing input 
at the research design stage and contributions during the writing of the article. 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, stated preference (SP) methods were introduced as a means of 
estimating the social value placed on the network quality improvement resulting 
from undergrounding electricity networks. Chapter 4 outlined a challenge 
associated with applying these methods when the objective is to estimate values 
for multiple attributes; namely, the challenge of task dependence. The appropriate 
assumptions when estimating values for policy use depend on the decision 
processes (or heuristics) underlying respondents‘ stated choices. Task dependence 
is a phenomenon that can arise from several different heuristics. These heuristics 
were grouped into two broad categories: strategic misrepresentation, in which the 
perceived social choice function leads respondents to answer a different question 
from that being asked, and, value learning, in which respondents‘ underlying 
preferences are revised, based on information presented in choice tasks. 
Approaches to investigating these heuristics were described in Chapter 5. One of 
those approaches is to use data from a split-sample treatment of elicitation format 
to assess the effect on stated preferences of presenting multiple choice tasks per 
respondent as opposed to a single incentive compatible choice task. To implement 
this approach, data were collected for a case study area (Canberra, Australia) 
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using a web-based survey (Chapter 6). The elicitation formats employed in the 
survey included a single binary (SB) choice task and a sequence of four binary 
choice tasks (the repeated binary, RB, format). 
The objectives of this chapter are to use the data from these two elicitation 
formats to: 
1) test whether stated preferences are affected by presenting four as 
opposed to one attribute-based choice task per respondent; and, 
2) test whether stated preferences in the first choice task presented are 
affected by advance knowledge that four as opposed to one choice task 
will be presented. 
The first objective seeks to develop an understanding of the importance of the 
property of incentive compatibility in practice. The second examines whether the 
first question in a sequence of choice tasks can be used as an unbiased 
comparator, thus saving the considerable expense of collecting a single choice 
observation per respondent. 
Section 8.2 summarises the method foreshadowed in Chapter 5. Section 8.3 
provides a summary of the data collection detailed in Chapter 6 and tests for 
differences in socio-economic characteristics of respondents in the two samples. 
Analysis of the data takes place in Section 8.4 and conclusions are drawn in 
Section 8.5. 
8.2 Summary of the method 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the prediction of neo-classical economic theory is that 
strategic misrepresentation heuristics will be employed in the RB format, but not 
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in the incentive compatible SB format. The expected pattern of response 
behaviour in the RB format is the rejection of some undergrounding options that 
would have been accepted had they been presented as a single choice task. This 
rejection serves to maximise respondent utility in the RB format by increasing the 
likelihood of implementation of a more preferred alternative observed earlier in 
the sequence of choice tasks. As a result, the prediction is that estimated 
willingness to pay (WTP) for undergrounding would be lower in the RB format 
than in the SB format. This prediction is tested by comparing expected WTP for 
the mean undergrounding scenario from a multinomial logit (MNL) model 
estimated on data from the SB format with the equivalent estimate from an MNL 
model estimated on data from the RB format. A (one-tailed) hypothesis is tested is 
based on the prediction. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
prediction of the strategic misrepresentation heuristic is correct. 
Hypothesis #2  20H : E*(WTP)SB = E*(WTP)RB  
   2AH : E*(WTP)SB > E*(WTP)RB  
Expected WTP is calculated as the area under the choice probability function 
truncated at the maximum cost level (A$16,000) with all non-cost variables set at 
their population means:
51
 
                                                 
51
 In the binary choice format, the choice probability curve represents the demand curve for the 
associated policy scenario (Hanemann, 1984; McConnell, 1995; Seller et al., 1985). The use of the 
area under this curve as a welfare measure is consistent with the integral in Small and Rosen‘s 
(1981) Equation 5.5. The log transformation on cost in our models prevents the use of the 
alternative, explicit evaluation in Small and Rosen‘s Equation 5.9.  
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The denominator of the choice probability function includes the number ―one‖ in 
place of the exponent of the indirect utility from the status quo alternative, since, 
in this case, all choice tasks comprise two alternatives and all observed variables 
are defined in such a way that observed variables, xit, are equal to zero in the 
status quo alternative (j=1). 
Turning to the second objective, economic theory also predicts that responses to 
the SB format may differ from responses to the first question presented to each 
respondent in the RB format.
52
 The first question presented in the RB format does 
not hold the ―take it or leave it‖ property required for incentive compatibility. The 
consequence of this is that, in theory, respondents may reject an alternative in 
anticipation of receiving a better offer later in the sequence.
53
 The question as to 
whether this prediction is realised in practice is an important one since, if it is not, 
                                                 
52
 It is assumed here that backward navigation through the choice tasks is prevented as is common 
in internet and computer assisted personal interview surveys. 
53
 In the reverse case, where the expectation is that worse offers will be offered later in the 
sequence, there is no incentive for respondents to misrepresent their preferences. Economic theory 
predicts that respondents might reject some preferred alternatives, but they would never accept a 
non-preferred alternative. 
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the RB format would be preferred to the SB format due to the additional 
information it generates at little additional cost. 
To test whether preferences stated in the first of a sequence of choice tasks are 
affected by advance knowledge that multiple choice tasks will be presented, the 
MNL model on the RB data used to test Hypothesis #2 is altered to include 
interactions between the cost variable and effects-coded variables for the order in 
which choice tasks were presented (with variables indicating the first three order 
positions, q1, q2 and q3, taking the value -1 in the fourth order position). Again, 
the test involves a one-tailed comparison of WTP for the mean undergrounding 
scenario from MNL models on the two response formats, but, in this test, WTP is 
evaluated at the first question in the sequence in the model on the RB data.  
Hypothesis #3  30H : E*(WTP)
SB
 = E*(WTP)
RB | q1 = 1
  
   3AH : E*(WTP)
SB
 > E*(WTP)
RB | q1 = 1
 
8.3 Summary of the data 
The analysis in this chapter uses data from two of the elicitation formats employed 
in the survey described in Chapter 6: the SB format and the RB format. In each 
binary choice task, respondents were presented with a description of their current 
(overhead) service and one undergrounding alternative.
54
 The attributes used to 
describe the alternatives and the levels assigned to those attributes are detailed in 
Chapter 6. All of the benefits of undergrounding other than supply reliability 
                                                 
54
 All non-status-quo alternatives involved new underground infrastructure. This ensured that 
every alternative in the design was meaningful as an SB choice, while allowing the same set of 
alternatives to be used in all elicitation formats. 
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benefits are embodied in the alternative label, including the amenity and safety 
benefits that qualitative questions showed to be the major household benefits from 
undergrounding. As described in Chapter 6, the SB design is an extreme blocking 
of the RB design, with each respondent in the SB sample split receiving one of 
these 16 choice tasks. 
The questionnaire advised respondents of the number of choice tasks that would 
be presented, the number of alternatives that would be presented in each task, and 
the attributes that would be used to describe each alternative. However, 
respondents were not given information about the range of levels that the 
attributes could take. The questionnaire outlined a suburb-based majority rule 
social choice function (often referred to as a ―provision rule‖ or ―decision rule‖ in 
the non-market valuation literature) that ensured incentive compatibility in the SB 
response format. In the RB format, the equivalent social choice function was that 
any undergrounding option that was preferred to the status quo by more than 50 
per cent of respondents in a suburb would be considered for implementation in 
that suburb. The full questionnaire is presented in Appendix C. 
Importantly, the survey instrument did not allow respondents to navigate back 
through the sequence of choice tasks. The survey was programmed to cycle 
through the various blocks, choice task orderings, and elicitation format sample 
splits to ensure approximately equal representation across choice observations. 
The number of responses to each choice task in the designs was approximately 
equal as shown in Table 6.10. Data were excluded from the analysis in this 
chapter where respondents took less than five minutes to complete the SB survey 
or less than six minutes to complete the RB survey. It was judged that these 
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responses were given without consideration (possibly randomly) solely as a means 
of qualifying for the prize draw participation incentive. 
Some 1,163 respondents completed the questionnaire in the SB sample split and 
292 in the RB sample split. Table 8.1 shows there is no significant difference in 
the socio-economic composition of the two groups in terms of household size, 
gender, age, education, or income.  
Table 8.1: Socio-demographic statistics by sample split 
Variable SB sample 
mean 
RB sample 
mean 
Test of difference in 
groups (p-value)
a 
Household size (persons) 2.94 3.06 0.402 
Gender (% male) 51.9 53.1 0.703 
Age:    
% under 40 18.8 19.7 0.733 
% over 65 15.7 15.2 0.832 
Highest level of education:    
% undergraduate degree 29.4 26.6 0.343 
% postgraduate degree 31.2 34.1 0.333 
Annual household income:    
% under A$52,000 11.3 10.0 0.533 
% A$52,000 – A$103,999 30.6 32.4 0.545 
% A$104,000 – A$181,999 29.3 30.3 0.723 
% over A$182,000 9.9 8.6 0.439 
% refused 18.2 17.6 0.816 
a  
p-values calculated from 2-test of differences in proportions across groups, except p-value for 
household size, which is calculated from a two-sided t-test. 
Indicator variables for the order in which choice tasks were presented were 
created for the analysis required to test Hypothesis #3. The variables were effects-
coded as shown in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Effects-coding of question order variables 
Variable q1 q2 q3 
Level when choice task is the first presented to a respondent 1 0 0 
Level when choice task is the second presented to a respondent 0 1 0 
Level when choice task is the third presented to a respondent 0 0 1 
Level when choice task is the fourth presented to a respondent -1 -1 -1 
 
8.4 Estimates of willingness to pay from single and 
repeated formats 
The model results are summarised in Table 8.3. The basic MNL models on the SB 
and RB formats (Models 1 and 2, respectively) include the natural log of the 
household contribution (cost), supply reliability attributes, and a constant to 
capture the value of the other benefits embodied in the alternative label. The log 
transformation of the cost variable is utilised because it results in a better model 
fit. The choice probability (or bid acceptance) curves derived from Models 1 and 
2 with non-cost variables set at their population means are shown in Figure 8.1. 
Bid acceptance is significantly lower in the RB format relative to the incentive 
compatible SB format for all cost levels except those at the lower end of the range 
used in the design. Estimates of mean WTP for the mean undergrounding scenario 
derived from these models are presented in Table 8.4 along with confidence 
intervals derived from a bootstrapping procedure with 1000 random draws 
(calculated by drawing from normal distributions for all relevant parameters with 
moments set at their means and standard errors).
55
 Point estimates for mean WTP 
are A$6,908 and A$5,369 in the MNL models on the SB and RB data, 
                                                 
55
 This procedure did not use the full covariance matrix through the Cholesky decomposition. 
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respectively. The one-tailed test based on random draws of 1000 paired 
differences has a p-value of 0.0775. At the 90 per cent confidence level the null is 
rejected, which leads to the conclusion that WTP is lower in the RB format than in 
the incentive compatible SB format. 
Table 8.3: Summary of results from multinomial logit models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Response format SB RB RB 
Parameter estimates:    
Undergrounding-specific constant 
.68486***      
(.15256) 
1.00020***      
(.15343) 
1.02303***      
(.15466) 
Log of household contribution (A$‘000s) 
-.66964***      
(.08050) 
-1.14726***      
(.09017) 
-1.17542***      
(.09177) 
Change in number of unplanned outages per 5 years 
-.05588         
(.05505) 
-.04107         
(.04210) 
-.04281         
(.04248) 
Change in unplanned minutes off supply per 5 years 
-.00060         
(.00055) 
-.00010         
(.00046) 
-.00011         
(.00046) 
Change in number of planned outages per 5 years 
-.09450         
(.08311) 
-0.17447*        
(.08903) 
-.18259**       
(.08992) 
Change in planned minutes off supply per 5 years 
-.00009         
(.00029) 
-.00031         
(.00026) 
-.00029         
(.00027) 
Interactions with log of household contribution:    
Order: question 1 (q1=1)    
.22681***      
(.06788) 
Order: question 2 (q2=1)    
-.08210         
(.07511) 
Order: question 3 (q3=1)   
-.12044         
(.07698) 
Model fit:    
Observations 1090 1112 1112 
Log-likelihood -711 -645 -639 
Information criterion AIC 1433 1301 1296 
 *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
 177 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Cost (A$'000s)
C
h
o
ic
e 
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 .
Single binary choice Sequence of binary choices
 
Figure 8.1: Bid acceptance curves derived from Models 1 and 2 
 
Table 8.4: Estimates of willingness to pay for mean undergrounding scenario (2009 $A) 
 Mean 95 per cent CI 
Model 1 (single binary choice) 6,908 5,212 – 8,595 
Model 2 (repeated binary choices) 5,369 4,058 – 6,819 
Model 3 evaluated at:   
Question 1  6,586 4,843 – 8,389 
Question 2  4,929 3,595 – 6,491 
Question 3  4,786 3,483 – 6,257 
Question 4  5,236 3,635 – 7,305 
 
8.5 Estimates of willingness to pay from the first question 
in the repeated choice format 
Turning to the second research objective, Model 3 incorporates interactions 
between cost and effects coded variables for the order in which choice tasks were 
 178 
presented to respondents in the RB format (Table 8.3). This model provides 
separate estimates of cost sensitivity at each of the four order positions in the 
sequence, where cost sensitivity is defined as: 
CostSenst = -∂U/∂cost = -(cost + q1*cost q1t + q2*cost q2t + q3*cost q3t) 
The parameter estimate for the q1 interaction is positive and significantly higher 
than the parameter estimates for the other question order interactions. This 
indicates that cost sensitivity is significantly lower in the first question relative to 
the later questions in the sequence with all other variables held constant. The 
modelled relationship between question order and WTP (mean and 95 per cent 
confidence interval) is presented in Figure 8.2. At A$6,586, the estimate of mean 
WTP in the first choice task is similar to the point estimate of mean WTP from the 
incentive compatible SB format of A$6,908. The null hypothesis of equivalence 
cannot be rejected at the 90 per cent confidence level in a one-tailed test based on 
1000 randomly drawn paired differences, with a p-value of 0.4078. That is, there 
is no evidence to suggest that advance knowledge that multiple choice tasks would 
be presented has an effect on preferences stated in the first choice task. Therefore, 
the difference in WTP estimates from the two response formats is driven by what 
is happening in the second, third and fourth questions in the sequence. In 
particular, these results suggest that cost sensitivity increases (and derived WTP 
decreases) after the first question has been answered. However, this is only proven 
under preference homogeneity, so, while it may be true on average over the 
population, it may not describe the behaviour of all respondents. 
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Figure 8.2: Willingness to pay by question order (with 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
8.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, spilt-sample comparisons have been made between preferences 
stated in a sequence of choice tasks and those stated in an incentive compatible 
attribute-based SB choice task. The author is aware of just one existing study 
(Racevskis and Lupi, 2008) and one concurrent study (Scheufele and Bennett, 
2010a) employing a split-sample treatment of these elicitation formats. This 
chapter also included a comparison of preferences stated in an incentive 
compatible SB choice format and those stated in the first choice task of a 
sequence.  
The evidence presented in this chapter supports (at the 90 per cent confidence 
level) the finding of Racevskis and Lupi (2008) that estimates of mean WTP from 
an elicitation format presenting multiple choice tasks to each respondent are lower 
than those from an incentive compatible single choice task format. The results are 
 180 
also consistent with the finding of Swait and Adamowicz (2001) and Boxall et al. 
(2009) that respondents are more likely to choose the status quo as the number of 
choice tasks increases. There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
preferences stated in the first choice task presented are affected by advance 
knowledge that four as opposed to one choice tasks would be presented. In fact, 
there is equivalence in the evidence on WTP estimates from the first choice task 
in a sequence and an SB choice task. This goes some way to justifying the use of 
the first choice task in a sequence as an unbiased comparator in studies such as 
Bateman et al. (2008b) and Day and Pinto (2010). It is expected that this 
equivalence would be at least as strong where respondents are not informed about 
how many choice tasks will be presented.  
Task dependence appears to be present in the data, since respondents rejected 
some undergrounding options in second, third and fourth questions in the RB 
format that would have been accepted had they been presented in the first question 
or in the SB format.
56
 Therefore, this study supports the growing body of literature 
finding that the standard assumptions of truthful, independent response with stable 
preferences are violated. The appropriate alternative assumptions depend on the 
decision processes (or heuristics) underlying the task dependence. The results of 
this study are consistent with the predictions of the strategic misrepresentation 
heuristics based on neo-classical economic theory. The explanation provided by 
                                                 
56
 Rather than decreasing over the full course of the sequence of questions, the point estimate of 
WTP evaluated at the fourth question is higher than the estimates evaluated at the second and third 
questions. The difference was not statistically significant in this study. Scheufele and Bennett 
(2010b) found a similar result in their concurrent study.  
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these heuristics is that the rejected options mentioned above were rejected because 
a more preferred option had been accepted earlier in the sequence of questions. 
However, this is just one possible explanation. The results could also be explained 
by a form of value learning that is asymmetric in the way in which cost influences 
preferences. In particular, decreases in stated WTP over the course of the 
sequence of questions are expected if relatively low costs have a greater effect on 
preferences than relatively high costs. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the two possible explanations have quite different 
implications for the way in which the SP models are used to derive a WTP 
estimate for policy use. It is therefore important to understand the respondent 
decision processes underlying the results in this chapter. In the following two 
chapters, two different approaches are taken to developing this understanding. The 
next chapter focuses on the relationship between cost sensitivity and the 
positioning of the cost level relative to levels presented in previous choice tasks. 
Each of the heuristics makes some prediction about this relationship. In the 
analysis, these predictions are tested against the data. Chapter 10 considers the 
possibility that each of the heuristics is adopted by a sub-group of the population. 
The proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with each heuristic is 
estimated using an equality-constrained latent class model. 
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9 Modelling response behaviour towards a 
sequence of choice questions: the effect of 
relative cost position 
The findings of this chapter and Chapter 8 were reported in an article published in Resource 
and Energy Economics (McNair et al., 2011a). This author conducted all analysis and took 
the primary role in writing the article, with Jeff Bennett and David Hensher providing input 
at the research design stage and contributions during the writing of the article. 
9.1 Introduction 
Stated preference (SP) methods are a means of estimating the social value placed 
on the network quality improvement resulting from undergrounding electricity 
networks (Chapter 3). A challenge associated with applying these methods when 
the objective is to estimate values for multiple attributes is that of task 
dependence, which is a phenomenon that calls for an alternative to the set of 
assumptions typically made by analysts when estimating values from choice data 
(Chapter 4). The appropriate alternative set of assumptions depends on the 
decision processes (or heuristics) used by respondents (which underlie the task 
dependence). Task dependence can arise from several heuristics. These include 
strategic misrepresentation heuristics, in which the perceived social choice 
function leads respondents to answer a different question from that being asked, 
and, value learning heuristics, in which respondents‘ underlying preferences are 
revised, based on information presented in choice tasks. Approaches to 
investigating these heuristics were presented in Chapter 5. One of those 
approaches was to use data from a split sample treatment of elicitation format to 
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assess the effect on stated preferences of presenting multiple choice tasks per 
respondent as opposed to a single incentive compatible choice task.  
Using data from a web-based survey in Canberra (Chapter 6), it was shown in 
Chapter 8 that estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) for undergrounding were 
significantly lower in the multiple choice task format compared to the single 
choice task format. It was shown that this difference was due to a lower rate of 
acceptance of undergrounding options in the second, third and fourth questions in 
the multiple choice task format (relative to the first question and to the single 
choice task format). These results suggest that task dependence is present in the 
data, but the nature of the decision processes underlying the task dependence 
remains unclear based on the analysis to this point in the thesis (although strategic 
misrepresentation has been identified as one potential explanation).  
This chapter develops an understanding of these decision processes by examining 
the relationship between cost sensitivity and the positioning of the cost level 
relative to levels presented in previous choice tasks in the multiple choice task 
format. A number of authors, including Bateman et al. (2008b) and Carson and 
Groves (2007), have discussed the potential for this relationship, but few studies 
have modelled it. Holmes and Boyle (2005) model the effects of cost levels in 
previous and future choice tasks using data from a paper-based survey. Day and 
Pinto (2010) use non-parametric methods on data from split samples presented 
with sequences of choice tasks with increasing and decreasing cost levels. A 
different approach to Day and Pinto (2010) is taken here by using econometric 
models to control for ordering anomalies. The models differ from Holmes and 
Boyle (2005) in that they are tailored to data from a survey that prevented 
backward navigation through the sequence of choice tasks. Rather than specifying 
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cost differences with lead and lag choice tasks as drivers of behaviour, categories 
are used to represent the positioning of the cost level relative to the full history of 
cost levels presented to the respondent.  
9.2 Summary of the method 
As detailed in Chapter 5, the intention is to test for the response patterns predicted 
by each heuristic in terms of relationships between responses and cost levels 
observed by respondents in previous choice tasks. The means of achieving this are 
to incorporate, in mixed logit (ML) and multinomial logit (MNL) models on the 
repeated binary (RB) choice data, variables indicating the four possible ―relative 
positions‖ for the cost level presented in a choice task. In any given choice task, 
the cost level presented must be one of the following four relative positions: 
1) both the minimum and the maximum level presented in the sequence 
to that point (m11); 
2) the minimum, but not the maximum level presented in the sequence to 
that point (m10); 
3) the maximum, but not the minimum level presented in the sequence to 
that point (m01); or 
4) neither the minimum nor the maximum level presented in the sequence 
to that point (m00). 
Indicator variables for the relative cost positions, m11, m10 and m01, are 
interacted with the cost variable to allow estimation of the relationship between 
cost sensitivity and the positioning of the cost level relative to the levels presented 
to the respondent in previous choice tasks.  
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The relationships between the relative cost position interaction coefficients 
implied by the various heuristics raised in the literature are presented in Table 9.1. 
Strong cost minimisation predicts an increase in cost sensitivity when the cost 
level is not the minimum presented in the sequence to that point. Alternatives are 
rejected when cost is the highest level observed by the respondent or within the 
range observed. Under weak cost minimisation the relationship between these two 
relative positions is uncertain since likelihood of acceptance depends on the 
maximum level of cost accepted in the sequence to that point. The parameter 
relationships implied by reference point revision are the same as those implied by 
weak cost minimisation, with likelihood of acceptance decreasing where a lower-
cost alternative has been presented in an earlier choice task. Value learning 
implies that cost sensitivity is increased when cost is the highest level observed by 
the respondent and decreased when cost is the lowest level observed by the 
respondent, relative to the first question or to questions in which cost lies within 
the range observed by the respondent. Cost averaging implies the opposite set of 
effects. Finally, the standard assumptions imply that relative cost position has no 
influence. 
The parameter estimates from the models are compared to these implied 
relationships to determine which heuristics are consistent with, or counter to, the 
data. Identification of a single over-riding theory may not be possible, but some 
discrimination will allow a narrowing of the range of potential explanations for 
the response behaviour witnessed in the RB sample.   
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Table 9.1: Parameter relationships implied by heuristics 
Heuristic Implied parameter relationships 
Strong cost minimisation βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost=βm00*cost 
Weak cost minimisation βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost and 
βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm00*cost Reference point revision 
Value learning 
βm10*cost>βm11*cost>βm01*cost and 
βm10*cost>βm00*cost>βm01*cost 
Cost averaging 
βm10*cost<βm11*cost<βm01*cost and 
βm10*cost<βm00*cost<βm01*cost 
Standard assumptions βm10*cost=βm11*cost=βm00*cost=βm01*cost=0 
 
As foreshadowed in Chapter 5, the null hypothesis of truthful response with stable 
preferences is to be tested, and, if it is rejected, the parameter relationships are to 
be compared to those implied by the heuristics.  
Hypothesis #4  
4
0H : βm11*cost = 0 and βm10*cost = 0 and βm00*cost = 0 and βm01*cost = 0 
4
AH : βm11*cost ≠ 0 or βm10*cost ≠ 0 or βm00*cost ≠ 0 or βm01*cost ≠ 0 
The ML model uses the relative cost position indicator variables to explain 
heterogeneity in the mean and heteroscedasticity of the distribution of cost 
sensitivity over respondents. The intention is to provide insight into any 
heterogeneity in the way in which respondents behave in the presence of a 
particular relative cost position, thereby deepening the understanding of the nature 
of the heuristic or heuristics being employed by respondents in this survey. 
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9.3 Summary of the data 
The analysis in this chapter uses data from one of the elicitation formats employed 
in the survey described in Chapter 6 – the RB format. A summary of some 
relevant points is provided here and the reader is referred to Chapter 6 for further 
detail.  
In each binary choice task, respondents were presented with a description of their 
current (overhead) service and one undergrounding alternative. The attributes 
used to describe the alternatives and the levels assigned to those attributes are 
detailed in Chapter 6. The cost levels assigned to undergrounding options ranged 
from A$1,000 to A$16,000, but the network service scenarios in the 
undergrounding alternatives were viewed as similar.
57
  
Respondents were not given information about the range of levels that the 
attributes could take, and, the survey instrument did not allow respondents to 
navigate back through the sequence of choice tasks. The survey was programmed 
to cycle through the various blocks and choice task orderings to ensure 
approximately equal representation across choice observations. Some 292 
respondents completed the questionnaire in the RB sample split, but 14 were 
excluded from the analysis because they completed the survey in less than six 
minutes. It was judged that these responses were given without consideration 
                                                 
57
 The focus on the cost attribute as a driver of strategic behaviour and value learning was 
supported by the higher rates of attribute non-attendance for the four supply reliability attributes 
(as revealed in responses to attribute attendance questions in the questionnaire) relative to the 
alternative label (type of infrastructure) and the cost attribute. 
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(possibly randomly) solely as a means of qualifying for the prize draw 
participation incentive.  
Indicator variables for relative cost position were effects-coded as shown in Table 
9.2. The full sample of RB data contained 289, 299, 297 and 271 choice 
observations for the m11, m10, m01 and m00 relative cost positions, respectively. 
Table 9.2: Effects-coding of relative cost position variables 
Variable m11 m10 m01 
Level when cost is both the minimum and the maximum level presented in 
the sequence to that point 
1 0 0 
Level when cost is the minimum, but not the maximum level presented in 
the sequence to that point 
0 1 0 
Level when cost is the maximum, but not the minimum level presented in 
the sequence to that point 
0 0 1 
Level when cost is neither the minimum nor the maximum level presented 
in the sequence to that point 
-1 -1 -1 
 
9.4 Results 
The MNL model, which includes interactions between cost and effects coded 
variables for relative cost position, is presented in Table 9.3. The model provides 
separate estimates of cost sensitivity at each of the four relative positions, where 
cost sensitivity is defined as: 
CostSenst = -∂U/∂cost = -(cost + m11*cost m11t + m10*cost m10t + m01*cost m01t)  
Of the coefficient estimates on the interactions, the coefficient on the m10 
interaction is highest, which indicates that cost sensitivity is lowest and WTP is 
highest when cost is the minimum, but not the maximum level presented in the 
sequence to that point (holding constant all other variables, including cost). The 
second highest is the coefficient estimate on the m11 interaction, followed by the 
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implicit coefficient estimate on the m00 interaction, which is equal to the negative 
of the sum of the three estimated coefficients (that is, -0.1038). The coefficient 
estimate on the m01 interaction is lowest, indicating that cost sensitivity is highest 
when cost is the maximum, but not the minimum level presented in the sequence 
to that point. The null hypothesis of truthful response with stable preferences 
( 40H ) is rejected even at the 99 per cent confidence level, indicating that task 
dependence is present in the data. 
Table 9.3: Summary of results from multinomial logit model 
 Model 1 
Parameter estimates:   
Undergrounding-specific constant 0.74583       *** (0.16589) 
Log of household contribution (A$‘000s) -0.92002       *** (0.10922) 
Change in number of unplanned outages per 5 years -0.07391         * (0.04433) 
Change in unplanned minutes off supply per 5 years 0.00004          (0.00047) 
Change in number of planned outages per 5 years -0.15752         * (0.08932) 
Change in planned minutes off supply per 5 years -0.00023          (0.00025) 
Interactions with log of household contribution:   
Relative cost position: m11  0.11544          (0.07307) 
Relative cost position: m10  0.35776       *** (0.11826) 
Relative cost position: m01  -0.36935       *** (0.08038) 
Model fit:   
Observations 1112   
Log-likelihood -630   
Correct prediction (y=1 if πit>0.5) 0.613   
Information criterion AIC 1279   
 *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Turning to the decision processes underlying this task dependence, Table 9.4 and 
Table 9.5 present p-values for one- and two-tailed t-tests of the statistical 
significance of the differences in the interaction coefficients. The one-tailed null 
hypotheses are rejected at the 90 per cent confidence level, indicating ordering 
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consistent with the point estimates. At the 95 per cent confidence level, only one 
of the one-tailed null hypotheses is not rejected – the hypothesis relating to the 
m10 and m11 interactions. 
Table 9.4: One-tailed T-tests for differences in coefficients on relative cost position 
interactions
 
HA: βm10*cost – 
βm11*cost > 0 
βm10*cost –  
βm00*cost > 0 
βm10*cost –
βm01*cost > 0 
βm11*cost –
βm00*cost > 0 
βm11*cost –
βm01*cost > 0 
βm00*cost –
βm01*cost > 0 
p-value 0.075 0.003 <0.001 0.025 <0.001 0.013 
 
Table 9.5: Two-tailed T-tests for differences in coefficients on relative cost position 
interactions 
HA: βm10*cost – 
βm11*cost ≠ 0 
βm10*cost –  
βm00*cost ≠ 0 
βm10*cost –
βm01*cost ≠ 0 
βm11*cost –
βm00*cost ≠ 0 
βm11*cost –
βm01*cost ≠ 0 
βm00*cost –
βm01*cost ≠ 0 
p-value 0.151 0.006 <0.001 0.050 <0.001 0.026 
 
In Table 9.6 and Table 9.7 (p. 192), the relationships found in the data are 
compared to those implied by the heuristics raised in the literature. At the 95 per 
cent confidence level, the relationships between the relative cost position 
interactions are consistent with the weak cost minimisation and reference point 
revision theories, which both imply βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost and 
βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm00*cost. Both of these theories explain the difference in WTP 
estimates derived from the RB and SB formats in Chapter 8. At the 90 per cent 
confidence level, the parameter relationships are consistent with the cost-driven 
value learning theory (βm10*cost>βm11*cost>βm01*cost and βm10*cost>βm00*cost>βm01*cost). 
However, in order for cost-driven value learning to adequately explain the 
difference in WTP derived from the single and repeated choice task elicitation 
formats (see Chapter 8), the behaviour would need to be asymmetric, with lower 
cost levels causing greater preference revisions than higher cost levels. The fact 
that the coefficient on the m00 interaction is significantly greater than the 
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coefficient on the m01 interaction is contrary to the prediction of strong cost 
minimisation (βm11*cost=βm10*cost>βm01*cost=βm00*cost). The results are clearly contrary 
to the cost averaging theory (βm10*cost<βm11*cost<βm01*cost and 
βm10*cost<βm00*cost<βm01*cost) and, as already identified, to truthful response with 
stable preferences (βm10*cost=βm11*cost=βm00*cost=βm01*cost=0).  
Table 9.6: Comparing results to the predictions of heuristics at 95 per cent confidence level 
Relationship 
implied by data 
(95 per cent 
confidence) 
βm10*cost = 
βm11*cost 
βm10*cost >  
βm00*cost 
βm10*cost > 
βm01*cost 
βm11*cost > 
βm00*cost 
βm11*cost > 
βm01*cost 
βm00*cost > 
βm01*cost 
Strong cost 
minimisation       
Weak cost 
minimisation       
Reference point 
revision       
Value learning 
      
Cost averaging 
      
Standard 
assumptions       
 
The modelled relationship between relative cost position and WTP is presented in 
Figure 9.1 (p. 193). The non-zero estimates of WTP when evaluated at the m01 
and m00 relative positions provide further evidence to suggest that strong cost 
minimisation was not widely employed. The figure also shows that the WTP 
estimate evaluated at the m11 relative cost position of A$6,543 is similar to the 
estimate from the incentive compatible SB choice data of A$6,908 (see Chapter 
8). This is consistent with the fact that a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
m11 relative cost position is that the question is the first in the sequence. The null 
hypothesis of equivalence cannot be rejected based on a two-tailed test using 1000 
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randomly drawn paired differences with a p-value of 0.8024. Estimates of WTP 
derived from responses to questions beyond the first vary significantly depending 
on the positioning of cost relative to levels observed in previous choice tasks. The 
point estimate of WTP when the cost level is the minimum observed is 
approximately double the point estimate when cost is the maximum level 
observed.  
Table 9.7: Comparing results to the predictions of heuristics at 90 per cent confidence level 
Relationship 
implied by data 
(90 per cent 
confidence) 
βm10*cost > 
βm11*cost 
βm10*cost >  
βm00*cost 
βm10*cost > 
βm01*cost 
βm11*cost > 
βm00*cost 
βm11*cost > 
βm01*cost 
βm00*cost > 
βm01*cost 
Strong cost 
minimisation       
Weak cost 
minimisation       
Reference point 
revision       
Value learning 
      
Cost averaging 
      
Standard 
assumptions       
 
In the ML model presented in Table 9.8, the relative cost position variables are 
used to describe heterogeneity in the mean and heteroscedasticity of a random 
cost parameter. The outcomes are estimated distributions of cost sensitivity across 
the population evaluated at each of the relative cost positions (see Figure 9.2),
58
 
where cost sensitivity is defined as: 
                                                 
58 
The distributions imply that some respondents exhibit a behaviourally implausible positive cost 
coefficient, which is not uncommon when using unconstrained random parameters, particularly 
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CostSensit = -∂U/∂cost  
= -it
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Figure 9.1: Willingness to pay by relative cost position (with 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
The result of interest is the distribution of cost sensitivity when cost is the 
minimum and not the maximum presented in the sequence to that point (m10). 
Mean cost sensitivity is reduced relative to the first question (m11) and the 
variance in cost sensitivity is significantly increased (one-tailed t-tests have p-
values 0.0355 and 0.0001, respectively). This indicates there is significant 
                                                                                                                                     
when adding variables to describe heterogeneity around the mean (Hensher and Greene, 2009; 
Hensher et al., 2005). 
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heterogeneity in response behaviour when cost is lower than the levels previously 
observed. The combination of the shift and the change in shape of the distribution 
indicates that most respondents answered m10 questions differently than if the 
question had been presented as the first in the sequence, but to differing degrees. 
This evidence supports a cost-driven value learning theory in which the 
magnitude of upward preference revision varies across respondents. Alternatively, 
it supports a mixture of behaviours across respondents, dominated by cost-driven 
value learning and one or both of weak cost minimisation and reference point 
revision.  
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Figure 9.2: Cumulative distributions of cost sensitivity across individuals by relative cost 
position 
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Table 9.8: Summary of results from mixed logit model 
 Model 2 
Random parameter: mean    
Log of [1 + household contribution (A$‘000s)] a -3.86793 *** (0.84452) 
Non-random parameters:   
Change in number of unplanned outages per 5 years 0.10437 (0.10608) 
Change in unplanned minutes off supply per 5 years -0.00122 (0.00132) 
Change in number of planned outages per 5 years -0.62662 ** (0.26552) 
Change in planned minutes off supply per 5 years -0.00057 (0.00073) 
Alternative specific constant (undergrounding = 1) 5.36297 *** (0.97546) 
Random parameter: heterogeneity in mean   
Relative cost position: m11  -0.43187 (0.44391) 
Relative cost position: m10  2.31286 ** (1.13387) 
Relative cost position: m01  -1.25095 ** (0.59936) 
Random parameter: standard deviation   
Log of household contribution (A$‘000s) 3.64465 *** (0.53801) 
Random parameter: heteroscedasticity    
Relative cost position: m11  -0.18012 (0.15211) 
Relative cost position: m10  1.10898 *** (0.26896) 
Relative cost position: m01  -0.42847 ** (0.20356) 
Model fit:   
Observations 1112  
Log-likelihood -461  
Information criterion AIC 947  
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively; standard 
errors are in parentheses; random parameter estimation is based on 200 Halton draws. 
a 
In this model, ln(1+cost) is used rather than ln(cost), to allow for the status quo alternative (with 
cost=0) to be included in the mixed logit model using two spreadsheet rows per choice observation 
(as opposed to the binary logit model using one spreadsheet row per choice observation used 
elsewhere in this research). 
9.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has developed an understanding of the decision processes that lead to 
task dependence by examining the relationship between cost sensitivity and the 
positioning of the cost level relative to levels presented in previous choice tasks in 
the multiple choice task format. While there are several possible interpretations 
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for the decrease in WTP after the first question in the RB format (identified in 
Chapter 8), the results discussed in this chapter show that the cost levels presented 
in previous choice tasks play a role. Three of the decision processes (or heuristics) 
raised in the literature are supported by the evidence. The first of these is the weak 
cost minimisation heuristic in which respondents might reject an alternative that is 
preferred to the status quo if a similar good was offered at a lower cost in a 
previous choice task. The second is the reference point revision heuristic in which 
value functions shift when a non-status-quo option is chosen and the third is a 
cost-driven value learning heuristic in which respondents revise the value they 
place on the good towards a weighted average of the cost levels presented in the 
sequence to that point (with a higher weight placed on lower cost levels than 
higher cost levels). As discussed in Chapter 4, these behavioural explanations 
have quite different implications for the way in which WTP estimates should be 
derived from stated choice data. These implications are discussed further in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis.  
The design used in this study does not allow further discrimination between the 
heuristics (for example, using the scope test applied by Bateman et al., 2008b). 
Regardless, this study adds further support to the growing body of literature 
casting serious doubt on the standard assumptions of truthful, independent 
response with stable preferences (Bateman et al., 2008b; Day et al., 2009). It 
confirms the finding of Day and Pinto (2010) that the order in which choice tasks 
are presented may have a significant effect on WTP estimates. An order with 
increasing cost levels will underestimate WTP relative to an incentive compatible 
SB choice format, while an order with declining cost levels might overestimate 
WTP (depending on whether a 90 or 95 per cent confidence level is applied).  
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This study focuses only on a case where similar goods were offered at quite 
different cost levels over the course of a sequence of choice tasks, making 
opportunities for strategic response relatively obvious and, potentially, 
exacerbating cost-driven value learning behaviour. However, Scheufele and 
Bennett (2010b), in their concurrent and similar study focusing on the case of a 
pure public environmental good, and Day and Pinto (2010) arrived at similar 
findings using surveys in which the cost attribute was less dominant.  
The primary analysis in this chapter sought to identify which heuristic best 
describes the response patterns in the data on average across individuals. 
Although the ML model in this chapter has identified some heterogeneity in the 
way in which respondents behave beyond the first question when cost is the 
minimum level presented to that point, it is difficult to interpret this result in 
behavioural terms. It is concluded that it may be caused by differences in the way 
in which preference revisions occur under value learning, or, that it may arise 
because sub-groups of respondents are employing different heuristics. This latter 
possibility is investigated in detail in the next chapter.
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10 Modelling response behaviour towards a 
sequence of choice questions: a latent class 
approach 
The findings of this chapter were reported in an article that has been revised for resubmission 
to Environmental and Resource Economics (McNair et al., 2011c). This author conducted all 
analysis and took the primary role in writing the article, with David Hensher providing input 
at the modelling stage and Jeff Bennett and David Hensher providing contributions during 
the writing of the article. 
10.1 Introduction 
One of the challenges associated with using stated choice methods to estimate the 
benefits to households from undergrounding is that of task dependence (Chapter 
4). Task dependence refers to the situation in which stated choices are influenced 
by the information observed in the course of completed choice tasks. It represents 
a violation of the assumptions that are typically made when modelling responses 
to a sequence of choice tasks – that each question is answered truthfully and 
independently of the other questions, and that underlying preferences are not 
influenced by the choice tasks. When these assumptions are violated, and a 
growing body of evidence suggests that they typically are violated (for example, 
Ariely et al., 2003; Bateman et al., 2008b; Boyle et al., 1985; Cameron and 
Quiggin, 1994; Carson et al., 2009; Day et al., 2009; Day and Pinto, 2010; 
DeShazo, 2002; Hanemann et al., 1991; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Holmes and 
Boyle, 2005; Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008; McFadden and Leonard, 1995), the 
analyst needs to make alternative assumptions in order to use the stated choice 
data to estimate values. The appropriate set of alternative assumptions depends on 
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the nature of the respondent decision processes (or heuristics) that lead to task 
dependence (and the violation of the standard assumptions). Several candidate 
heuristics have been raised in the literature. In Chapter 4, these heuristics were 
grouped into two broad categories – strategic misrepresentation, in which the 
perceived social choice function leads respondents to answer a different question 
from that being asked, and, value learning, in which respondents‘ underlying 
preferences are revised, based on information presented in choice tasks. 
Analysis of the stated choice data collected for the present research using a web-
based survey in Canberra (Chapter 6) commenced in Chapter 8. It became clear 
that task dependence was present in the data from the repeated binary choice 
format, with a lower rate of acceptance of undergrounding options in questions 
presented second, third and fourth, relative to the question presented first. The 
nature of the decision processes underlying the task dependence was investigated 
in Chapter 9 by examining the relationship between cost sensitivity and the 
positioning of the cost level relative to levels presented in previous choice tasks in 
the multiple choice task format. It was shown that the relationship was clearly 
inconsistent with the standard assumptions of truthful response with stable 
preferences. Of the specific heuristics raised in the literature, only three could not 
be ruled out based on the relationship – weak cost minimisation, reference point 
revision, and (an asymmetric form of) value learning. A mixed logit model 
showed that there was some heterogeneity in response behaviour towards the 
sequence of choice tasks. However, it is not clear, based on the analysis to this 
point, whether the heterogeneity arose because sub-groups of the population were 
employing different heuristics. 
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In Chapter 9, the focus was on identifying the heuristic that best explains the 
responses in the entire data set. This is the approach that is typically taken when 
investigating behavioural explanations for task dependence (Day et al., 2009; Day 
and Pinto, 2010; DeShazo, 2002). However, it appears that no studies have 
investigated the possibility that each of the proposed heuristics explains the 
response behaviour of a sub-group of respondents in the survey (up to a 
probability). This chapter offers a contribution towards addressing this research 
gap. The objective is to demonstrate, using both binary and multinomial choice 
data, how an equality-constrained latent class (ECLC) model can be used to 
account for discrete levels of heterogeneity in response behaviour towards a 
sequence of choice questions. The chosen framework is similar to that previously 
used to account for attribute non-attendance (Scarpa et al., 2009) and dual 
processing of common-metric attributes (Hensher and Greene, 2010). Classes of 
respondents are defined by separate utility functions specified by restricting 
certain parameters to be zero in each class. Estimated parameters are restricted to 
be equal across classes to ensure that class membership is determined by response 
behaviour towards a sequence rather than by taste heterogeneity.  
In the following section, the ECLC model is summarised. The data to which it is 
applied are summarised in Section 10.3. Section 10.4 details the results from the 
analysis. Section 10.5 concludes. 
10.2 Summary of the method 
As in Chapter 9, the intention when analysing the stated choice data is to identify 
the response patterns predicted by a given heuristic in terms of relationships 
between responses and attribute levels observed by respondents in previous choice 
 201 
tasks. In this study, an ECLC model is used to estimate the latent (or unknown) 
proportions of respondents behaving in accordance with the three broad types of 
decision process (or heuristic) outlined in Chapter 4: 
1) the standard assumptions (truthful, independent response with stable 
preferences); 
2) value learning; and 
3) strategic misrepresentation. 
A summary of the method is provided here, and the reader is referred to Chapter 5 
for more detail.  
Three sets of utility functions are specified to capture the response patterns 
associated with each of the classes of response behaviour. Consistent with the 
approach taken throughout this research, they are tailored to analyse responses to 
stated choice surveys in which similar goods are offered at different prices over 
the course of a sequence. The consequence is that value learning and strategic 
behaviour tend to be driven mainly by the cost attribute. The utility functions in 
this study are specified accordingly. The standard attributes, x, which enter the 
utility functions, are defined so that they take the value zero in the status quo 
option. This is achieved by defining the attributes in terms of changes relative to 
the status quo. The reason for this redefinition becomes clearer as the description 
of the utility functions proceeds. The ECLC model assigns respondents to these 
utility functions up to a probability to maximise the log-likelihood function (as 
described in Chapter 5). 
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10.2.1 Class 1 (standard assumptions) 
The utility functions specified for the latent class of respondents behaving in 
accordance with the standard assumptions are the conventional sum-product of the 
k attributes as they appear in the choice task being answered and their associated 
taste intensities.  
Uit,SQ,class1  =  1x1,it,SQ + … + kxk,it,SQ 
Uit,ALT,class1  = 0 +  1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT 
10.2.2 Class 2 (value learning) 
The second latent class represents those responding in accordance with a value 
learning heuristic. The utility functions are specified to capture the response 
patterns of this group by allowing the alternative-specific preference to vary with 
the average of cost levels observed in the sequence up to and including the current 
choice task. The utility functions are as follows: 
Uit,SQ,class2  =  1x1,it,SQ + … + kxk,it,SQ 
Uit,ALT,class2  = 0 +  1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT + k+1zit,ALT 
where 
zitj = z
o
itj – žj 
z
o
itj  = the average of cost levels observed up to and including the 
current choice task 
žj  = the average of cost levels in the sample (across all respondents 
and all choice tasks) 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, the average observed cost variable, zit,ALT, is based on 
cost levels only in undergrounding alternatives, since the cost level was zero in 
the status quo (overhead) alternative presented in each choice task. The average of 
undergrounding cost levels observed, žALT, was A$6,503 in the RB sample and 
A$6,508 in the MN sample.  
10.2.3 Class 3 (strategic misrepresentation) 
In a third class of response behaviour, utility functions are specified to capture the 
response patterns predicted by a strategic misrepresentation heuristic. Consistent 
with the weak cost minimisation and reference point revision heuristics that were 
found in Chapter 9 to be consistent with the response patterns in the data on 
average, the strategic misrepresentation heuristic specified here has two features. 
The first is that respondents compare alternatives to those accepted in previous 
choice tasks. It is assumed that respondents effectively replace the status quo with 
a reference alternative once they have expressed a preference for an alternative 
over the status quo. The reference alternative is defined as the highest-cost 
alternative previously accepted in the sequence. Over the range of cost and 
willingness to pay (WTP) levels that matter, this reference alternative yields the 
highest expected utility (based on the provision probabilities discussed below) of 
all previously accepted alternatives. 
The second feature of this heuristic is that respondents consider the probability of 
provision. When a similar good is offered at very different cost levels over the 
course of a sequence of choice tasks, respondents may assume that higher-cost 
goods are more likely to be provided because the agency is more likely to proceed 
with the project the higher respondents‘ stated WTP. It is assumed that the 
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perceived probability of project provision is equal to the ratio of the maximum 
cost level accepted and the maximum cost level observed.  
The utility equations represent the expected utilities from the reference and 
current alternatives:
59
 
Uit,SQ,class3  = pit,SQ(0 + 1x
a
1,it + … + kx
a
k,it) 
Uit,ALT,class3  = pit,ALT(0 + 1x1,it,ALT + … + kxk,it,ALT) 
where 
x
a
it = the levels of attributes in the highest-cost alternative accepted in 
previous choice tasks (x
a
1,it is the maximum cost level accepted in previous 
choice tasks) 
pit,SQ = x
a
1,it/x
o
1,it 
x
o
1,it = the maximum cost level observed up to and including the current 
choice task 
pit,ALT = max[pit,SQ , x1,it,ALT/x
o
1,it] 
10.2.4 Class structure in the equality-constrained latent class model 
The three sets of utility functions are operationalised in the latent class model by 
three separate sets of restrictions on a ―master‖ utility function. Certain 
parameters are restricted to zero and certain parameters are restricted to equality 
both within and across classes as shown in Table 10.1. The alternative-specific 
constants and the standard attributes, x, are divided into two parts – one multiplied 
by pit,ALT and another by 1- pit,ALT. In Classes 1 and 2, coefficients on attributes 
                                                 
59
 The (1-p) terms are not required since utility from the status quo is zero. 
 205 
multiplied by pit,ALT and 1- pit,ALT are assumed to be equal so that they represent 
the marginal utility of the standard attribute without consideration of the 
probability of provision. In Class 3, the coefficients on attributes multiplied by 1- 
pit,ALT are set to zero so that utility does depend on the probability of provision. A 
set of reference alternative variables are restricted to hold zero value in Classes 1 
and 2 (in which previously accepted alternatives are ignored), but in Class 3, they 
are assumed to have the same taste intensities as the equivalent variables in the 
―non status quo‖ alternatives in the current choice task. All non-zero attributes are 
assumed to take the same value across classes. 
Table 10.1: Class structure 
Variable Alternative  Parametersa  
  
Class 1 
(Standard) 
Class 2 
(Learning) 
Class 3 
(Strategic) 
pit,SQ Status quo 0 0 0 
x
a
itpit,SQ Status quo 0 0  
pit,ALT Underground alternative 0 0 0 
xitpit,ALT Underground alternative    
1-pit,ALT Underground alternative 0 0 0 
xit(1-pit,ALT) Underground alternative   0 
zit,ALT Underground alternative 0 k+1 0 
a  refers to a coefficient vector, 1, 2,…, k, associated with x1,…, xk. 
Two sets of hypothesis tests were set out in Chapter 5. The first set tests whether 
each heuristic explains the behaviour of a significant proportion of respondents, 
where Gq is the estimated proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with 
heuristic q of Q. 
Hypothesis #5  50H : G1
RB
 = 0   
    5AH : G1
RB
 ≠ 0   
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 Hypothesis #6  60H : G2
RB
 = 0   
    6AH : G2
RB
 ≠ 0   
 Hypothesis #7  70H : G3
RB
 = 0   
    7AH : G3
RB
 ≠ 0  
Hypothesis #8  80H : G1
MN
 = 0 
   8AH : G1
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #9  90H : G2
MN
 = 0 
   9AH : G2
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #10 100H : G3
MN
 = 0 
   10AH : G3
MN
 ≠ 0 
The second set of hypotheses test whether the proportions differ between data 
from the RB and MN formats. 
Hypothesis #11 110H : G1
RB
 – G1
MN
 = 0 
   11AH : G1
RB
 – G1
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #12 120H : G2
RB
 – G2
MN
 = 0 
   12AH : G2
RB
 – G2
MN
 ≠ 0 
 Hypothesis #13 130H : G3
RB
 – G3
MN
 = 0 
   13AH : G3
RB
 – G3
MN
 ≠ 0 
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10.3 Summary of the data 
The model is implemented on data from two elicitation formats used in the stated 
choice survey detailed in Chapter 6. The first is the format comprising a sequence 
of four binary choice tasks in which respondents were presented with a 
description of their current (overhead) service and one undergrounding alternative 
(the repeated binary, RB, choice format). The second format is that comprising a 
sequence of four choice tasks, where each task contained the current service and 
two undergrounding alternatives (the multinomial, MN, choice format). A few 
relevant points are summarised here and the reader is referred to Chapter 6 for 
further detail.  
The network service was viewed by respondents as similar across the 
undergrounding options, but the cost of the options varied considerably from 
A$1,000 to A$16,000. Two blocks of four choice tasks were constructed in the 
MN choice format. The RB design was created by splitting these two blocks into 
four blocks of four binary choice tasks as detailed in Chapter 6. Some 292 
respondents completed the web-based questionnaire in the RB choice format and 
290 in the MN choice format. The questionnaire advised respondents of the 
number of choice tasks that would be presented, the number of alternatives that 
would be presented in each task and the attributes that would be used to describe 
each alternative. However, respondents were not given information about the 
range of levels that the attributes could take, and, the questionnaire did not allow 
respondents to navigate back through the sequence of choice tasks.  
As many as 30 per cent of respondents completing the RB format and 24 per cent 
of respondents completing the MN format chose the status quo scenario in all four 
choice tasks. The response behaviour of this group is difficult to determine 
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because, if the value placed on undergrounding by a respondent is sufficiently 
low, then all three heuristics result in the same pattern of responses – selection of 
the status quo in every task. These respondents are omitted from the latent class 
model to ensure that the method can be demonstrated effectively.  
An important part of the modelling approach is the manipulation of variables prior 
to estimation. A spreadsheet was used to create the normalised average observed 
cost variable, zit,ALT, the provision probability proxies for the reference and current 
alternatives, pit,SQ and pit,ALT, the attribute levels associated with the highest-cost 
alternative previously accepted, x
a
it, and the maximum cost level observed up to 
and including the current choice task, x
o
1,it. 
10.4 Results 
A summary of the ECLC model results for the RB (Model 1) and MN (Model 2) 
formats is presented in Table 10.2 with full estimation results detailed in Table 
10.3 and Table 10.4 (pp. 215-216). The seven parameter estimates in each model 
have the expected sign where they are significant at the 95 per cent confidence 
level.
60
 The positive coefficient on the normalised average observed cost variable 
indicates that, within Class 2, the value placed on undergrounding is influenced by 
the cost levels observed in previous choice tasks and the current choice task. A 
respondent in this class is more likely to accept an undergrounding alternative 
priced at $4,000 in the second choice task if the alternative offered in the first 
                                                 
60
 As expected when designing the survey, coefficients on the supply reliability attributes are more 
statistically significant in the multinomial choice data where respondents were asked to 
discriminate between two undergrounding options on the basis of these attributes (and A$100 or 
A$200 cost differences). 
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choice task was priced at $6,000 than if it was priced at $2,000 (all else held 
constant).  
Table 10.2: Summary of estimation results 
Model type Equality-constrained latent class Standard multinomial logit 
Choice format Binary choice 
Multinomial 
choice 
Binary choice 
Multinomial 
choice 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Undergrounding-specific 
constant 
8.271 8.42 5.592 7.98 4.634 13.37 3.564 10.54 
Log of household contribution -4.139 -9.28 -2.852 -9.31 -2.409 -13.91 -1.963 -12.57 
Change in frequency of 
unplanned power cuts 
-0.067 -1.07 -0.153 -2.76 -0.051 -1.07 -0.173 -3.52 
Change in frequency of planned 
power cuts 
-0.169 -1.62 0.062 0.94 -0.155 -1.93 0.046 0.82 
Change in average duration of 
unplanned power cuts 
0.000 -0.02 -0.006 -3.57 -0.002 -0.49 -0.005 -3.72 
Change in average duration of 
planned power cuts 
-0.001 -0.80 -0.004 -7.24 -0.002 -1.49 -0.004 -7.55 
Normalised average observed 
cost (Class 2 only) 
0.611 3.42 0.389 2.40     
Estimated class probabilities         
Class 1 (standard assumptions) 0.229 2.23 0.114 0.36     
Class 2 (value learning) 0.383 5.08 0.386 2.15     
Class 3 (strategic 
misrepresentation) 
0.388 5.25 0.500 3.13     
Model fit:         
N 800  872  800  872  
Log-likelihood -348  -762  -373  -778  
AIC 714  1543  759  1568  
 
Turning to the estimated class probabilities, all except one are significant at the 95 
per cent confidence level across the two models. The one insignificant class 
probability refers to the class responding according to the standard assumptions in 
the MN choice format. In terms of the hypotheses set out in Chapter 5 and Section 
10.2, the null hypotheses, 50H , 
6
0H , 
7
0H , 
9
0H , and 
10
0H  are rejected at the 95 per 
cent confidence level, but 80H  cannot be rejected. Both models estimate that 39 
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per cent of respondents behaved according to the value learning utility 
specification. The proportion behaving in line with the strategic misrepresentation 
specification is estimated at 38 per cent in the binary format and 50 per cent in the 
MN format. The class with the lowest membership probability in both models was 
that based on the standard assumptions of truthful response and stable preferences, 
with 23 and 11 per cent predicted by Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. No 
single class dominates either model, indicating significant heterogeneity in the 
response behaviour towards both the RB and MN choice formats. There is no 
evidence of a relationship between choice format and response behaviour, with 
the class probabilities statistically indistinguishable at the 95 per cent confidence 
level across the two models. In terms of the hypotheses set out in Chapter 5, none 
of the null hypotheses, 110H , 
12
0H , and 
13
0H , are rejected, with p-values of 0.74, 
0.99, and 0.55 based on 1000 paired differences. 
The log-likelihood values associated with the ECLC models indicate an 
improvement in model fit over the standard multinomial logit (MNL) models 
(also presented in Table 10.2). This improvement is expected given the additional 
parameters accommodating heterogeneity in the ECLC models. Of greater interest 
is the improvement in the Akaike information criterion (AIC) value, which 
accounts for parameter proliferation. The improvement in this criterion suggests 
that accounting for heterogeneity in response behaviour using the ECLC model is 
important even when model parsimony is considered desirable.  
Turning to implications for welfare estimates, the undergrounding choice 
probability (or bid acceptance) functions for the RB and MN choice format models 
are shown in Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2 (p. 212) with all non-cost attributes set 
at their sample means. Estimates of the (improper) expectation of total WTP, 
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calculated as the truncated areas under the undergrounding choice probability 
curves, are not significantly different at the 95 per cent confidence level across the 
ECLC and MNL models. However, this may not be the case in other data sources. 
The changes in the curves when moving from the MNL to the latent class model 
are the net effect of two separate influences – the effect of accounting for value 
learning (Class 2); and the effect of accounting for strategic misrepresentation 
(Class 3). The overall effect on WTP depends on the magnitude of each of these 
effects, which are determined, in part, by the associated class probabilities. 
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Figure 10.1: Undergrounding choice probability implied by models on binary choice format 
The expected effect of accounting for value learning behaviour is an increase in 
probabilities at lower costs and a decrease in probabilities at higher costs. The 
reason is as follows. Average observed cost, z, is positively related to cost, x1, for 
a given set of cost levels in previous choice tasks. Utility from undergrounding 
alternatives net of the effect of average observed cost therefore needs to be higher 
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at lower cost levels and vice versa in order to adequately explain respondents‘ 
choices. The latent class model achieves this by altering the remaining parameters, 
β. The effect is a narrowing of the distribution of total WTP (with average 
observed cost held constant) around the mean cost level presented across all 
choice observations. Accounting for value learning has a relatively small effect on 
estimates of mean WTP in this case, because the mean cost level presented in the 
survey (approximately A$6,300) is similar to mean WTP. 
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Figure 10.2: Undergrounding choice probability implied by models on multinomial choice 
format 
The expected effect of accounting for strategic misrepresentation is an increase in 
undergrounding choice probability at all cost levels (albeit not in a linear fashion). 
For a given set of parameters, β, the undergrounding choice probability for Class 
3 is always less than or equal to that for Class 1 since Uit,SQ,class3≥Uit,SQ,class1 and 
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Uit,ALT,class3≤ Uit,ALT,class1.
61
 Therefore, when switching from a Class 1 to a Class 3 
utility specification, the parameters must be altered in such a way that increases 
the undergrounding choice probability. Accounting for strategic misrepresentation 
therefore leads to increased estimates of mean WTP, which is expected since 
strategic misrepresentation effectively involves an under-stating of true WTP. 
10.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has presented an ECLC model that can be used to identify 
heterogeneity in response behaviour towards a sequence of choice tasks, and, 
potentially, account for heuristics that cause task dependence when estimating 
WTP for policy purposes. The utility functions specified to capture strategic 
misrepresentation and value learning represent alternatives to the standard 
assumptions of truthful, independent response with stable preferences. The 
illustrative evidence herein shows the model can be applied to choice data from 
both binary and multinomial choice formats where a status quo alternative is 
present and similar goods are offered at very different prices over the course of a 
sequence of questions.  
The ECLC models achieved an improvement in fit over standard MNL models, 
even based on information criteria that account for model parsimony. Estimates of 
total WTP were statistically indistinguishable between the two types of model. 
                                                 
61
 Note that in the first question in a sequence, the utility functions in Classes 1 and 3 are identical. 
An assumption has been made in the analysis in this chapter that there are no scale effects across 
classes. If different classes do in fact have different scales, then ratios of coefficients are 
comparable across classes, but the coefficients themselves are not. 
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However, this may not be the case for other data sources as it depends on several 
factors including the relative mix of class probabilities. 
Three distinct groups were identified in both the binary and multinomial choice 
data. The group behaving in accordance with the standard assumptions was the 
smallest of the three in both models, providing further evidence that the standard 
assumptions do not adequately reflect the response behaviour of the majority of 
respondents in a survey of this type. The heterogeneity in response behaviour 
identified herein may explain the variation in findings across studies and the 
ambiguity of evidence within studies (Day and Pinto, 2010) that have attempted to 
identify a single heuristic that best describes respondent behaviour towards a 
sequence of choice questions. It suggests that the literature may never converge to 
agreement on a single heuristic. The best way forward would appear to be to 
consider the possibility of heterogeneity in response behaviour. The method 
presented in this paper is one approach that could be used in future studies. 
Clearly, other approaches are possible and this is likely to be a fertile area for 
future research. 
In the next chapter, the findings of the studies presented to this point in the thesis 
are used to inform the estimation of the household benefits that would result from 
undergrounding in the case study area. 
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Table 10.3: Equality-constrained latent class model on binary choice data (Model 1) 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Variable Alternative Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
pSQ 
a Status quo     8.271 8.42 
pSQ * Log of household contribution in highest-
cost alternative accepted previously 
Status quo     -4.139 -9.28 
pSQ * Change in frequency of unplanned power 
cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     -0.067 -1.07 
pSQ * Change in frequency of planned power cuts 
in highest-cost alternative previously accepted 
Status quo     -0.169 -1.62 
pSQ * Change in average duration of unplanned 
power cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     0.000 -0.02 
pSQ * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     -0.001 -0.80 
pALT 
a Underground 8.271 8.42 8.271 8.42 8.271 8.42 
pALT * Log of household contribution Underground -4.139 -9.28 -4.139 -9.28 -4.139 -9.28 
pALT * Change in frequency of unplanned power 
cuts 
Underground -0.067 -1.07 -0.067 -1.07 -0.067 -1.07 
pALT * Change in frequency of planned power cuts Underground -0.169 -1.62 -0.169 -1.62 -0.169 -1.62 
pALT * Change in average duration of unplanned 
power cuts 
Underground 0.000 -0.02 0.000 -0.02 0.000 -0.02 
pALT * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.001 -0.80 -0.001 -0.80 -0.001 -0.80 
(1-pALT) Underground 8.271 8.42 8.271 8.42   
(1-pALT) * Log of household contribution Underground -4.139 -9.28 -4.139 -9.28   
(1-pALT) * Change in frequency of unplanned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.067 -1.07 -0.067 -1.07   
(1-pALT) * Change in frequency of planned power 
cuts 
Underground -0.169 -1.62 -0.169 -1.62   
(1-pALT) * Change in average duration of 
unplanned power cuts 
Underground 0.000 -0.02 0.000 -0.02   
(1-pALT) * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.001 -0.80 -0.001 -0.80   
Normalised average observed cost All   0.611 3.42   
Class probabilities:        
Estimated latent class probabilities  0.229 2.23 0.383 5.08 0.388 5.25 
Model fit:        
N  800      
Log-likelihood  -348      
AIC  714      
a Probabilities are variables, not coefficients. The coefficient on the probability variables, 0, can therefore take 
values outside the 0-1 range.  
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Table 10.4: Equality-constrained latent class model on multinomial choice data (Model 2) 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Variable Alternative Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
pSQ Status quo     5.592 7.98 
pSQ * Log of household contribution in highest-
cost alternative accepted previously 
Status quo     -2.852 -9.31 
pSQ * Change in frequency of unplanned power 
cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     -0.153 -2.76 
pSQ * Change in frequency of planned power cuts 
in highest-cost alternative previously accepted 
Status quo     0.062 0.94 
pSQ * Change in average duration of unplanned 
power cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     -0.006 -3.57 
pSQ * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts in highest-cost alternative previously 
accepted 
Status quo     -0.004 -7.24 
pALT Underground 5.592 7.98 5.592 7.98 5.592 7.98 
pALT * Log of household contribution Underground -2.852 -9.31 -2.852 -9.31 -2.852 -9.31 
pALT * Change in frequency of unplanned power 
cuts 
Underground -0.153 -2.76 -0.153 -2.76 -0.153 -2.76 
pALT * Change in frequency of planned power cuts Underground 0.062 0.94 0.062 0.94 0.062 0.94 
pALT * Change in average duration of unplanned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.006 -3.57 -0.006 -3.57 -0.006 -3.57 
pALT * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.004 -7.24 -0.004 -7.24 -0.004 -7.24 
(1-pALT) Underground 5.592 7.98 5.592 7.98   
(1-pALT) * Log of household contribution Underground -2.852 -9.31 -2.852 -9.31   
(1-pALT) * Change in frequency of unplanned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.153 -2.76 -0.153 -2.76   
(1-pALT) * Change in frequency of planned power 
cuts 
Underground 0.062 0.94 0.062 0.94   
(1-pALT) * Change in average duration of 
unplanned power cuts 
Underground -0.006 -3.57 -0.006 -3.57   
(1-pALT) * Change in average duration of planned 
power cuts 
Underground -0.004 -7.24 -0.004 -7.24   
Normalised average observed cost All   0.389 2.40   
Class probabilities:        
Estimated latent class probabilities  0.114 0.36 0.386 2.15 0.500 3.13 
Model fit:        
N  872      
Log-likelihood  -762      
AIC  1543      
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11 Estimates of household benefits for the case 
study area 
The findings of this chapter were reported in an article published in Energy Policy (McNair 
et al., 2011b). This author conducted all analysis and took the primary role in writing the 
article, with Jeff Bennett, David Hensher, and John Rose providing input at the research 
design stage and contributions during the writing of the article. 
11.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, a broad research question was established in relation 
to the evaluation of net economic benefits from undergrounding electricity 
networks in residential areas. The social value placed on the broadly-defined 
network service quality improvement that would result from undergrounding is a 
crucial element in this evaluation, irrespective of governance structure in the 
industry (Chapter 2). Inaccurate estimation of the values could lead to investments 
with a net economic cost being undertaken and, conversely, investments with a 
net benefit not being undertaken. Considerable reliance is therefore placed on two 
methods for gathering information about preferences for the network quality 
improvement resulting from undergrounding – the hedonic price method and 
stated preference methods. In Chapter 4, the focus of this thesis was narrowed to 
two specific challenges associated with applying the methods – multicollinearity 
in the hedonic price method and task dependence in stated preference methods. 
Four of the five research questions set out in Chapter 5 focused on these 
challenges and how the methods could be adapted to understand and overcome 
them. The focus of the studies conducted in the four chapters preceding this 
chapter was on addressing these four questions. A fifth research question related 
 218 
to estimating the household benefits of undergrounding in the case study area. 
This question was addressed, in part, by the hedonic price study conducted in 
Chapter 7, but, to this point in the thesis, no analysis has been conducted on the 
stated choice survey data with a focus on estimating values for policy use. The 
objective of this chapter is to use the results of the studies conducted in the thesis 
to this point to inform the estimation of the benefits of undergrounding in the case 
study area. The intention is for this estimate to be used in economic cost-benefit 
analyses by the local electricity network service provider, ActewAGL. 
The hedonic price study conducted in Chapter 7 provided an estimate of the 
implicit price of underground wires in the market for real estate in three selected 
suburbs in the case study area. This implicit price represents the value placed on 
underground wires by the marginal purchaser in the market. The value of interest 
when estimating economic benefits is the total (or the mean) value placed on 
underground wires across all households. The implicit price provides very little 
information about this value. The analysis in this chapter therefore focuses on the 
stated choice survey data since they can be used to estimate the value of interest. 
However, the evidence from the hedonic price study is compared to the demand 
curve estimated using the stated choice data as a check on the robustness of the 
results. 
Chapters 8 to 10 show the importance of accounting for the decision processes 
that lead to task dependence when analysing the stated choice data. In Chapter 8, 
it was shown that estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) from an incentive 
compatible single binary choice format were higher than those from a choice 
format comprising multiple choice tasks per respondent. Preferences stated in the 
first of a sequence of choice tasks were not significantly different from those 
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stated in the single binary choice task, but, in subsequent choice tasks, the rate of 
acceptance of undergrounding options was lower. In Chapter 9, it was shown that 
responses in these choice tasks are influenced by cost levels observed in past 
questions. Three of the heuristics raised in the literature can be used to explain the 
relationship – weak cost minimisation, reference point revision, and cost-driven 
value learning. The latter heuristic can only explain the decrease in WTP in 
questions subsequent to the first if it is asymmetric in the sense that lower cost 
levels cause greater preference revision than higher cost levels. The evidence from 
Chapter 10 suggests that these heuristics may explain the response behaviour of 
significant sub-groups of the population.  
The weight of evidence suggests that strategic misrepresentation was one of the 
primary types, if not the primary type, of decision process employed by 
respondents in the survey. One approach to estimating the household benefits of 
undergrounding where this heuristic is present is a simple sample selection 
approach focusing on data from the incentive compatible single binary choice 
format and the first question in the repeated binary choice format (which was 
shown in Chapter 8 to elicit statistically equivalent responses). There is evidence 
that some respondents may have employed a value learning heuristic; possibly one 
that is asymmetric in the way in which lower and higher cost levels influence 
preferences. The implications of this evidence for estimating the household 
benefits of undergrounding are not clear. One of the arguments put forward in the 
literature is that the analyst should be interested in the prior distribution of WTP, 
rather than the posterior distribution influenced by the experimental design 
(Herriges and Shogren, 1996). Like the strategic misrepresentation heuristic, this 
interpretation calls for a focus on the single binary choice and the first question 
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from the multiple choice formats, since these questions provide the best 
information on the prior distribution of WTP. Although other interpretations have 
been raised in the literature (Bateman et al., 2008a), this ―prior distribution‖ 
approach is adopted in this chapter. Under this assumption, an impasse is avoided 
since the simple sample selection approach to accounting for both of the candidate 
decision processes is the use of single binary choice data and the first question 
from the repeated binary choice data. This chapter proceeds on that basis and 
alternative approaches are discussed in the concluding chapter. 
To provide information about how household benefits may vary from one area to 
another, this study investigates sources of observed heterogeneity in WTP for 
undergrounding. In particular, WTP is related to the socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents, including age and household income. WTP is also 
related to the specific benefits of undergrounding viewed as most important by 
each respondent. This analysis develops the understanding of the relative 
importance of the components of the mixed bundle of benefits associated with 
undergrounding.  
11.2 Summary of the data 
The household benefits of undergrounding in Canberra are estimated using data 
from the stated choice survey detailed in Chapter 6. A few relevant comments are 
provided here, with readers referred to Chapter 6 for more detail. Three parts of 
the survey questionnaire are of particular interest in this chapter. The first is a 
question about the specific benefits from undergrounding. Respondents were 
asked to select two of the following specific benefits in response to the question: 
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―What would be the two most significant benefits to your household from 
undergrounding? 
1) improved appearance and unobstructed views; 
2) fewer power cuts; 
3) better safety, particularly during storms and bushfires; 
4) reduced tree trimming requirements and associated costs; 
5) fewer restrictions on use of yard space (eg for construction of a garage 
or swimming pool); 
6) less need for ActewAGL to access your backyard; or 
7) other (please specify below).‖ 
In the analysis in this chapter, responses to this question are related to stated 
choices, providing an indication of the relative value of the specific benefits. 
Indicator variables were created for the selection of each pair of specific benefits 
to facilitate this analysis. 
The key part of the questionnaire in terms of valuation of overall household 
benefits is the stated choice component. Some 1,163 households responded to a 
single choice task and 292 households responded to a sequence of four choice 
tasks (the repeated binary, RB, format). Data from questions subsequent to the 
first in the RB format are excluded from the analysis to account for respondents‘ 
decision processes, as discussed in the introductory section of this chapter. Some 
82 choice observations where respondents took less than five minutes to complete 
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the survey are excluded from the analysis in this chapter.
62
 The final data set 
comprises 1,373 binary choice observations. 
Sixteen choice tasks were designed. The survey instrument was programmed to 
cycle through these choice tasks, ensuring approximately equal representation 
across choice observations. The scenarios in the tasks were described in terms of 
the number and duration of planned and unplanned power cuts. Undergrounding 
scenarios included a one-off household contribution. Respondents were instructed 
that their contribution would be payable either up-front with a three per cent 
discount or in instalments for up to five years at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent. 
The level of this contribution ranged from A$1,000 to A$16,000. The levels 
assigned to other attributes are detailed in Chapter 6. Of the specific benefits of 
undergrounding, only supply reliability could be included as a variable in the 
choice tasks. The other benefits of undergrounding are effectively embodied in the 
alternative label. To ensure the prominence of supply reliability benefits in choice 
tasks did not cause a disproportionate focus on this benefit, each choice task page 
included a reminder of the two most important benefits and the most important 
disadvantage of undergrounding selected by the respondent in earlier questions.
63
  
                                                 
62
 As discussed earlier, it was judged that these responses were given without consideration solely 
as a means of qualifying for the prize draw participation incentive. 
63
 In the question about disadvantages of undergrounding, respondents were asked ―Other than 
cost, what would be the most significant disadvantage to your household?‖ The options provided 
were: ―power cuts may be longer‖, ―inconvenience during undergrounding works‖, ―service pillar 
in front of property‖, and ―other (please specify below)‖. 
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The final part of the questionnaire comprised questions about the socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondent and their household. In particular, questions 
related to the age, gender and education of the respondent, the number of persons 
in the household, the suburb location of the household and annual household 
income. These characteristics are related to stated choices in the analysis in this 
chapter. The age and household income characteristics are effects-coded to form 
the variables described in Table 11.1 and Table 11.2.  
Table 11.1: Effects-coding of age variables 
Variable Age: 18-29 Age: 30-39 Age: 50-64 Age: 65 and over 
Level when age is 18-29 1 0 0 0 
Level when age is 30-39 0 1 0 0 
Level when age is 40-49
 a 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
Level when age is 50-64 0 0 1 0 
Level when age is 65 or over 0 0 0 1 
a 
23 per cent of the sample. 
Table 11.2: Effects-coding of household income variables
 
Variablea 
$18,199 
or less 
$18,200 - 
$51,999 
$52,000 - 
$88,399 
$88,400 - 
$129,999 
$130,000 - 
$181,999 
$182,000 
or more 
Level when income is 
$18,199 or less 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
Level when income is 
$18,200 - $51,999 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Level when income is 
$52,000 - $88,399 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
Level when income is 
$88,400 - $129,999 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
Level when income is 
$130,000 - $181,999 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
Level when income is 
$182,000 or more 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Level when income is 
not provided
 b -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
a 
All dollars are 2009 A$. 
b 
19 per cent of the sample. 
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11.3 Method 
Respondents‘ choices were modelled with a standard binary logit model 
(equivalent to the multinomial logit (MNL) model described in Chapter 3, but 
where status quo utility is zero) based on random utility theory (McFadden, 1974). 
The utility that respondent i derives from alternative j in choice task t is Uijt = αij + 
′zij + ′xitj + itj where αij is the coefficient on a constant specific to 
undergrounding options, zij is a vector of respondent characteristics (also specific 
to undergrounding options), xitj is a vector of observed variables, and  and  are 
vectors of coefficients to be estimated. The assumption that the random element, 
ε, is independently and identically distributed according to the extreme value type 
I function gives the logit model form. In the models in this chapter, all choice 
tasks comprise two alternatives and all observed variables are defined in such a 
way that xit = 0 in the current service alternative (j=1). This allows estimation of a 
binary logit model on data with a single spreadsheet row per choice observation 
(as opposed to the MNL model which is estimated on data with two or more 
spreadsheet rows per choice observation). The choice probability function for 
respondent i in choice task t is: 
 
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Consistent with the approach developed in Chapter 5, household benefits are 
measured as the truncated (improper) expectation of WTP for the representative 
household – a Hicksian compensating measure of welfare change. It is calculated 
as the area under the choice probability function truncated at the maximum cost 
level used in the survey (A$16,000) with supply reliability variables set at their 
population means: 
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where 
x1 = the cost attribute (max x1 is the maximum cost level in the survey) 
itiit xxW ,11'    
x = a vector of the means of supply reliability variables 
Truncation at the maximum cost level used in the survey is common in analysis of 
dichotomous choice contingent valuation data. However, it is important to note 
the implications of the approach. By effectively assuming the cumulative density 
function jumps to the value one at the WTP value A$16,000, the effect in this case 
is to assume a WTP estimate of A$16,000 for all respondents whose WTP is 
A$16,000 or more. This results in an underestimate of the true mean WTP, but to 
an unknown extent. To estimate true WTP, the analyst requires information about 
the shape of the estimated density function for WTP values exceeding A$16,000. 
However, estimating this shape invariably relies on the interpolation within the 
A$0-A$16,000 range, resulting in significant positive density at implausibly large 
WTP values – the so-called ―fat tail‖ problem. It is possible to rescale a density 
function by the missing density to force the integral of the modified density to 
equal one over the range supported by the data, but this is theoretically 
undesirable as it is inconsistent with random utility maximisation. In this research, 
a simple truncation has been applied, resulting in an improper expectation, with 
implications discussed where appropriate. 
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11.4 Results 
The estimation results for three choice models are presented in Table 11.3 (p. 
230). Model 1 includes the undergrounding-specific constant, the natural 
logarithm of the household contribution and the change in the various power 
supply reliability attributes between the current service and undergrounding 
alternatives. The log transformation of the cost variable is utilised because it 
results in a better model fit. The choice probability curve, derived from Model 1, 
for an undergrounding option with supply reliability variables set at their 
population means is presented in Figure 11.1. The figure shows that there is 
significant heterogeneity in WTP for undergrounding across the population. 
Approximately one-quarter of households are not willing to pay A$1,000 towards 
undergrounding in their suburb, while another quarter are willing to pay A$16,000 
or more. As a result of the log transformation on the cost variable, the estimated 
choice probability approaches one as cost approaches zero. The model therefore 
rules out the possibility of negative WTP for undergrounding. This restriction was 
judged to be reasonable since 97 per cent of respondents agreed that 
undergrounding is a good idea in principle putting cost aside.  
The truncated mean WTP is A$6,838 with a 95 per cent confidence interval of 
A$5,444 to A$8,253.
64
 This is a conservative estimate of mean WTP since 
approximately one-quarter of households have been assigned a WTP of A$16,000 
                                                 
64
 Confidence intervals are generated using a bootstrapping procedure with 1,000 random draws 
from normal distributions for relevant parameters, with moments set at their coefficient point 
estimates and standard errors (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). This procedure did not use the full 
covariance matrix through the Cholesky decomposition. 
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in the calculation when in fact their value may be higher. The true mean WTP is 
higher than A$6,838, but to an unknown extent.
65
 The median WTP, which may 
be important from a political perspective, is approximately A$4,000. 
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Figure 11.1: Estimated undergrounding choice probability curve 
Model 2 incorporates effects-coded variables for household income and the age of 
the respondent. Other socio-demographic characteristics, namely gender, 
education and household size were found to be statistically insignificant and 
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 A higher maximum cost level (or ―choke price‖) in the choice tasks would be required to resolve 
this uncertainty. The maximum level used in this survey, $16,000, was determined based on 
evidence of household WTP from pre-testing interviews. The proportion of respondents stating a 
WTP this amount in the main survey was higher than anticipated. There is some debate as to how 
best to select this ―choke price‖ level given evidence suggesting that it affects stated preferences 
(Cooper and Loomis, 1992; Mørkbak et al., 2010). 
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omitted from the final model. Of the coefficient estimates on the age variables, the 
estimate for respondents over 65 years old is highest, indicating a stronger 
preference for undergrounding among that group (holding constant other 
variables, including income). Figure 11.2 confirms the point estimate of mean 
WTP is highest when evaluated for this age group. 
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Figure 11.2: Willingness to pay by age (with 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
Turning to the household income variables, the coefficient estimates are negative 
for lower income levels and positive for higher income levels, suggesting a 
positive relationship between income and WTP for undergrounding. Figure 11.3 
confirms there is a strong relationship. The point estimate of mean WTP is less 
 229 
than A$3,000 for the lowest income bracket. It rises with each successive income 
bracket to more than A$9,000 for the highest bracket.
66
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
<$18,199 $18,200 -
$51,999
$52,200 -
$88,399
$88,400 -
$129,999
$130,000 -
$181,999
>$182,000
Annual household income
M
ea
n
 W
T
P
 (
A
$
'0
0
0
s)
  
|
 
Figure 11.3: Willingness to pay by household income (with 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
Response shares for the qualitative question about specific benefits are presented 
in Figure 11.4 (p. 231). Consistent with prior expectations, more than half of 
respondents indicated that improved appearance would be one of the two most 
significant benefits of undergrounding for their household. A similar proportion of 
respondents indicated that improved safety was a significant benefit, while just 12 
per cent of respondents viewed a reduction in the frequency of power cuts as one 
of the most significant benefits to their household.  
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 At approximately A$5,000, the mean WTP for respondents that chose not to report their income 
was lower than that for all income brackets except the lowest income bracket (<A$18,199).  
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Table 11.3: Models of household choice between network scenarios 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Undergrounding-specific constant 0.7476 *** 0.1335 0.6333 *** 0.1650 0.3212 * 0.1831 
Log of household contribution (A$‘000s) -0.6944 *** 0.0706 -0.7407 *** 0.0728 -0.7363 *** 0.0740 
Change in number of power cuts without 
warning each 5 years 
-0.0691 * 0.0383 -0.0652 * 0.0390 -0.0525 0.0397 
Change in average duration of power cuts 
without warning each 5 years 
-0.0016  0.0017 -0.0021 0.0017 -0.0017 0.0018 
Change in number of power cuts with 
notice each 5 years 
-0.1050 * 0.0538 -0.0921 * 0.0542 -0.0973 * 0.0520 
Change in average duration of power cuts 
with notice each 5 years 
-0.0004  0.0006 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 
Interactions with undergrounding-specific 
constant: 
       
Age: 18-29    -0.0513 0.2648   
Age: 30-39    -0.2302 0.1456   
Age: 50-64    0.0905 0.1072   
Age: 65 and over    0.3145 ** 0.1452   
Household income: A$18,199 or less    -1.4401 *** 0.5076   
Household income: A$18,200 - A$51,999    -0.1429 0.1864   
Household income: A$52,000 - A$88,399    0.0036 0.1480   
Household income: A$88,400 - A$129,999    0.3162 ** 0.1422   
Household income: A$130,000 - 
A$181,999 
   0.5444 *** 0.1564   
Household income: A$182,000 or more    0.9787 *** 0.1970   
Benefits: Appearance and power cuts       1.0026 *** 0.3644 
Benefits: Appearance and safety       0.9145 *** 0.1874 
Benefits: Appearance and tree trimming       0.8710 *** 0.1928 
Benefits: Appearance and yard space       0.9053 *** 0.2536 
Benefits: Appearance and DNSP access       0.1898 0.3285 
Benefits: Appearance and other       -0.0408 0.5292 
Benefits: Power cuts and safety       -0.3641 0.2749 
Benefits: Power cuts and tree trimming       -0.0938 0.4558 
Benefits: Power cuts and yard space       -0.4181 1.2326 
Benefits: Power cuts and DNSP access       -1.1155 1.0959 
Benefits: Power cuts and other       -0.4081 1.1816 
Benefits: Safety and tree trimming       0.7558 *** 0.2029 
Benefits: Safety and yard space       0.8063 *** 0.2963 
Benefits: Safety and other       -0.8147 0.5604 
Benefits: Tree trimming and yard pace       0.8859 *** 0.2886 
Benefits: Tree trimming and DNSP access       -0.4708 0.3084 
Benefits: Tree trimming and other       -0.3658 0.6606 
Benefits: Yard space and DNSP access       0.1058 0.4361 
Benefits: Yard space and other       -0.5495 1.2186 
Benefits: DNSP access and other           -1.5290 ** 0.7446 
Model fit:         
Observations 1373   1373   1373  
Log-likelihood -891   -867   -844  
Information criterion AIC 1795   1765   1741  
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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"What would be the two most significant benefits to your household from undergrounding?"
 
Figure 11.4: Specific benefits of undergrounding 
Model 3 includes effects-coded variables for the pairs of specific benefits chosen 
by the respondent in the qualitative question. The purpose of the model is to 
reveal whether there is a relationship between WTP and the specific benefits 
viewed as most significant by the respondent. While the simple response shares 
discussed above are useful information, they can be misleading. A specific benefit 
may be viewed as one of the most significant by a large number of respondents 
that place a low value on undergrounding. Conversely, a specific benefit may be 
significant to a small group of respondents that place a high value on 
undergrounding.  
Despite the large number of additional variables, the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) is improved relative to Model 1, indicating a significant relationship 
between WTP for undergrounding and responses to the qualitative question about 
specific benefits. Estimates of mean WTP evaluated at each pairing of specific 
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benefits are presented in Table 11.4. Although only 18 per cent of respondents 
indicated that fewer restrictions on use of yard space would be one of the most 
significant benefits, these respondents tended to place a higher-than-average value 
on undergrounding. Respondents indicating reduced need for network operator 
access to their yard, or some other (respondent-specified) benefit as one of the 
most significant benefits, tended to place a lower-than-average value on 
undergrounding.
67
 All pairings of specific benefits from improved appearance, 
safety, tree trimming or use of yard space were associated with higher levels of 
WTP for undergrounding.  
Table 11.4: Willingness to pay by pairings of specific benefits 
  Appearance Power cuts Safety Tree trimming Yard space DNSP access 
Power cuts 
8,469 [38]      
(5,350 - 11,529)      
Safety 
8,172 [274] 4,024 [86]     
(5,995 - 10,378) (2,322 - 6,248)     
Tree 
trimming 
8,016 [237] 4,839 [22] 7,602 [190]    
(5,818 - 10,243) (2,285 - 8,289) (5,388 - 9,906)    
Yard space 
8,134 [92] 4,473 [3] 7,779 [59] 8,062 [63]   
(5,598 - 10,737) (502 - 12,224) (5,132 - 10,565) (5,398 - 10,826)   
DNSP access 
5,674 [47] 2,862 [6] 4,289 [87] 3,755 [68] 5,435 [25]  
(3,293 - 8,547) (333 - 9,105) (2,506 - 6,570) (2,062 - 6,030) (2,730 - 8,895)  
Other 
5,024 [17] 4,456 [3] 3,060 [22] 4,187 [13] 4,154 [3] 1,897 [17] 
(2,142 - 9,022) (555 - 11,979) (1,072 - 6,424) (1,344 - 8,806) (457 - 11,771) (418 - 5,253) 
Note: 95 per cent confidence intervals in parentheses; number of choice observations in square brackets; all figures are 2009 A$. 
The few respondents who viewed a reduction in the frequency of power cuts as 
one of the most significant benefits from undergrounding exhibited below-average 
                                                 
67
 Some of the respondents selecting ―other‖ used the text field to indicate that they did not see any 
benefit in undergrounding or that only one specific benefit was important to them. Others used the 
field to express the view that the benefits are insufficient to justify the cost of undergrounding. 
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WTP for undergrounding. This result is consistent with the lack of statistical 
significance for coefficient estimates on the supply reliability attributes included 
in the choice tasks. Evidence from pre-testing interviews suggests this lack of 
WTP is due to the relatively high level of reliability of electricity supply from the 
current overhead service in Canberra. 
11.5 Comparison with the hedonic price estimate 
The key finding from the hedonic price study in Chapter 7 was that 31 per cent of 
households in the sample paid an estimated property price premium of 2.9 per 
cent for houses serviced by underground wires. This premium equates to 
approximately A$12,350 at the mean property sale price in the sample. The 
chosen functional form for the hedonic price function implies that the premium 
paid was lower for less expensive properties and higher for more expensive 
properties. However, assuming a relatively symmetric distribution of house prices 
around the mean, a broad conclusion can be drawn that approximately one-third of 
households in the sample area revealed they were willing to pay A$12,350 for 
underground networks.  
In the stated choice study, the estimated choice probability function implies that 
31 per cent of households across all suburbs with overhead wires would be willing 
to pay that amount or more for undergrounding in their suburb. Given that the 
proportion of houses serviced by underground wires in Canberra as a whole is 
similar to the proportion in the hedonic price study suburbs, the point on the 
demand curve implied by the hedonic price study lies on or very near to the 
demand curve estimated using the stated choice survey as shown in Figure 11.5. 
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This consistency across two distinct data sources instils confidence in the estimate 
of household benefits calculated in this chapter. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Household contribution / implicit price ($'000s)
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
ch
o
o
si
n
g
 u
n
d
er
g
o
u
n
d
in
g
  
  
.
Point implied by hedonic price study
Estimated choice probability curve
 
Figure 11.5: Comparing evidence from the hedonic price and stated choice studies 
 
11.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, data from the stated choice survey described in Chapter 6 has been 
used to estimate the benefits to households from replacing existing overhead 
electricity and telecommunications networks in Canberra with new underground 
infrastructure. The evidence from the analysis suggests the value of these benefits 
would be at least A$6,838 per household on average. This is a conservative 
estimate of average WTP calculated by effectively assuming a WTP level of 
A$16,000 for households indicating that they would be willing to pay A$16,000 
or more for undergrounding in their suburb. There is significant heterogeneity in 
benefits across households with approximately one-quarter of households falling 
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into this category and another quarter of households not willing to pay A$1,000 
for undergrounding in their suburb. An undergrounding program would receive 
majority support across all areas currently serviced by overhead wires if the 
household contribution were A$4,000 or less. These findings are consistent with 
evidence from the hedonic price study in Chapter 7, with the demand point 
derived from that study lying on the demand curve for undergrounding estimated 
in this chapter. 
The implications of this estimate, in terms of whether net economic benefits from 
undergrounding would be positive are discussed in the concluding chapter. 
Comments are also made with respect to matters that should be taken into 
consideration when transferring this estimate to cost-benefit analyses of potential 
undergrounding projects in other cities.  
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12 Conclusion 
12.1 Introduction 
A number of cities around the world have implemented, or are considering, 
programs to replace overhead low-voltage electricity and telecommunications 
networks with new underground infrastructure in residential areas. This process of 
undergrounding is an expensive exercise, with major civil works required to 
install new wires and remove existing infrastructure. In order for undergrounding 
to be economically viable, this expense must be justified by the mixed bundle of 
benefits conferred by undergrounding, which includes benefits to network 
businesses, such as reduced ongoing network maintenance costs, and benefits to 
households, such as improved aesthetics, better safety during storms and fires, and 
improved supply reliability. The ongoing cost savings to network businesses are 
typically small relative to the cost of undergrounding. The estimated value of the 
benefits to households is therefore a crucial component in the economic 
evaluation of undergrounding programs. This presents a major problem, since 
there appears to be no complete estimate of the benefits to households available in 
the literature. This thesis represents a contribution towards addressing that 
research gap. Two non-market valuation methods have been used in this research 
to inform an estimate of the benefits that households would derive from 
undergrounding in Canberra, Australia – the hedonic property price method and 
the stated choice method.  
In addition to providing a benefit estimate where little or no information was 
previously available, this thesis has focused on one of the many challenges 
associated with applying each of these methods. It has improved the 
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understanding of those challenges and developed techniques for overcoming 
them. The challenge examined with respect to the hedonic price method was the 
difficulty posed by highly-correlated explanatory variables in the estimated price 
function. This multicollinearity problem is common when applying the method in 
cities where retro-fit undergrounding is yet to take place. As a result, it can be 
difficult to disentangle the price effect of underground wires from the effects of 
other property characteristics, such as building age and proximity to the central 
business district. This thesis has shown how a selective sampling approach, 
similar to the boundary discontinuity approach used to value school quality 
(Black, 1999; Davidoff and Leigh, 2008; Gibbons and Machin, 2003), can be used 
to overcome this challenge in certain circumstances. 
The challenge examined with respect to the stated choice method is that of 
understanding the implications of task dependence in choice data, where task 
dependence refers to a situation in which responses are influenced by information 
observed in the course of completing the choice tasks. Several studies have found 
task dependence in choice data by identifying violations of the standard 
assumptions of truthful response with stable preferences (for example, Ariely et 
al., 2003; Bateman et al., 2008b; Boyle et al., 1985; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; 
Carson et al., 2009; Day et al., 2009; Day and Pinto, 2010; DeShazo, 2002; 
Hanemann et al., 1991; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Holmes and Boyle, 2005; 
Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008; McFadden and Leonard, 1995; Swait and 
Adamowicz, 2001). The appropriate set of alternative assumptions depends on the 
decision processes (or heuristics) underlying the stated choices. Some of the 
authors cited above have speculated as to which heuristics may have led to task 
dependence in their studies. These heuristics include strategic misrepresentation 
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(Carson and Groves, 2007), and value learning (Plott, 1996). Only a few have 
investigated which of the various heuristics raised in the literature best explains 
the response patterns in a given data source (Bateman et al., 2008b; Day and 
Pinto, 2010; DeShazo, 2002). It seems that none has investigated the possibility of 
heterogeneity in response behaviour over the population; that is, the possibility 
that each of the heuristics explains the response behaviour of a sub-group of the 
population.  
This thesis makes a contribution to this line of investigation by developing an 
understanding of the decision processes employed by respondents in a specific 
study and by developing novel techniques that could be used in other studies to 
analyse and account for those decision processes. One of those techniques 
explains within-subject variation in cost sensitivity over a sequence of discrete 
choice questions by incorporating, in parametric choice models, indicator 
variables for the positioning of cost relative to the levels observed in previous 
choice tasks. Another uses an equality-constrained latent class (ECLC) model to 
estimate the proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with each of the 
broad types of task-dependence-inducing heuristics raised in the literature. 
The following section outlines the research findings of this thesis in relation to the 
objectives set out in the introductory chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, the 
implications of those findings for policy and the application of methods are 
discussed, and recommendations for further research are provided.  
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12.2 Research findings 
The objective of this thesis has been to make a contribution towards addressing 
the research gaps identified in the discussion above. In particular, the specific 
objectives outlined in the introductory chapter were to: 
1) estimate the value of benefits to households from undergrounding low-
voltage electricity and telecommunications networks in a specific case 
study area; 
2) investigate whether the hedonic price approach can be adapted to 
overcome the multicollinearity problems generally present in cities where 
retro-fit undergrounding is yet to take place; and 
3) develop the understanding of the respondent decision processes that lead 
to task dependence in stated choice data by: 
a) investigating whether elicitation format, in terms of the number of 
choice tasks per respondent and the number of alternatives per choice 
task, influences the extent to which respondents employ heuristics that 
lead to task dependence; and 
b) investigating whether sub-groups of the population respond in 
accordance with different heuristics. 
This section demonstrates that these objectives have been achieved and provides a 
brief summary of findings in relation to each objective. 
12.2.1 Household benefits in the case study area 
The benefits to households from replacing existing overhead electricity and 
telecommunications networks in Canberra with new underground infrastructure 
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were estimated in Chapter 11 using data from the stated choice survey described 
in Chapter 6. The evidence from the analysis suggests the value of these benefits 
would be at least A$6,838 per household on average. This is a conservative 
estimate of average willingness to pay (WTP) calculated by assigning a WTP 
level of A$16,000 to households indicating that they would be willing to pay 
A$16,000 or more for undergrounding in their suburb. There is significant 
heterogeneity in benefits across households, with approximately one-quarter of 
households falling into this category, and another quarter of households not 
willing to pay A$1,000 for undergrounding in their suburb. An undergrounding 
program would receive majority support across all areas currently serviced by 
overhead wires if the household contribution were A$4,000 or less.  
These results were found to be consistent with evidence from the hedonic price 
study in Chapter 7. Undergrounding was found to increase house price by 2.9 per 
cent with other property characteristics held constant. This equates to 
approximately A$12,350 based on the mean sale price in the data. Approximately 
31 per cent of households in the study areas chose to pay the price premium for a 
property serviced by underground wires (and the proportion of households 
serviced by underground wires in Canberra as a whole is also around 30 per cent). 
The choice probability function estimated using the stated choice data implied that 
31 per cent of respondents would be willing to pay A$12,350 or more for 
undergrounding in their suburb. This consistency of evidence instils additional 
confidence in the accuracy of the benefit estimate derived from the stated choice 
study. 
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12.2.2 Multicollinearity and the hedonic price method 
A sample selection approach was developed in Chapters 5 and 6 as a potential 
means of overcoming the problems caused by multicollinearity that tend to arise 
in a city-wide sample where retro-fit undergrounding has yet to take place. The 
approach utilises real estate sales data from areas with a mix of overhead and 
underground infrastructure where neighbourhoods and housing stock are 
relatively homogeneous. In Chapter 7, the data were analysed to assess whether 
the approach was successful in a specific study. The two main problems caused by 
multicollinearity are large standard errors on the coefficient estimates for the 
affected variables, and a lack of robustness in those estimates to changes in model 
specification. The results in Chapter 7 confirm that these problems were 
successfully overcome by the sample selection approach in the case study. The 
coefficient on the indicator variable for underground wires was significantly 
different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level in the estimated price 
function. The value and significance of this estimate were both robust against four 
alternative model specifications.  
12.2.3 Task dependence and the stated choice method 
An understanding of the respondent decision processes that lead to task 
dependence in stated choice data was developed using three studies. In the first 
(Chapter 8), split-sample comparisons were made between preferences stated in a 
sequence of choice tasks and those stated in an incentive compatible attribute-
based single binary (SB) choice task. It was concluded, at the 90 per cent 
confidence level, that estimates of mean WTP from an elicitation format 
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presenting multiple choice tasks to each respondent were lower than those from an 
incentive compatible single choice task format.
68
 That study also made a 
comparison between preferences stated in an incentive compatible SB choice 
format and those stated in the first choice task of a sequence. No evidence was 
found to support the hypothesis that stated preferences in the first choice task 
presented were affected by advance knowledge that four as opposed to one choice 
task would be presented. In fact, there was equivalence in the evidence on WTP 
estimates from the first choice task in a sequence and an SB choice task. The 
evidence suggests that task dependence is present in the data, with cost sensitivity 
clearly increasing (and implied WTP decreasing) in questions subsequent to the 
first in the sequence.
69
 
In a second study (Chapter 9), the understanding of the decision processes 
underlying this task dependence was developed by examining the relationship 
between cost sensitivity and the positioning of the cost level relative to levels 
presented in previous choice tasks in the multiple choice task format. A significant 
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 The question as to which estimate is closer to true WTP depends on the respondent decision 
process (or processes) underlying the result. These decision processes were investigated by the 
second and third studies of the stated choice data as discussed below. 
69
 There may have been another (separate) relationship – one between scale and choice task 
ordering. It is possible that WTP could decrease over the course of a sequence (due to strategic 
misrepresentation or some other heuristic), with scale increasing over the course of the sequence as 
choices become more deterministic (as respondents become more familiar with the choice task 
format) as per the findings of other studies (Caussade et al., 2005). This was not investigated in 
this study, but could be examined in future research by making scale a function of a choice task‘s 
position in the sequence. 
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relationship was found, with cost sensitivity tending to be higher when cost levels 
observed in previous questions were relatively low. The result confirms the 
finding of Day and Pinto (2010) that the order in which choice tasks are presented 
can have a significant effect on WTP estimates. An order with increasing cost 
levels will underestimate WTP relative to an incentive compatible SB choice 
format, while an order with declining cost levels might overestimate WTP.  
Three of the decision processes (or heuristics) raised in the literature are supported 
by this evidence. The first is the weak cost minimisation heuristic in which 
respondents might reject an alternative that is preferred to the status quo if a 
similar good was offered at a lower cost in a previous choice task. The second is 
the reference point revision heuristic in which value functions shift when a non-
status-quo option is chosen. The third is a cost-driven value learning heuristic in 
which respondents revise their valuation of the good towards a weighted average 
of the cost levels presented in the sequence to that point, albeit the latter heuristic 
can only explain the decrease in WTP beyond the first question in a sequence if 
lower costs levels have greater influence on the value revision process than higher 
cost levels.
70
  
A third study (Chapter 10) showed how an ECLC model can be used to identify 
discrete heterogeneity in response behaviour towards a sequence of choice tasks 
                                                 
70
 Further research could investigate the nature of the preference revision process in more detail. 
For example, it may be that information observed in more recent questions has a greater influence 
on preferences than that observed in questions earlier in the sequence, particularly in longer 
sequences (Day et al., 2009). Alternatively, information observed in the first choice task may 
continue to play an important role throughout a sequence of questions (Ariely et al., 2003).  
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by estimating the proportion of respondents behaving in accordance with each of 
the broad types of heuristic. The results showed the model can be applied to 
choice data from both binary and multinomial choice formats where a status quo 
alternative is present and similar goods are offered at very different prices over the 
course of a sequence of questions. The ECLC models achieved an improvement in 
fit over standard multinomial logit models, even based on information criteria that 
account for model parsimony. Estimates of WTP were statistically 
indistinguishable between the two types of model. However, this may not be the 
case in other data sources as the effect on WTP of accounting for heterogeneity in 
decision process depends on several factors including the difference between 
mean WTP and the mean cost level used in the survey, and the relative mix of 
class probabilities. 
Three distinct groups were identified in both the binary and multinomial choice 
data, corresponding to the broad types of heuristic – strategic misrepresentation, 
value learning, and truthful response with stable preferences (the standard 
assumptions). The relative sizes of these classes were not significantly different 
across the binary and multinomial choice formats. The group behaving in 
accordance with the standard assumptions was the smallest of the three groups in 
both models, providing further evidence that the standard assumptions do not 
adequately reflect the response behaviour of the majority of respondents in a 
survey of this type.  
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12.3 Implications for policy and application of methods 
12.3.1 The economic viability of undergrounding 
The key question from an economic evaluation perspective is whether the 
(conservative) benefit estimate of A$6,838 per household exceeds the difference 
between the capital cost of undergrounding and the present value of ongoing cost 
savings to network businesses. This seems most likely where capital costs are 
similar to those experienced in Perth of approximately A$10,000 per property 
(Office of Energy, 2008). If capital costs exceed A$20,000 per property as they 
have in South Australia (ETSA Utilities, 2009), then the economic viability of 
widespread undergrounding would depend on the avoided costs of complementary 
projects (such as the National Broadband Network in Australia) and wider 
community benefits.
71
 Where widespread undergrounding is not justified, there 
may be merit in programs targeting particular areas where the costs and benefits 
are favourable. Evidence from this research suggests benefits would be highest in 
areas with higher household income and older residents where improved 
appearance, safety, tree trimming or restrictions on the use of yard space are of 
concern. 
Care should be taken when transferring this benefit estimate to other cities. In 
Canberra, most overhead electricity and telecommunications networks are 
reticulated along the rear boundary of properties rather than the much more 
                                                 
71
 This research estimates the benefit to households from undergrounding in their own suburb. 
There may be further benefits to households from undergrounding in neighbouring suburbs and 
other parts of the city. 
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common street verge reticulation. Electricity supply is relatively reliable and 
households are responsible for keeping trees clear of power lines. The value of 
amenity and supply reliability benefits may be higher in other cities, while the 
value of relaxing tree trimming requirements and restrictions on the use of yard 
space may be lower. Despite these limitations, the estimate derived here provides 
valuable information to policy makers considering the economic merits of 
undergrounding programs where little or no information was previously available. 
12.3.2 Application of the hedonic property price method 
Turning to implications for the application of methods, the first stage of the 
hedonic price method is of some use to policy makers since it indicates a point on 
the demand curve for underground networks (corresponding to the value placed 
on underground networks by the marginal purchaser in the market). However, the 
value of interest – the average value placed on underground networks – is equal to 
the area under this demand curve. In cases where the second stage of hedonic 
analysis (discussed in Chapter 3) is not possible, the stated choice method should 
be preferred by policy makers when assessing the benefits of a potential 
undergrounding program since it allows direct estimation of this value. However, 
the indication of demand provided by the first stage of the hedonic price method 
would be valuable to policy makers where no other information is available and 
where practical constraints necessitate a study that can be conducted quickly and 
inexpensively. The sample selection approach developed in this thesis provides a 
means by which such a study can take place in cities where retro-fit 
undergrounding has yet to take place. In other cities, a difference-in-difference 
approach, comparing price increases in undergrounding project areas to price 
increases elsewhere, may be preferred. 
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12.3.3 Application of stated choice methods 
Evidence from the split-sample comparison of stated choice elicitation formats 
(Chapter 8) suggests that responses to the first question in a sequence of binary 
choice tasks can be considered equivalent to those from an incentive compatible 
SB choice. This is an important result because it suggests that the potentially 
considerable expense associated with collecting single choice observations from 
each respondent can be avoided (by collecting multiple observations from a 
smaller sample of respondents). It goes some way to justifying the use of the first 
choice task in a sequence as an unbiased comparator in studies such as Bateman et 
al. (2008b) and Day and Pinto (2010).  
However, the finding of a decrease in implied WTP in questions subsequent to the 
first in a sequence suggests that care should be taken when analysing data from 
choice formats with multiple questions per respondent. Indeed, the finding of a 
relationship between WTP and the cost levels observed in previous choice tasks 
(in Chapter 9) adds to a growing body of evidence that casts serious doubt on the 
standard assumption that all responses are truthful and preferences are stable over 
the course of a sequence of questions. The appropriate approach to deriving a 
WTP estimate for policy use from repeated choice data depends on the decision 
processes (or heuristics) underlying this relationship. Unfortunately, the two types 
of heuristic consistent with the response patterns identified in this thesis may have 
quite different implications.  
Strategic misrepresentation heuristics, such as weak cost minimisation and 
reference point revision, imply that more reliance should be placed on responses 
to an incentive compatible SB choice format or to the first question presented to 
each respondent in repeated question formats. A simple sample selection 
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technique to account for this behaviour would be to limit analysis to choice data 
generated by these questions.  
The presence of value learning presents a more fundamental problem since a 
decision process in which values are influenced by prices is incompatible with 
standard microeconomic theory.
72
 Some authors have argued that the analyst 
should be interested in the prior distribution of WTP, uncertain as it may be, 
rather than the posterior distribution influenced by the experimental design 
(Herriges and Shogren, 1996). Others have suggested that greater weight be 
placed on responses towards the end of a sequence of questions, after respondents 
have experienced the (typically unfamiliar) good in the simulated market setting 
(Bateman et al., 2008a). The latter approach may be more appropriate when cost 
levels in the experimental design are roughly equal to the actual production cost of 
the associated scenario (since the choice tasks are then roughly reflective of a real 
competitive market), while the former approach may be preferred when cost 
levels are set well above or below the production cost as a means of capturing the 
anticipated distribution of preferences across the population (since this may 
constitute an influence on values that would not occur in a real market). This 
debate highlights the fact that the implications of the cost-driven value learning 
heuristic extend beyond the analysis of choice data to the design of the choice 
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 Ariely et al. (2003) point out that this problem is not confined to the stated preference context, 
but extends to real markets.  
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experiments themselves, and, in particular, to the selection of cost levels in the 
design.
73
  
The approach to accounting for the heuristics that lead to task dependence is 
further complicated by the finding of heterogeneity in response behaviour 
described in Chapter 10. The presence of multiple heuristics within a choice data 
source renders simple sample selection techniques ineffective. According to the 
interpretation of at least some authors, omitting data from the first question 
presented to each respondent may be appropriate for a sub-group of the population 
exhibiting a value learning heuristic. However, it is entirely inappropriate to apply 
this approach to those behaving in accordance with a strategic misrepresentation 
heuristic. The presence of heterogeneity in response behaviour calls for the 
application of an econometric approach to accounting for the heuristics in the full 
set of choice data. The method presented in Chapter 10 is one approach that could 
be used to do so in future studies. As well as estimating the proportion of 
respondents behaving in accordance with different heuristics, it takes that 
behaviour into account when estimating the underlying taste intensities that are 
used to derive benefit estimates.
74
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 Future research could investigate the role of experience in value learning; in particular, whether 
preferences for unfamiliar goods are more heavily influenced by the experimental design than 
preferences for familiar goods. 
74
 Application of these econometric approaches is not restricted to the case of heterogeneity. Any 
utility function specified to capture an heuristic in these models can also be used in place of the 
standard utility function typically used in models assuming homogeneity. This type of model 
represents an alternative to simple sample selection approaches. 
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Turning to experimental design, the typical approach of designing a mixture of 
cost level profiles over the sequences of choice tasks presented to respondents 
seems appropriate given uncertainty over whether strategic misrepresentation or 
value learning is the more dominant heuristic. If strategic misrepresentation were 
expected to dominate, then an order with declining cost levels may be preferred.  
12.4 Limitations and areas for further research 
This thesis provides an estimate of the benefits to households from 
undergrounding in a specific case study area. While this information is likely to be 
valuable to policy makers considering the merits of undergrounding in other 
cities, there would be significant value in conducting further case studies to 
develop an understanding of any differences in preferences between cities and of 
the conditions that may drive those differences.  
Turning to research on methods, this thesis has focused on the heuristics that can 
lead to task dependence in a maintained full compensatory framework. Many 
other aspects of respondents‘ decision processes have been studied in the 
literature, including changes in the extent to which responses are deterministic in 
terms of institutional learning (Braga and Starmer, 2005) and fatigue (Caussade et 
al., 2005), and the use of simplifying heuristics (Hensher and Greene, 2010; 
Hensher and Layton, 2010; Hensher and Rose, 2010; Layton and Hensher, 2010; 
Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). Incorporating these aspects of respondents‘ 
decision processes with the aspects studied in this thesis in a single model would 
provide a rich understanding of the preferences underlying stated choices. This 
remains a challenge for future research.   
 251 
One of the key findings in Chapter 8 was that respondents‘ sensitivity to cost 
increased after the first question in a sequence of binary choice tasks. However, 
cost sensitivity did not increase monotonically over the course of the sequence. 
The point estimate of WTP evaluated at the fourth question is higher (and cost 
sensitivity is lower) than the estimates evaluated at the second and third questions, 
giving a skewed ―u-shape‖ to the diagram plotting estimated WTP against 
question position order. The difference was not statistically significant in this 
case. However, Scheufele and Bennett (2010b) found an identical situation in their 
concurrent study. Future research could investigate whether these findings are a 
coincidence. That is, it could investigate whether a significant difference can be 
found using a larger number of choice observations and whether such a result 
could be linked to the fact that the final question in a sequence holds a ―take it or 
leave it‖ property. 
Although the good valued in this thesis is familiar to respondents in the sense that 
they see and use the overhead network almost daily (and have probably visited 
residential areas serviced by underground networks), the situation in which a 
choice of network services is offered is unfamiliar. This lack of real, and possibly 
stated, choice experience is typical in the context of non-market valuation surveys. 
It seems possible that accumulated choice experience may play a role in any value 
learning that takes place when a respondent is presented with a sequence of choice 
tasks. In particular, future research could investigate whether preferences for 
unfamiliar goods are more heavily influenced by an experimental design than are 
preferences for familiar goods. 
In the stated choice survey analysed in this thesis, similar goods were offered at 
quite different cost levels over the course of a sequence of choice tasks, making 
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opportunities for strategic response relatively obvious and, potentially, 
exacerbating cost-driven value learning behaviour. Scheufele and Bennett 
(2010b), in their concurrent and similar study focusing on the case of a pure 
public environmental good, and Day and Pinto (2010) found similar evidence with 
respect to task dependence using surveys in which the cost attribute was less 
dominant. However, in all of these studies, the cognitive burden of choice tasks 
was low, particularly relative to many studies undertaken in the transportation and 
marketing disciplines. Day and Pinto (2010) and Scheufele and Bennett (2010b) 
employ binary choices between alternatives described by one cost and either one 
or two non-cost attributes. An important objective for future research will be to 
establish whether the decision processes identified in these studies become less 
prevalent as the cognitive burden of the trade-offs in the choice task (potentially 
measured by the number of attributes attended to and the number of alternatives 
per choice task) is increased. 
The economic benefits of undergrounding distribution networks is a topic that is 
likely to remain of interest to policy makers around the world as households 
serviced by ageing overhead networks contrast their service with that in the 
growing suburban areas in which networks were installed underground. This 
thesis provides an estimate of the value of the benefits to households in a specific 
case study area and makes a contribution towards understanding and overcoming 
certain challenges associated with estimating those benefits. The agenda for future 
research discussed above would further increase confidence in the cost-benefit 
analyses used by policy makers when considering the merits of undergrounding 
programs.  
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Appendix A: Derivation of general equilibrium 
welfare effects 
Using a general equilibrium framework to identify conditions for optimal 
provision gives a rich understanding of the full social impact of provision 
including related market and distributional effects. The limitations of the general 
equilibrium framework in the natural monopoly setting are the assumptions of 
exogenous productivity and a benevolent social planner with full information. 
However, the framework is discussed here to show how the welfare effects of 
network service provision are derived from consumers‘ constrained utility 
maximisation problem.  
Consider an economy comprising I consumers who derive utility, U, from 
electricity, X, network quality, Q, and a composite of all other goods, Y (which is 
numeraire).
75
 Network quality is assumed to be a public good that cannot be 
differentiated between consumers. Each consumer is endowed with an equal share 
of a composite resource, which is allocated as an input, Nj, in production of good j 
(where j = X, Q or Y).
76
 The price of this composite resource is c. Each consumer 
receives an equal share of profits from private production. These simplifying 
assumptions of equal endowment and shareholding across consumers allow the 
model to focus on the efficiency of provision rather than on distributional effects, 
which can be isolated through pricing/taxation decisions. Consumers choose the 
allocation of their resources except with regard to production of network service 
                                                 
75
 U‘>0, U‖<0 and there is heterogeneity in preferences across consumers. 
76
 dj/dNj>0, d
2
j/dNj
2
<0 and productivity is held constant. 
 254 
quality, which is an exogenous policy variable.
77
 Production of network quality is 
funded via a fixed charge (A) and/or a consumption charge (a specific tax, t, on 
electricity). All markets other than that for Q are competitive, including the 
market for electricity.
78
 The consumption charge, t, is representative of the 
distribution-use-of-system (DUoS) component of the final retail electricity 
consumption price, q = p + t, where p is the producer price of electricity. 
Each consumer, i, faces an identical resource constraint (where total resources in 
the economy is equal to 1) and a budget constraint:
79
  
1/I = N
i
X + N
i
Q + N
i
Y. 
 Y
i
 + A + qX
i
 = c (N
i
X + N
i
Q + N
i
Y) + 1/I [πQ + Y – cNY + pX – cNX] 
Profit from production of network service quality is defined as:
80
 
 πQ = AI + tX – cNQ 
Consumers maximise their utility subject to these two constraints. This 
maximisation problem is represented by the following Lagrange function: 
                                                 
77
 Q is non-rivalrous, so dQi/dX = 0, and the level of X has no bearing on the cost of providing Q 
(Q has zero marginal cost in X). 
78
 This is consistent with the institutional arrangements for electricity markets in the US, the UK 
and Australia, where generation and retail markets are privatised and competitive, but the networks 
used to distribute the electricity are regulated natural monopolies.  
79
 Consumers may have non-identical preferences. 
80
 Importantly, it is assumed that πQ does not enter into the first-order condition (FOC) for 
consumers‘ choice of X. That is, consumers select their consumption of X based on the final retail 
price, without regard to the fact that as a shareholder in the firm, they would receive a share of any 
profit. 
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W
i
 = U
i
(X
i
, Q
i
, Y
i) + λi[c/I + 1/I {πQ + Y – cNY + pX – cNX] - Y
i
 - A - qX
i
} 
 where λi is the marginal utility of income for consumer i. 
Total differentiation and substitution of the FOCs for consumer choice variables, 
NX and NY, the FOCs for private production of X and Y, and the definition of πQ, 
leads to the following expression for the welfare of consumer i in units of the 
numeraire, Y: 
  Qii
i
Q
i
i
cdNtdX
I
dqXX
I
dQ
UdW







11

 
This expression for the individual consumer describes the various welfare effects 
of investment in network quality. The major benefit of improved network service 
quality is the increase in consumer utility. The major cost of improved network 
service quality is the required increase in expenditure of resources. Additional 
welfare effects arise due to related market effects (changes in activity in other, 
distorted markets) and the distributional effects of changes in market prices.  
To a large extent, related market and distributional effects can be isolated from 
analysis of provision decisions because they can be influenced by pricing policy 
decisions. Recovery of network costs via a consumption charge will increase the 
price of electricity above marginal cost and impose a social cost due to the 
consequent reduction in electricity use. However, recovering some costs via a 
consumption charge may result in a preferable distributional outcome if lower-
income consumers tend to use less electricity and are given greater weight in the 
social welfare function than their higher-income counterparts. In order to focus on 
provision rather than pricing decisions, simplifying assumptions can be made so 
as to ignore these related market and distributional effects. First, the social welfare 
function can be assumed to be an unweighted sum of individual welfare. This 
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ignores the welfare effects of changes in market prices by assuming that they 
simply transfer welfare from one consumer to another (sometimes referred to as 
the ―dollar is a dollar‖ assumption). Second, all network service provision costs 
can be assumed to be recovered via fixed charges (lump-sum transfers).
81
 This 
ignores effects in the related electricity market by assuming that it is a non-
distorted market. Under these simplifying assumptions, changes in social welfare 
are represented by the following expression: 
Q
i i
i
i
Q
i
i
cdNdQ
UdW
 

 
The condition for welfare maximising provision of network services is:
82
  
0
1
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dN
dQU
dN
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Q
Q
Q 
 
 
                                                 
81
 It is assumed that these fixed charges would not exclude any consumers from the market. 
82
 It is assumed that a benevolent social planner chooses NQ and that Q is a known function of NQ. 
The Hatta (1982) Decomposition implies that the actual welfare change can be used to evaluate the 
social optimum, without the need to calculate compensated welfare changes. It is used to show 
how, for individual consumers, dollars are a reliable proxy for utility, whenever policy changes are 
incrementally small. This decomposition finds that income effects are a scaling coefficient on the 
efficiency effects from marginal policy changes that play no role in single consumer economies. 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix for property sales data 
 
  TIME SIZE BED3 BED4 BED5UP GARAGE ENSUITE UG TRAFFIC DIST_LN VIEW2 VIEW3 COND2 COND3 CALWELL MACARTH TIMESQ SIZESQ 
TIME 1.00                                   
SIZE 0.02 1.00                                 
BED3 -0.02 -0.29 1.00                               
BED4 -0.04 0.33 -0.82 1.00                             
BED5UP 0.09 0.18 -0.25 -0.23 1.00                           
GARAGE 0.02 0.35 -0.30 0.32 0.11 1.00                         
ENSUITE -0.05 0.39 -0.55 0.57 0.16 0.48 1.00                       
UG 0.04 -0.25 0.09 -0.14 0.01 -0.14 -0.11 1.00                     
TRAFFIC -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.19 1.00                   
DIST_LN 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.12 0.15 1.00                 
VIEW2 0.02 0.17 -0.17 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.20 -0.27 0.17 0.42 1.00               
VIEW3 -0.04 0.23 -0.16 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.17 -0.06 0.03 0.16 -0.20 1.00             
COND2 -0.06 0.23 -0.10 0.16 -0.03 0.21 0.21 -0.19 0.00 -0.06 0.15 -0.05 1.00           
COND3 0.04 0.13 -0.23 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.18 -0.13 -0.01 0.15 0.14 0.26 -0.45 1.00         
CALWELL 0.08 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.88 0.34 0.10 -0.08 0.09 1.00       
MACARTH -0.08 0.29 -0.12 0.16 -0.01 0.13 0.17 -0.18 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 -0.47 1.00     
TIMESQ 0.97 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.08 1.00   
SIZESQ 0.03 0.98 -0.29 0.29 0.19 0.31 0.35 -0.19 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.19 0.11 -0.02 0.27 0.04 1.00 
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Appendix C: Example of questionnaire contents 
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Dear respondent, 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. As a home owner in an area with overhead wires, 
you could be affected by decisions about placing electricity and telecommunications wires 
underground. 
 
This survey is being conducted by ActewAGL and the Australian National University (ANU) in 
partnership with the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS) at the University of 
Sydney. 
 
Please answer these questions on behalf of your household. Please do not use your internet 
browser’s ‘back’ or ‘forward’ buttons, as your responses may not be saved correctly. It 
should take about 15 minutes to complete this survey. 
 
ORIMA Research will not reveal your identity to ActewAGL, the ANU or ITLS. The 
information you provide will only be used in a grouped format.  
 
The survey results will be used to assess options for undergrounding of existing overhead 
wires in your suburb and other suburbs in Canberra. 
 
If you have any technical problems accessing the questionnaire, please contact Kim Sullivan 
or Daniel Prior at ORIMA Research on (02) 6175 1000 or by email at 
kim.sullivan@orima.com or daniel.prior@orima.com. 
 
If you have any enquiries about the content of the questionnaire, please contact me by 
email at ben.mcnair@anu.edu.au. 
 
If you have any concerns regarding the way in which this survey was conducted, please 
contact the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee on (02) 6125 7945 or by e-mail at 
Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ben McNair 
Crawford School of Economics and Government 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 
 
 
Login code:  
 
 260 
 
The reason for this survey 
 
ActewAGL Distribution owns and manages the poles, wires and other network infrastructure 
used to transport electricity to your home.  
 
Canberra suburbs developed after 1990 have underground wires.  
 
Many residential areas in Canberra still have overhead wires on poles.  
 
ActewAGL Distribution is considering the merits of replacing these overhead wires with new 
underground wires in the street verge. 
 
This survey forms part of an initial feasibility study. Depending on survey responses from 
your suburb, ActewAGL may proceed to a full investigation of undergrounding in your 
suburb including consultation with the community, stakeholders, Government and 
independent regulators.  
 
 
Why underground wires? 
 
Placing wires underground is a means of avoiding the ongoing costs of maintaining and 
replacing poles in backyards, which would otherwise need to be recovered through 
electricity bills. 
 
Underground wires have several advantages over overhead wires, including: 
  
 Improved neighbourhood appearance and unobstructed views 
 Fewer power cuts 
 Better community safety, particularly in storms and bushfires 
 Reduced tree trimming requirements and associated costs 
 Fewer restrictions on use of yard space (eg for construction of a garage or 
swimming pool) 
 Less need for ActewAGL to access your backyard 
 
A disadvantage of underground wires is that when unplanned power cuts occur it can take 
longer to restore power than with overhead wires as it may be harder for ActewAGL to find 
and repair the fault. 
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Example of improved neighbourhood appearance 
 
  
 
Overhead     Underground (simulation) 
 
Example of unobstructed views 
 
  
 
Overhead     Underground (simulation) 
 
Undergrounding in other cities 
 
Perth, Darwin and several other cities around the world are ‘undergrounding’. The photos 
below are from East Victoria Park in Perth before and after undergrounding. 
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How is it done? 
 
 
Undergrounding would include both 
electricity and telecommunications wires. It 
would involve: 
 
• Underground horizontal drilling to 
install new wires under the verge in 
each street. 
• Underground horizontal drilling to 
install new wires from connection 
pillars (usually a green minipillar 
(pictured) near the front corner of 
every second property) to the meter 
box at each house. 
• Connection of the new underground 
wires to the existing meter box and 
telecommunications connection box 
within each residence. 
• Re-instatement and repair of all 
disturbed work areas. 
• Changeover of supply from the 
overhead to the underground 
network. 
• Removal of existing poles and 
overhead wires. 
 
 
 
 
The use of underground drilling 
instead of open trenching will limit the 
areas disturbed and reduce the impact 
on local residents during the 
underground installation works. 
 
 
 
 
Who would pay for undergrounding? 
  
Funding arrangements for any undergrounding program in the ACT would be developed 
in consultation with the community, stakeholders, Government and independent 
regulators.  
 
One of the options that would be considered as part of this process is the following 
approach, which has been used as part of the Underground Power Program in Perth.  
 
All property owners in an area to be ‘undergrounded’ are required to make a specific 
contribution towards the cost of undergrounding in their suburb. Two payment methods 
are offered: 
 
1. Upfront (within 35 days) with a 3% discount; or 
2. Instalments (for up to 5 years) at a 6.5% p.a. interest rate (to cover financing 
and administration costs). If a house is sold, the balance would be paid at the 
time of sale.  
 
For the purpose of this survey, you should assume that this approach would be used in 
the ACT.
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Your views on undergrounding 
 
We want to know your views on some undergrounding options for the ACT.  
 
First, we would like to know:  
 
• how you think undergrounding would benefit or disadvantage you; and 
• some details about your current electricity service. 
 
 
Benefits of undergrounding 
 
Do you incur costs trimming trees near overhead power lines? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you have views from your property that are affected by power lines? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Is the service line (from the pole to your house) obstructing potential development on 
your property (eg construction of a garage or swimming pool)?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
What would be the two most significant benefits to your household from 
undergrounding? (please tick two boxes) 
 
 Improved appearance and unobstructed views 
 Fewer power cuts 
 Better safety, particularly during storms and bushfires 
 Reduced tree trimming requirements and associated costs 
 Fewer restrictions on use of yard space (eg for construction of a garage or swimming 
pool) 
 Less need for ActewAGL to access your backyard 
 Other (please specify below) 
 
 
Disadvantages of undergrounding 
 
Other than cost, what would be the most significant disadvantage to your household? 
(please tick one box) 
 
 Power cuts may be longer 
 Inconvenience during undergrounding works 
 Service pillar in front of property 
 Other (please specify below) 
 
 
Overall view on undergrounding 
 
Putting cost aside, do you think undergrounding is a good idea in principle? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Your current electricity service 
 
In the next part of this questionnaire, the power cuts you would experience with your 
current overhead service will be compared to the power cuts that could occur with an 
underground service. 
 
Typical power cuts to be expected over a 5-year period with an overhead service are: 
a) 4 power cuts without warning, with an average duration of 1 hour; and 
b) 3 power cuts with written notice, with an average duration of 3 hours. 
 
Please choose how you would like your current service to be presented: 
 
 I would like my current service to be presented as the typical power cuts described 
above. 
 I would like to specify the number and duration of power cuts to be presented as my 
current service. 
 
 265 
 
[ONLY SHOW THIS PAGE IF TICKED ‘I WOULD LIKE TO SPECIFY…’ IN 
PREVIOUS QUESTION] 
 
Your current electricity service  
 
Please describe the power cuts you believe you would experience over a five-year period 
with your current overhead service. In doing so, think about instances where you are not 
at home, but you notice that digital clocks are reset. These details will be used for 
comparison with undergrounding in the next part of this questionnaire.  
 
How many power cuts without warning would there be over a 5 year period? 
 4     
 
How many power cuts with written notice would there be over a 5 year period?   
 3     
 
How long would the power cuts without warning be on average? 
 60    minutes   
 
How long would the power cuts with written notice be on average? 
 180   minutes   
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Your input 
 
There are a number of different options for undergrounding wires. Different types of 
wires, different service connections and different maintenance programs will affect both 
cost and supply reliability outcomes.  
 
This survey is seeking your input on which option, if any, should be considered for your 
suburb.  
 
In the following questions you will be presented with 4 sets of options. Each set contains 
3 options – your current service and two undergrounding options. Each option is 
described by the number and duration of power cuts and the cost to your household. 
 
In each set you will be asked to choose your preferred option. 
 
Please answer each question as though the options presented are the only ones 
available. 
 
The number and duration of power cuts vary from one option to the next. Your input will 
help ActewAGL develop a maintenance program to suit community preferences.  
 
 
How your input will be used 
 
Decisions whether to underground would generally be made at the suburb level. 
 
ActewAGL will proceed with further investigation of an undergrounding option in your 
suburb if it is preferred to the current service by more than 50% of survey respondents 
in your suburb.  
 
 267 
 
Option set 1 of 4 
 
Reminder 
 
Your two most important benefits of underground wires are: 
<insert chosen benefit 1> 
<insert chosen benefit 2> 
 
Your most important disadvantage of underground wires is: 
<insert chosen disadvantage 1> 
 
 
Please choose your preferred option using the checkboxes below. 
 
 
<choice set> 
 
 
If one of these undergrounding options were to take place in your suburb, which 
payment method would you choose? 
 Upfront (within 35 days) with 3% discount 
 Instalments (for up to 5 years) at 6.5% p.a. interest rate (with balance paid if house 
is sold) 
 
 
Please use the checkboxes in the table below to indicate the extent to which you 
considered each of the service attributes when choosing between the options in the 
‘option set’ above (please tick one box in each row). 
 
 I did not 
consider 
this at all 
I considered 
this, but it 
did not 
influence my 
choice 
This did 
influence 
my choice 
    
Type of infrastructure (underground or 
overhead) 
□ □ □ 
    
Power cuts without warning:    
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Power cuts with written notice (occurring in 
normal business hours): 
   
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Your one-off undergrounding contribution □ □ □ 
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Option set 2 of 4 
 
Reminder 
 
Your two most important benefits of underground wires are: 
<insert chosen benefit 1> 
<insert chosen benefit 2> 
 
Your most important disadvantage of underground wires is: 
<insert chosen disadvantage 1> 
 
 
Please choose your preferred option using the checkboxes below. 
 
 
<choice set> 
 
 
If one of these undergrounding options were to take place in your suburb, which 
payment method would you choose? 
 Upfront (within 35 days) with 3% discount 
 Instalments (for up to 5 years) at 6.5% p.a. interest rate (with balance paid if house 
is sold) 
 
 
Please use the checkboxes in the table below to indicate the extent to which you 
considered each of the service attributes when choosing between the options in the 
‘option set’ above (please tick one box in each row). 
 
 I did not 
consider 
this at all 
I considered 
this, but it 
did not 
influence my 
choice 
This did 
influence 
my choice 
    
Type of infrastructure (underground or 
overhead) 
□ □ □ 
    
Power cuts without warning:    
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Power cuts with written notice (occurring in 
normal business hours): 
   
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Your one-off undergrounding contribution □ □ □ 
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Option set 3 of 4 
 
Reminder 
 
Your two most important benefits of underground wires are: 
<insert chosen benefit 1> 
<insert chosen benefit 2> 
 
Your most important disadvantage of underground wires is: 
<insert chosen disadvantage 1> 
 
 
Please choose your preferred option using the checkboxes below. 
 
 
<choice set> 
 
 
If one of these undergrounding options were to take place in your suburb, which 
payment method would you choose? 
 Upfront (within 35 days) with 3% discount 
 Instalments (for up to 5 years) at 6.5% p.a. interest rate (with balance paid if house 
is sold) 
 
 
Please use the checkboxes in the table below to indicate the extent to which you 
considered each of the service attributes when choosing between the options in the 
‘option set’ above (please tick one box in each row). 
 
 I did not 
consider 
this at all 
I considered 
this, but it 
did not 
influence my 
choice 
This did 
influence 
my choice 
    
Type of infrastructure (underground or 
overhead) 
□ □ □ 
    
Power cuts without warning:    
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Power cuts with written notice (occurring in 
normal business hours): 
   
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Your one-off undergrounding contribution □ □ □ 
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Option set 4 of 4 
 
Reminder 
 
Your two most important benefits of underground wires are: 
<insert chosen benefit 1> 
<insert chosen benefit 2> 
 
Your most important disadvantage of underground wires is: 
<insert chosen disadvantage 1> 
 
 
Please choose your preferred option using the checkboxes below. 
 
 
<choice set> 
 
 
If one of these undergrounding options were to take place in your suburb, which 
payment method would you choose? 
 Upfront (within 35 days) with 3% discount 
 Instalments (for up to 5 years) at 6.5% p.a. interest rate (with balance paid if house 
is sold) 
 
 
Please use the checkboxes in the table below to indicate the extent to which you 
considered each of the service attributes when choosing between the options in the 
‘option set’ above (please tick one box in each row). 
 
 I did not 
consider 
this at all 
I considered 
this, but it 
did not 
influence my 
choice 
This did 
influence 
my choice 
    
Type of infrastructure (underground or 
overhead) 
□ □ □ 
    
Power cuts without warning:    
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Power cuts with written notice (occurring in 
normal business hours): 
   
Number of power cuts each 5 years □ □ □ 
Average duration of power cuts □ □ □ 
    
Your one-off undergrounding contribution □ □ □ 
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Thankyou for making your choices 
 
Before finishing this survey please answer the following questions about the survey and 
about yourself. 
 
Questions about how you made your choices 
 
In order to compare the options, did you add together the number of power cuts without 
warning and the number of power cuts with written notice for each option?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
In order to compare the options, did you calculate the total number of hours of power 
cuts for each option?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Were any of your later choices influenced by options you remembered from earlier 
‘option sets’ in the survey? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Were any of your choices influenced by what you think other respondents would choose? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you feel you had enough time to make the decisions asked of you? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you feel you had enough information to make the decisions asked of you? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Have you seen or heard any media stories on undergrounding in Canberra? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Demographic questions 
 
In which suburb do you live? 
 
 
What is your age? 
 18-29 
 30-39 
 40-49 
 50-64 
 65 or over 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
How many persons live in your household? 
  
 
What is the highest level of education you have obtained (so far)? 
 Less than year 10 
 Year 10 
 Year 12 
 Diploma or certificate 
 Undergraduate degree 
 Postgraduate degree 
 
Please approximate your annual household income (before tax) in 2007-08. All answers 
in this survey are strictly confidential. 
 Under $7,800 
 $7,800 - $18,199 
 $18,200 - $33,799 
 $33,800 - $51,999 
 $52,000 - $72,799 
 $72,800 - $88,399 
 $88,400 - $103,999 
 $104,000 - $129,999 
 $130,000 - $155,999 
 $156,000 - $181,999 
 $182,000 - $207,999 
 $208,000 or more 
 I don’t know 
 I don’t want to provide this information 
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Thank you 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. Your opinions are very important. 
 
If you would like to make any other comments, please use the space below. 
 
 
 
<submit button>
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<Thank you for your cooperation and comments> 
 
 
You have been automatically entered into the prize draw (ACT TP 09/01953).  
 
The prizes are: 
 
1st prize: $1500 
2nd prize: $1000 
3rd prize: $500 
 
Prize winners will be notified by email on 5 August 2009 and published in the public 
notice section of the Canberra Times on Saturday 8 August 2009. The email and notice 
will include ORIMA Research’s contact details for winners to claim their prize. Each prize 
will be in the form of a cheque made out to the named prize winner. The cheque will be 
posted to the named prize winner via registered post within two days of the prize being 
claimed. 
 
Full terms and conditions are attached to the email from ORIMA Research inviting you to 
participate in this survey. 
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Appendix D: Email invitation to stated choice 
survey 
EMAIL SUBJECT: ActewAGL Undergrounding Survey 
 
Dear <First Name>, 
 
Re: Undergrounding overhead wires in residential areas in the ACT – a 
survey of community preferences 
Recently you were telephoned and invited to participate in an online survey about 
undergrounding overhead wires in the ACT. Thank you for agreeing to participate 
in this research process. As a home owner in an area with overhead wires, you 
could be affected by decisions about undergrounding. 
What is this project about? 
We are assessing community support for replacing existing overhead wires with 
new underground wires in residential areas in the ACT.  
This research is part of a joint project between ActewAGL, the Australian 
National University (ANU) and the University of Sydney, supported by funding 
from ActewAGL and a grant from the Australian Research Council. ORIMA 
Research is assisting with the survey process. 
Why were you invited to participate in the research? 
You have been invited because you are a home owner in a residential area with 
overhead wires. Participation in this survey is purely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw at any stage.  
How will the research results by used? 
The results of this study will be reported to ActewAGL and used to assess options 
for undergrounding existing overhead wires in your suburb and other suburbs in 
Canberra. Results may be published in academic journals. However, published 
results will only report on survey responses in a grouped format. Individuals‘ 
responses will be de-identified in any publication. ORIMA Research will not 
reveal your identity to the ANU, University of Sydney or ActewAGL.  
How to complete the questionnaire? 
We invite you to click on the link below to access the web-based questionnaire.  
<insert URL here> 
On the first page of the questionnaire you will need to enter the login code 
provided below.  
<insert password here> 
The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. 
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Once you have completed and submitted the questionnaire, you will be entered 
into a prize draw. First prize is $1500, second prize is $1000 and third prize is 
$500. A maximum of 2500 respondents will be entered into the draw. Full terms 
and conditions for this draw are included below. 
Who to contact for information or clarification? 
If you have any technical problems accessing the questionnaire, please contact 
Kim Sullivan or Daniel Prior at ORIMA Research on (02) 6175 1000 or by email 
at kim.sullivan@orima.com or daniel.prior@orima.com. 
If you have any enquiries about the content of the questionnaire, please contact 
Ben McNair at the ANU by email at ben.mcnair@anu.edu.au. 
If you have any concerns regarding the way in which this survey was conducted, 
please contact the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee on (02) 6125 7945 or 
by email at Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Kim Sullivan 
 
Kim Sullivan 
Senior Research Consultant 
ORIMA Research Pty Ltd 
CANBERRA |MELBOURNE 
Ground Floor, 2 Brindabella Circuit 
Brindabella Business Park 
CANBERRA AIRPORT ACT 2609 
T: 02 6175 1000 
www.orima.com 
 
Competition terms and conditions TP 09/01953: Win up to 
$1500 by completing an online questionnaire 
1. To be eligible to enter and win up to $1500 participants must complete and 
submit an online questionnaire, comprising up to 40 questions. A link to the 
questionnaire will be sent by email by ORIMA Research Pty Ltd to persons 
who have agreed to participate in a research survey conducted on behalf of 
the promoter. 
2. Participants will be automatically entered into the prize draw once they have 
completed and submitted the online questionnaire. The online questionnaire 
must be fully completed and submitted between 9:00am 15 June 2009 and 
5:00pm 10 July 2009.  Incomplete questionnaires cannot be submitted and 
will not be entered into the draw. 
3. The prizes are 
 1st prize: $1500 
 2nd prize: $1000 
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 3rd prize: $500 
 Total prizes:   $3,000 including GST. 
4. Each prize will be in the form of a cheque made out to the named prize 
winner. The cheque will be posted to the named prize winner via registered 
post within two days of the prize being claimed. 
5. The prize draw will involve the generation of a random number by computer 
for each entry received. 1
st
 prize will be awarded to the entry with the lowest 
number, 2
nd
 prize will be awarded to the entry with the second lowest 
number and the 3
rd
 prize will be awarded to the third lowest number. 
6. The winners will be drawn on 3 August 2009 at 10am at the ORIMA 
Research offices, Ground Floor, 2 Brindabella Cct, Canberra Airport ACT 
2609. 
7. Prize winners will be notified by email two days after the draw and 
published in the public notice section of the Canberra Times on Saturday 8 
August 2009. The email and notice will include ORIMA Research‘s contact 
details for winners to claim their prize. 
8. In the case of an ineligible participant being drawn as the winner, a re-draw 
will take place immediately. 
9. Except as expressly provided by these terms and conditions, the prize is not 
transferable, not exchangeable and cannot be redeemed as cash. 
10. In the event that a prize is unclaimed, a redraw will take place at 10am on 9 
November at  ORIMA Research offices, Ground Floor, 2 Brindabella Cct, 
Canberra Airport ACT 2609 
11. The promoter is ActewAGL Distribution ABN 76 670 568 688, a 
partnership of ACTEW Distribution ABN 83 073 025 224 and Jemena 
Networks (ACT) Pty Ltd ABN 24 008 552 663 and is being administered by 
ORIMA Research Pty Ltd ABN 77 076 347 914. 
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